《清华法治论衡》第十三辑：环境法：挑战与应对，高鸿钧、王明远主编，清华大学出版社2010年6月。

购买本书：卓越网；当当网。

目 录 [PDF]

卷首语 寓言与预言：天·地·人 [PDF]

主题论文

生态法学方法论的要点
对中国环境法的反思
经济学理论与环境法
论环境法的思想根据
动物权利的伦理基础
树应该有诉讼资格吗?——迈向自然物的法律权利
气候变化利益格局及应对机制
应对全球性环境问题的困境与出路：自治还是他治?
国际环境法之立法理念
美国可再生能源配额制及其启示——基于得克萨斯州的经验分析
气候变化互动机制评鉴——以美国联邦与州政府间的互动为例展开
论环境法上的环境侵权——兼论《侵权责任法(草案)》的完善
对松花江重大水污染事件可能引发跨界污染
损害赔偿诉讼的思考
守法的困境：企业为什么选择环境违法?
论环境管理失效的制度原因
节能减排的法律对策思考
绿色专利——应对气候变化的技术创新制度

法治纵论

民事第三审的反思与建构——从“问题”到制度的分析
王权政治与英国法院的发展——以普通法法院和衡平法法院为参照
洗钱犯罪中的上游犯罪和自洗钱研究

法苑品茗

环境法的正当性探源——《环境法的哲学基础：财产、权利与自然》介评
经济发展之生态回归——评《寂静的春天》
民主：扼住司法审查之喉?——评桑斯坦的《就事论事》

资讯漫笔

“环境法治的拷问与省思”研讨会纪要
环境法学，什么是你的贡献?
狂欢还是规训?——话说“人肉搜索”

编后记 [PDF]

大凡经典，都有层出不穷的译本，《新约》尤甚。究其原因，大致有三。一是学术在进步，二十世纪中叶以降巴勒斯坦和近东地区一系列重要的考古发现，犹太教同早期基督教伪经及各派“异端”文献的解读，极大地丰富了学界对耶稣时代的宗教思想、政治、法律、经济、社会体制和物质文明的了解。《新约》各篇的许多译名、词语源流、人物史实乃至教义，都有了新的考释。前人的译本，从学术角度看，就需要修订甚而重起炉灶，推陈出新了。

其次是语言即读者母语的变迁。旧译之让人感觉“旧”，一半是由于译文的语汇表达，跟读者的社会语言习惯和文学标准——广义的文学，包括形象化的宗教思想与道德感情表述——有了距离，变得不好懂了，容易误会，对不上经文的原意。因此，旧译的订正、翻新，往往又是不得已的事。而且，译文既是原著的一时一地的解释，时间便是译本的死亡天使，再怎么忠实顺畅也逃脱不了——除非译作有幸加入母语文学之林，脱离原著而自成一间文字殿堂，门楣上涂了天才的血，深夜大地哀哭之际，那专取头生子性命的毁灭者才会逾越不入（《出埃及记》12:23）。当然，这是在讲译家的理想了（详见拙著《宽宽信箱与出埃及记》，页79以下）。

第三，西方资本主义消费社会的建立，全球化经济体制和文化输出，催生了文化多元、价值开放、包容异见异端的大潮。从前传统社会，宗教或宗法信条是道德的基础；可是从启蒙开始，进入现代资本主义，如康德所言，两者颠倒了关系，道德反而成了宗教的基础。当今道德立场的多元趋势，就不免颠覆一部分传统价值，影响到人们对经文的诠解和运用。不仅学术译本，连较为保守的传教或“牧灵”译本也受了压力。例如，英文“新国际本”（NIV，1978）是美国新教保守派阵营的传教译本。原是针对钦定本的“修订标准本”（RSV，1952）的自由派倾向，组织教会的专家班子翻译的，为的是捍卫经文“无错”（inerrant）的信条，坚守新教传统教义。可是，不久前新闻报道，新国际本也在修订，且专家班子已开会决定，采纳“两性包容”原则，学一些跨教派学术译本如“新修订标准本”（NRSV，1990）的榜样，把没有必要，但可能理解为，仅指男性而排斥女性的经文一律改掉。例如阳性单数第三人称代词“他”（he, his, him），改成不分性别的复数“他们”（they, their, them），或代之以无性别色彩的名词。试想，这得改动多少句子，从摩西的诫命到保罗的规劝；又是多大的传教“牧灵”压力，才会让主事者向美国社会的主流意识形态和“政治正确”妥协，变相放弃经文“无错”的信条？

顺便说一句，相较之下，中文的“他”远没有英文那么硬性，用法也活得多，常能兼容男女两性，或者泛指、虚指（如睡他一觉），还可以用作指示代词（他人、他乡）。中文表达，在好些方面，确实跟古典希伯来语和《新约》的希腊语普通话（koine）有相通之处；就文字的简洁含蓄与灵动而言，甚而十分相似。这是现代英译，尤其学院派的造句修辞（因译者多数是大学教授）所无法比拟的。

中文《新约》不时需要修订和重译，也不外乎这几条道理。不过具体到旧译的诸多困难，似可拈出以下几点略作剖析。

旧译的成就，以新教和合本（1919）为最高，堪称几代英美传教士在华译经的“天鹅之歌”（见拙译《摩西五经》前言）。然而和合本的舛误极多，且被之后的白话译本大量继承，如思高本（1968）、吕振中本（1970）等，给读者造成不少困惑，亟需纠正。比如，近东名物每每误译：海枣（椰枣）作棕榈，毒麦作稗子，提灯作灯笼。犹大领来抓耶稣的一营士兵和差役，居然“拿着灯笼”（和合本《约翰福音》18:3），纯如国产古装大片里的场面。动词更是错得离谱：迫害作逼迫，记住/挂念作记念，惊愕/惊讶作希奇。有个百夫长爱仆病重，恳请耶稣救治；他虽是外族，却非常虔敬，耶稣听了他的信仰表白“就希奇”（和合本《路加福音》7:9），仿佛太阳下真有什么新事，让降神迹的人子少见多怪了。

有鉴于此，本卷夹注在简短的释义、重要的异文异读之外，择要举出旧译一些典型的舛讹及语病，以和合本为主，兼及思高本。例如《马太福音》五章，耶稣登山训众，第一句“福哉，苦灵的人”，夹注：“苦灵，喻（甘愿）贫贱。旧译虚心、神贫，误”。分别指和合本、思高本的误译。希伯来传统，“灵”（ruah，希腊语：pneuma）指人的生命之气、整个的人、精神、灵魂；“苦灵”（ptochoi to pneumati），实际是一句希伯来/亚兰语习语——耶稣与门徒百姓讲亚兰语，故福音书所载非耶稣原话，而是经后人整理编辑，译成希腊文的数个版本——指人在精神上或整个的人甘愿贫贱；绝不是要人“虚心”行事（谦虚），或安于“神贫”（精神贫乏）的状态。耶稣以举扬贫苦人为“九福”之首，否定传统偏见，指明了他的天国福音的一个核心理念。

再如，耶稣被捕前同门徒一起吃逾越节晚餐，席间他告诉众人：你们当中有一个要把我交出去。门徒们又悲又恼，一个接一个问他：不是我，对吧？出卖老师的犹大也说：不是我，对吧，拉比？耶稣的回答，若依照和合本的译法，“你说的是”（《马太福音》26:25），即是同意犹大，自相矛盾了。其实这句话（sy eipas）也是亚兰语习语，直译如钦定本：Thou hast said，你说了，“你”（sy）字重读；通常用来表示事实不容否定，委婉拒绝对方的想法，暗示其错误，相当于汉语“那是你说的”。正如后来罗马总督彼拉多审讯耶稣时，问他：你是犹太人的王，是吗？耶稣又这么回答：“那是你说的”（sy legeis，同上，27:11）。暗示自己并非要称王作乱，反抗罗马；基督的国不属今世，乃是在天上。旧译“你说的是”，却成了人子招供，承认耶路撒冷祭司当局的指控和捏造的罪名；而彼拉多把他当作罗马的敌人钉十字架处死，就是合法的了。

有趣的是，旧译有个别关键术语的误译，按学术标准不足取，却可能不是疏忽，而是传教士的刻意选择。例如，和合本将“言”（logos，钦定本：word）译作“道”：“太初有道”（《约翰福音》1:1）。无论讲本义、转喻，还是阐发传统教义，这“道”都是误译。希腊语“言”的动词（lego）本义，有收集、安排、挑选的意思（荷马史诗的用法），言说在希腊传统，便蕴含着思辨、理智、启示、精神追求，故而可以用来指称人格化的不朽不灭的神性。这一用法恰好跟希伯来语《圣经》里“言”（dabar）的一些义项吻合。后者不仅指言说的内容，也指言说行为及其后果。所谓“创世之言”或“圣言”，并非只是《创世记》一章记载的那几句话（“上帝说”），它着重的是至高者的大能、一言创世，及延续至今而达于万代的救世宏图：圣言乃是人类作为受造之物的道德与信仰依据，拯救的预定同保证。故在希伯来智慧文学中，又把它描写为参与创世的大智慧（hokmah，七十士本：sophia），赋予人格化的诗意的形象（《箴言》8:12-31，次经《德训篇》24章）。耶稣时代的犹太哲人，如亚历山大城的菲罗（Philo of Alexandria），对此多有阐述。这些，都不是植根于中国哲学的传统术语“道”所能涵盖的。所以，为准确理解计，还是直译作“言”较好；能够提醒读者注意外来的宗教思想和表达。

然而，和合本不仅把“言”改作“道”，还进一步，有选择地把另外三个重要术语“道/路”（hodos）、“真理”（aletheia）与“信仰”（pistis），也译作了“道”或“真道”（《雅各书》3:14，《迦拉太书》1:23，《提摩太前书》1:19）。跟希伯来语经文的用法一样，《新约》中的“道”，除了本义道路，还可转指人的精神生活方向、道德准则、上帝之道等。基督的会众便美称为“道”（《使徒行传》19:23，22:4），信徒则叫“入道之人”（同上，9:2）。而和合本将圣言、耶稣之言（即福音）跟信仰、真理合并，归在“道”之下，就从根本上修正了教义。这恐怕不是一时的草率。

我对清末民初的传教史没有研究。这儿仅指出旧译在若干核心术语上的混淆。但为什么传教士译者要引入“道”，这样一个传统中国哲学与宗教术语，不惜曲解经文改造教义，一定是有着现实的考虑或传教经验支持的。不管动机如何，这一选择的历史意义是深远的。因为，加上其他一些重要术语有意无意的误译，如“信仰”也译作“信心”——强调立信皈依基于心愿，而淡化预定论和选民观念——新教的传布，就有了鲜明的“中国特色”；殊可视为基督教中国化的一项成果。因此，虽然以学术要求衡量，我们把此类曲解混淆列为误译，就传教策略跟教派发展而言，却显示了传教士的注重实际、善于妥协。我以为，在这宗教复兴的时代，和合本等中文旧译对基督教核心术语同教义的改造，是特别值得研究的。而且可以预见，随着中国社会开始伦理重建，民族自信心日渐提高，包括基督教在内的本土宗教思想，会有更为多元的发展，甚至产生新的宗派，一如历史上佛教在中土的流布。到那时，一些关键术语的改造创新，便很可能再次成为传道者的选择。换言之，传教“牧灵”的译经，若能扬弃学术之道，由“误译”生发新枝，将是基督教中国化的必由之路的一个标识。

拙译依据的底本，《新约》用德国斯图加特版Nestle-Aland汇校本第二十七版（NTG，1993），夹注以“原文”称之；希伯来语《圣经》（旧约）则取斯图加特版Kittel-Kahle-Elliger-Rudolph传统本第五版（BHS，1997）。详见参考书目。

本卷的体例与前两卷相同。希腊文、希伯来文语词，皆用拉丁字母转写，略长短音和部分软音符号；词源语音的演化方向，则以“>”表示。但正文里添了三个提示符号，说明如下：

圆括弧内，是汇校本正文采用的读法或诸抄本所载异文。例：《马太福音》3:16，耶稣受洗完毕，从水里上来，“忽然，诸天（为他）开了”。“为他”（auto）二字，西奈山抄本和梵蒂冈抄本脱，但其他主要抄本都有，故汇校本采用，拙译从之。

方括弧内，是原文省略，但中文必须写明才好理解的文字，包括所有原文没有而译文补入的圣名（上帝、耶稣、基督等）。例：《使徒行传》17:26，“他从一[人]造出万族”。原文无“人”字，圣杰罗姆拉丁语通行本直译：ex uno，从一。不好懂。故后世西方抄本多写作“一血”，路德本、钦定本从之。古人认为，血孕育生命，属上帝。人，指人祖亚当，据《申命记》32:8；或作族、祖先（如新修订标准本），亦通。参较和合本：“他从一本造出万族的人”，费解。

星号“*”表示存疑，即所标记的经文不见于早期抄本、善本与译本，往往也未有早期教父引用，加之语言特征思想观点同上下文迥异，学界通说属于后人增补。如《马可福音》16:9-20，所谓“长结尾”；《约翰福音》7:53-8:11，“淫妇”的故事。《马可福音》原来的结尾突兀：塔城的玛丽娅等三人买了膏遗体的香料，赶来墓窟，却遇上一个穿白袍的年轻人（天使）。后者说耶稣复活了，要她们转告彼得和众门徒。她们“吓晕了”，“谁也没敢告诉，因为害怕”（16:8）。完。似乎叙述被打断了，抄本脱落一叶。后人遂参照《马太福音》等的描写，补了一短一长两种结尾。拙译从通例，取长结尾，标以星号。“淫妇”的故事，则是一则脍炙人口的寓言，但早期抄本与基督教成为罗马帝国官方宗教之前的教父文献皆不载；或录自口传的福音传统。该传统源远流长，一直延续到中世纪末期，包括阿拉伯语和伊斯兰世界流传的无数充满智慧的耶稣福音（参见哈里迪《穆斯林耶稣》，2001）。

前两卷面世以来，收到许多读者和信友的电邮，提问、商榷、谈心得或祝祷，于我都是极大的勉励，在此一并致谢。还要谢谢清华大学“法律与宗教”班的同学，跟我一块儿探讨经文律法，研究宗教伦理信仰和现代政法体制的依存与矛盾关系。而能够顺利开展这一领域的教学，则须感谢清华同仁的关爱，并江阴孙志华君的鼎力支持。

和往常一样，内子担任第一读者，在初稿上画杠杠打钩钩，提出疑问和详细的修改意见，不放过一个字，一个标点。我愿人人读经顶真若此。

这本书献给书生。我不知道，一个卑贱者走失，他是第几次被凯撒的法定罪，归于忤逆之列（《以赛亚书》53:12，《路加福音》22:37）。但哀牢见证，有人铭记，将近四十年前那一段同为“苦灵”而蒙福的日子。因为，那福藉着这言，已彰示。

二〇一〇年三月于麻省新伯利港铁盆斋，原载《书城》8/2010

冯象：《宽宽信箱与出埃及记》，北京三联书店，2007。
哈里迪（Tarif Khalidi）（译注）：《穆斯林耶稣》（The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories in Islamic Literature），哈佛大学出版社，2001。

福哉，苦灵的人——《新约》前言

相关链接：《摩西五经》、《智慧书》。

来源：魏武辉的blog，欢迎更多的朋友加入这份电子杂志的编辑或作者，具体方法参加杂志附录部分。

The Ideological Origins of American Federalism, by Alison LaCroix. Harvard University Press 2010.

Book Description

Federalism is regarded as one of the signal American contributions to modern politics. Its origins are typically traced to the drafting of the Constitution, but the story began decades before the delegates met in Philadelphia.

In this groundbreaking book, Alison LaCroix traces the history of American federal thought from its colonial beginnings in scattered provincial responses to British assertions of authority, to its emergence in the late eighteenth century as a normative theory of multilayered government. The core of this new federal ideology was a belief that multiple independent levels of government could legitimately exist within a single polity, and that such an arrangement was not a defect but a virtue. This belief became a foundational principle and aspiration of the American political enterprise. LaCroix thus challenges the traditional account of republican ideology as the single dominant framework for eighteenth-century American political thought. Understanding the emerging federal ideology returns constitutional thought to the central place that it occupied for the founders. Federalism was not a necessary adaptation to make an already designed system work; it was the system.

Connecting the colonial, revolutionary, founding, and early national periods in one story reveals the fundamental reconfigurations of legal and political power that accompanied the formation of the United States. The emergence of American federalism should be understood as a critical ideological development of the period, and this book is essential reading for everyone interested in the American story.

Review

“LaCroix’s great achievement is to show that American federalism has an intellectual pedigree: it was not simply an ad hoc institutional arrangement, a bundle of compromises, or a codification of colonial experience in the British Empire. Instead, revolutionaries theorized their way to federalism. This is an important book that will change the way we think about the American founding. ”—Peter S. Onuf, University of Virginia

“Where did American federalism come from? Although federalism’s roots in the institutional practices and structures of the early modern British Empire are well known, we have long needed a history of federalism as a legal and intellectual concept. Thanks to Alison LaCroix’s splendid book, that wait is over. ”—Eliga H. Gould, University of New Hampshire

About the Author

Alison L. LaCroix is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

CHARLIE ROSE: Joseph Stiglitz is here. He served as one of President Clinton’s top advisors and as chief economist at the World Bank. Today, he’s advising the Greek government as it faces a debt crisis that has rattled the European markets. Earlier in his career he was part of a team that won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001.

His new book is called “Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.” In this he writes that he fears the country faces a far longer and deeper recession with a financial system that is more vulnerable to another crisis.

Give me a sense of where you think we are.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, we’ve been brought back from the brink, but we’re not out of the woods. And let me tell you why I think we are still in a — you might say a precarious position.

While growth is starting to resume, it’s not likely to be sustained. It’s likely to get much weaker. But the core problems are two. First, a very high level of unemployment. More than one out of six Americans would like a full-time job and can’t get it. This includes people who have jobs but are working part time, can’t get a real job.

And 40 percent, more than 40 percent of those who are unemployed today are long-term unemployed, unemployed for more than six months. That’s so important because the longer you’re unemployed, you drain your cash reserves.

And particularly for young people, a period of should be building up skills, those skills, their training becomes weakened. And we know from previous downturns in the United States and elsewhere that young people who have experienced, or other people who’ve experience protracted periods of unemployment are much harder to bring back into the labor force. And when they do, their wages are markedly lower.

And then there’s the problem with the foreclosure, which is what started the crisis in the first place. The pace of foreclosures is expected to be higher in 2010 than in 2008 and ‘09. We’ve done nothing about the — almost nothing about the underwater mortgages where they owe more money than —

CHARLIE ROSE: Than the house is worth.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — than the house is worth. And more than 25 percent of those with mortgages are now underwater.

Now, there’s some additional problems that we’re about to face. Commercial real estate, about a half trillion dollars commercial real estate has to be rolled over.

CHARLIE ROSE: We have loans that are coming due, and they’ve got to —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — be rolled over somehow. Many of those are underwater. Many of those are securitized, and those are very difficult to roll over.

In the old days where you had conventional banking, the banks might have rolled them over holding their nose and closing their eyes in the view that — with the view that maybe with luck somewhere down the road things will get better.

Bank examiners, supervisors, are less willing to engage in what’s called forbearance because they’ve been very criticized for having not done their job in the last five years. And with securitization, it’s almost impossible to roll over these underwater mortgages.

The first of these problems came to the fore in the bankruptcy of Cifizen. And that was a multiple dollar failure.

CHARLIE ROSE: By one of the most reputable land development and real estate firms in the city of New York, and then when it came time to pay the loan, they couldn’t do it.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And that’s symptomatic of what we’re about to see over and over again.

Two more problems, if you’re not feeling bad enough. The states have a shortfall of about

CHARLIE ROSE: The states?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The states — of $200 billion a year in revenues, down from what it would normally be because of the recession. And the states — many of the states depend very heavily on property taxes. The states have balanced budget frameworks, which means that when the revenues go down, they either have to cut expenditures or raise taxes. That’s equivalent to a negative stimulus.

And so far the federal government’s been picking up about a third of that gap, but with the stimulus coming to an end in 2011, the question is, what will happen.

I just came back from California where you see the future, in a way — teachers, university professors on furlough two days a month on the way to being laid off. And, you know, a whole set of problems in a number of other states.

So these are among the sort of clouds hanging on the horizon —

CHARLIE ROSE: And so therefore you believe the consequences of all these things are?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That the economy will not be able to sustain the growth that we’ve seen in the last two quarters. There will be a marked slowdown, possibly into actually a double dip, which is another recession.

But the bottom line is for what most people care about, jobs, growth will be too slow to provide new jobs for the new entrants in the labor force, and certainly too slow reduce the unemployment from the very high level that it is.

So it’s going to be a lot of stress both in the labor market and the housing market unless we do something more than we’ve been doing.

CHARLIE ROSE: And what would that be?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that comes to the view, I think we need a second stimulus. We need a large second stimulus. A lot of deficit hawks are around there saying we can’t afford it. And I would say we can’t afford not to do it. And, you know —

CHARLIE ROSE: You have to put people to work first and then you can worry about the deficit.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Moreover, it was the shortsightedness of the banks that got us into this trouble. We ought to be looking not at the deficit but the long-term debt.

If we take — if a large fraction of this money goes into investments — education, technology, infrastructure — and we under-invested in the all these areas for years, all we need is a return of about five percent or six percent, and then we get more tax revenue from the growth in the short run, we get more tax revenue from the growth in the long run from these productive investments, and our long-term national debt will be lower as a result of running a deficit today.

And that’s what we should be focusing on.

CHARLIE ROSE: What size stimulus are you talking about?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the way I like to think about it is the size ought to be appropriate for the depth of the downturn. So, for instance, one of the key pieces of what I’ve been calling for is making up for the shortfall in revenues of the states.

So right now that shortfall is about $200 billion. If our economy remains weak, we’re going to have to make up for that. If the economy recovers, then the amount of money we have to put in would be that much less.

And if I were an optimist I would say it’s going to recover, but I don’t know, and I’m a little bit of a pessimist seeing the kinds of problems that we face.

CHARLIE ROSE: Some argue that we should have had a much larger stimulus — Paul Krugman for example. You’re in the same camp.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. That’s one of the points I said in “Freefall.” And even the president’s chairman of the council of economic advisors is said to have —

CHARLIE ROSE: Christina Romer.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Christina Romer said we needed $1.2 trillion. And what we’ve seen since then has been very clear they were optimistic about where we were going.

And it’s a really important point here. The stimulus has worked. A lot of people have looked and said unemployment has gone up and that proves the stimulus hasn’t worked. No, the stimulus worked. But if we hadn’t had the stimulus we would have had, say, 12 percent unemployment instead of 10 percent.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, but then they argue you could have designed a better stimulus.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. Again, something I say in my book. Clearly we could have done it. The big mistake we made was the tax cut. We knew from the experiment we did in February, 2008, the Bush tax cut, with the overhang of debt and with the uncertainty in the job market people would save a large fraction.

It makes them feel good, it’s important for their sense of well-being, but the nature of a stimulus is it has to stimulate. That means you have to have spending. And so a very large fraction of Americans have saved a significant part of that stimulus.

The other part that I think was a mistake was we didn’t give enough aid to the states in the way I described. And so you have this picture across the United States while the government — the federal government is putting money in, they’re contracting.

CHARLIE ROSE: Here’s what I don’t understand. Larry Summers early on — and I realize you and Larry have had —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Discussions.

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: Discussions, yes, have had intense discussions — said early on “timely, temporary, targeted” for stimulus. So that idea was out there. Were these targeted?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They were reasonably targeted, but not as targeted as they should have been.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK. You would have spent more money on jobs that would really train people for the future?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. And — that’s a long-run vision — and a recognition of the problem of the states that I talked about. And that is a way of putting money into the banks of the economy very quickly without creating a new bureaucracy because if you don’t put the money there they have to lay off workers.

And in a recession is exactly time that there’s so many demands. And people — young people who can’t get a job want a place in a university. They want to be able to at least build up their skills.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And the universities are contracting. It just doesn’t make any sense.

CHARLIE ROSE: I hear time and time again that the president made a mistake when he said we’re going to engage with the stimulus program and in other programs — education, climate change, and health care, that he should have said the issue is jobs, jobs, jobs. Do you buy that argument?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Not really, because the problem wasn’t lack of focus. The problem was a program that was not as strong as it should have been.

CHARLIE ROSE: Because of congress?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: One interpretation was a judgment about political feasibility. And my view on that was that if you compromise too much early and it turns out that you need more money later on, it would be difficult for you to accomplish what you really wanted. And that’s exactly the situation we’re now in, because it is now clear that we need a second stimulus, and many people are saying the stimulus didn’t work. So that was a political judgment that I think may have been flawed.

The second argument for why not enough was done in the area of mortgages and the banks, or not the right thing done in the area of mortgages and banks, was the influence of the financial sector that had gotten us into the trouble in the first place.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’re talking about the TARP program and the bank bailouts and the bailout of General Motors and Chrysler?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, and in particular — for instance, one of the — a lot of people said why don’t you give more money to homeowners so that they can restructure their mortgages. Let’s have trickle-up economics.

CHARLIE ROSE: My impression is that banks are modifying mortgages. Am I completely wrong about that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Very little.

CHARLIE ROSE: So it’s a good idea — they claim they’re doing it, but they’re not doing it enough?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And there’s one category which is a very important, the most important category where it’s almost not happening at all, and that’s the underwater mortgages. The one in four mortgages where they owe more money —

CHARLIE ROSE: Than the house is worth. What should be done about that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, what I advocate is what I call a “homeowners’ chapter 11.” And chapter 11 is a provision of our bankruptcy code that allows a restructuring of debt that says that if you owe more money than the company is worth, you convert bondholders into shareholders, and the shareholders get wiped out.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is your voice heard in the White House because of the tension that has existed in your relationship with Larry Summers?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I don’t think that’s the issue at all. I think there was —

CHARLIE ROSE: What’s the issue?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The issue is the influence of the financial markets, of the people who at first succeed in getting deregulation.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Then succeed in getting —

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, but let’s talk about it specifically. The people — are you talking about Larry Summers now who, because of his influence has — within the treasury with Bob Rubin — were able to get deregulation, were able to get Glass-Steagall repealed? Is that what we’re talking about?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s part of what we’re talking about. But it’s more pervasive than that, because it’s not only that they succeeded in getting this deregulation, you know, preventing regulation of the derivative, which the derivatives are what led to the problem at AIG, which cost American taxpayers so much money.

CHARLIE ROSE: And who was the woman that was surging them and trying to warn them?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Bjorn (ph), and she had said before the long-term capital management debacle —

CHARLIE ROSE: This was a debacle a number of years earlier.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That was back in 1998. The failure of one firm threatened to bring down the whole global financial market.

CHARLIE ROSE: And that was early warning.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That was an early warning. She said it before. She said after that, how can you doubt that? And yet they succeeded in not only not having the regulation but passing a law saying you could not regulate it.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have been much tougher than you are being here. You have said, for example, that Larry Summers and the Obama team are in the pockets of the banks and they need new faces who have no vested interest in the past.

You’re basically saying they came with a mindset to the Obama administration that was sort of — we want to make sure we take care of Wall Street so that when the time came and the crunch came and the emergency came they were not prepared for the kind of solutions that you believed were the right solution for the right moment.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. It’s a mindset —

CHARLIE ROSE: What’s the mindset?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, it’s the mindset that began with saying markets always work.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And that Adam Smith’s idea that the invisible hand, the pursuit of self-interests would lead —

CHARLIE ROSE: So you’re saying there was no difference in their attitude about market than was, say, Alan Greenspan?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. There was a picture on “Time” that described the three of them as “The Committee to Save the World.” And the fact is they approached the problems of regulation and managing the monetary system in a very —

CHARLIE ROSE: Are we talking about Summers, Rubin, and Greenspan, or are we talking about whom?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that group, but there were others.

One of the things I think is important in this area is not just to focus on individuals but to focus on ideas, and these ideas were very pervasive.

One of my concerns has been not only did they bring in, in some sense, the wrong mindset but because they were so closely affiliated with the mistakes of the past, it would be very difficult to get confidence.

CHARLIE ROSE: With great respect for a Nobel laureate, some might argue that Joe Stiglitz is a little bit outside and he’s screaming a bit because those guys were brought inside and he wasn’t.

And he had a Nobel Prize, experience at the World Bank, and had written a number of books and was, you know, a distinguished professor. So therefore he had all the credentials to be on the inside and he wasn’t, and they were. So now he’s saying those guys had a mindset that prevented them from fixing the problem.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, I really didn’t want to go inside. I had been through that experience. It was a very exciting time.

CHARLIE ROSE: For Clinton.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Under President Clinton. It was a very exciting time.

CHARLIE ROSE: With Bob Rubin.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: We often differed. I opposed the repeal of Glass-Steagall, he supported it.

But what has disturbed me is that others like Paul Volcker have been very — who share many of the same views, have been very — their views have been very reluctant to be heard.

CHARLIE ROSE: But they are heard now.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They are being heard, and that’s what I feel much better about.

CHARLIE ROSE: But being heard on one question, the big question of financial reform and the need for new kinds of regulation.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. And even that is not as much as I would — I think is necessary.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: We’re about a third of the way.

CHARLIE ROSE: What will be the two-thirds that are missing?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, for instance, Volcker has focused a great deal on making sure that the depository institutions, commercial banks, do not engage in proprietary trading, that they’re not too big to fail.

CHARLIE ROSE: That they don’t have hedge funds or private equity firms.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. I’ve also been concerned that you can have too big to fail institutions that are not deposit-taking institutions — investment banks, that once you separate the two, you can still —

CHARLIE ROSE: But he seems to be arguing to me and others that there’s no such thing as too big to fail if, in fact, you’re not a depository institution.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. And that’s where, I think, we differ.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, that’s one place you differ.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And so, for instance, we wound up bailing out AIG and we bailed out —

CHARLIE ROSE: Should we have bailed out AIG or should we — what was the alternative?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The alternative was to say let it go and if —

CHARLIE ROSE: What does “let it go” mean?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Let it go bankrupt.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And if some parts of our financial institutions have problems, need money, like Goldman Sachs, then give them money — not give them money, lend then money in a way that will get back —

CHARLIE ROSE: In the same way they did with Citigroup? You lend them money for a piece of the equity, or just lend them money —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: One of my criticisms is that when you give them money, you get back appropriate compensation. So the form would have been such as something like Warren Buffett. When he gave money to Goldman Sachs he got back warrants and preferred shares.

CHARLIE ROSE: And a 10 percent return.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And a very high return. And so we should have done just as well as Warren Buffett. Why can’t we negotiate terms — that was an arm’s length deal not affected by politics.

CHARLIE ROSE: So in other words, the United States government should have been a Warren Buffett negotiating the deals it made with commercial institutions, with financial institutions that were in trouble.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. And other countries have done a better job in providing money to their banks and getting back value than the United States. So that’s what we should have done there.

Another area that we need to do something about is do more in breaking up the too big to fail banks. I think, you know, the notion that these too big to fail banks can be trusted in any way seems to be — you know, the one thing economists agree on is that incentives matter. And if you have an incentive to engage in excessive risk taking, you will.

And the question there is whether the failure of this institution engaging in financial activities would send significant ripples through the economy that anybody could say to us if you don’t save that institution it will have sufficient consequences through the financial system.

You know, there are other set of issues with General Motors for jobs —

CHARLIE ROSE: And how do you measure that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that’s not an easy question, but there are models that can look at what happens if you pull out one institution out of the financial web. One of the big advances in recent years in research, particularly the Bank of England, have been to look at these networks of financial interdependence. Some of my own research is actually focused on exactly that kind of question.

CHARLIE ROSE: I think government of the Bank of England, Mervin King — is that his name?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is in favor of breaking up the banks.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, he says, and I agree, if you’re too big to fail you’re too big to be.

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: And you buy that.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I buy that.

CHARLIE ROSE: Universal banks is not by definition a bad idea, is it?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I think what you have to look at in the context of the American economy are the costs versus the benefits.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There are some benefits, but what we’ve seen are the costs far outweigh those benefits.

An important point to remember is the services that they provide won’t disappear. They will be provided, but organized differently.

CHARLIE ROSE: And more efficiently.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And I think more efficiently.

And the point is right now we can’t — the big banks are effectively subsidized and they have a competitive advantage not based on greater efficiency, but the fact is that because everybody knows they’re too big to fail they can get capital at a lower interest rate, and that gives them a big advantage over every smaller institution.

CHARLIE ROSE: You believe that the American capitalist system should look much more like the European Scandinavian model, which is sometimes called “capitalism with a human face.”

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right.

CHARLIE ROSE: What do you mean?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There are a couple of dimensions of this. One is we have to recognize that we need to get a balance between the market and the government. And the government plays an important role not just in restraining bad behavior but also promoting innovation. The Internet, which has transformed our society, was financed by —

CHARLIE ROSE: By the government.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: By the government.

CHARLIE ROSE: The Pentagon, in fact.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The revolutions in biology that are extending our lives begin with basic research that is funded by the government. So that —

CHARLIE ROSE: And done at the university level and at NIH and wherever.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: So that gives you an important constructive role for government.

CHARLIE ROSE: But we already do that, don’t we?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: But part of the debate is the extent to which we do it. Part of the debate is the extent to which we — the role of the government in restraining the bad behavior, the regulation that we talked about in the financial sector.

So that’s part of our debate. And then the other part of the debate is the extent of social protections that you provide.

CHARLIE ROSE: The safety net.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The safety net. And that —

CHARLIE ROSE: So therefore has France — being exhibit one — been better off in the economic crisis than we have because they had more influence of the state in their economy and had a firmer safety net?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, both France and Germany have — you know, they’ve been very badly hit, but on the other hand, the amount of suffering of the individuals has not been as bad.

I’ll give you one example. One of the things that we’re now — a number of places are beginning to imitate in the United States is where they put people into part-time work so that they share the work. They’ve recognized the system isn’t working well, and that rather than having, as the United States, one out of six Americans — one out of ten Americans who can’t get a job, what they’re doing is sharing the work more broadly.

CHARLIE ROSE: All right, let me just continue down this. You suggest that capitalism has some moral failings.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: An example, for instance, was in the financial market the —

CHARLIE ROSE: “Moral depravity of the financial sector,” I think, is the term you used.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. And the example I give is the discovery that was made a few years ago that there was money at the bottom of the pyramid and they did everything they could to move that money from the bottom of the pyramid to the top, including predatory lending, the credit card abuses.

The point I was making here was that, well, one of the criticisms — and I think a justified criticism — of the financial sector was that it didn’t manage risk-taking well. It didn’t allocate capital to where it was best used. But it went beyond that.

CHARLIE ROSE: But when you get to that point, that’s where people in the financial community come back, push back to you and others, and Paul Volcker as well.

They’re saying the kind of financial reform you’re talking about, too big to fail and all that was not the problem. The problem was leverage and risk and the capital requirements. If those had been enforced you wouldn’t have had the problem. And you’re not going to solve the problem, they argue, by some elimination of proprietary trading.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There’s no single thing that is going to solve this kind of problem.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right, the potential of another crisis.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Of another crisis. I agree absolutely we have to do something about leverage. You have to do something about hidden leverage, which was part of what the credit default swaps were all about. So I agree with them on that.

But conflicts of interest are what caused problems. The conflicts of interest were en route of the Enron, World.com scandals.

CHARLIE ROSE: But that’s just fraud and corruption.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: But that fraud and corruption undermine confidence in the market economy and contribute, contribute — I don’t say — contribute to an economic downturn when it exists on the scale that it did in the United States.

CHARLIE ROSE: You don’t think globalization is such a great idea.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, actually what I said is globalization can be a very positive thing if it’s managed well.

CHARLIE ROSE: And so what is wrong about globalization as it exists today?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, let me give you one example. What we did when we talked about globalization is we talked about unfettered capital markets moving across borders with very little regulation. The result of that is that you can have a country with inadequate — a very small country with inadequate regulation putting in jeopardy savers, individuals all over the world.

Iceland is an example. So that’s an example where people in the U.K., people in the Netherlands suffered. And now it’s coming back, now people in Iceland are suffering from globalization. They were told let our banks — let your banks become global marketplaces, you’ll all benefit. What they’re seeing is they’re being asked to mortgage their future for generations to come.

They’re probably going to vote against it on Saturday, but that’s — that is an example of globalization that has not been managed well.

CHARLIE ROSE: You think Greece will be all right in the end?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. I think that Europe is going to come —

CHARLIE ROSE: To the rescue.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — to the rescue. And let me make it clear. When you use the word “rescue,” the fact is that Greece with its debt to GDP income ratio of 120 percent is perfectly capable —

CHARLIE ROSE: Debt to GDP.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Debt to GDP — of make it’s — fulfilling its commitments. When you face a speculative attack and interest rates soar, then you have a problem. And I think Europe realizes that that’s what this is.

CHARLIE ROSE: If they don’t act it will spread to other places like Spain and Portugal and maybe even Italy.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. So what is at stake here is the integrity of the Euro and European Union, which is why I felt so confident that they would eventually come to the rescue.

CHARLIE ROSE: One of the reasons I like you so much is you have opinions and you have ideas, and they are interesting and controversial. You’re not thrilled by the World Bank or the IMF.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the IMF has changed a little bit.

CHARLIE ROSE: So they’re more to your liking?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They’ve reformed to a considerable degree.

CHARLIE ROSE: Meaning they’re not creating such tough standards to receive their money?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. Or to put it the way I would put it —

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: Which is a better way.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: In the East Asia crisis, they demanded what we call pro-cyclical policies that converted downturns into recessions, recessions into depressions. If you look at their programs more recently, most of them have been much less in that way. Some of them have actually been very, very helpful.

So I think that’s part of the change of — in the global debate, and that’s why many people in Greece say if Europe doesn’t come to itself, the IMF is not necessarily that bad of an alternative.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’re not thrilled by the dollar remaining the reserve currency of the world.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: No.

CHARLIE ROSE: That puts you and the president of France in the same boat.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: A dollar-based reserve system is not working. It’s fraying.

CHARLIE ROSE: And they’re going down to Brazil and doing some interesting things to sort of —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And they’re very worried, and you can understand that, that with the buildup of the —

CHARLIE ROSE: Go ahead.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: With the buildup of the U.S. debt and the blowing up of the balance sheet of the Fed, they’re worried that the value of their huge holdings of U.S. dollars will be diminished in one way or another. So China, for instance, has $2.3 trillion of reserves.

CHARLIE ROSE: Two billion dollars a day.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And it is estimated somewhere between around two-thirds of that is probably in dollars, and they worry that the current system puts them at great risk.

So there’s a demand by the countries that hold large amounts of reserves to move to an alternative system. And other countries have expressed a view this way. They say in a 21st century, to have the currency of one country be the basis of a global financial system doesn’t make a lot of sense.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’d like to see a government bank.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I point out in the book that if you had taken that $700 billion that went into TARP and used just a fraction of that to create a new institution to provide money to, say, small or medium-size enterprises, we would have had a flow of new credit that is so essential to getting the American economy going again.

Instead we focused on the past. We focused on institutions that have proven themselves not having done an adequate job in allocating capital. They’re focusing on dealing with past mistakes.

And one of the basic lessons in economics is bygones should be bygones. And unfortunately it’s very hard to get existing institutions to do that. And that was just one — it was a way of thinking about what we might have done that would have —

CHARLIE ROSE: So it wasn’t so much a prescription for the future. It’s looking at the past and figuring out what might have been a better try go at solving the problem.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly.

CHARLIE ROSE: But how about nationalization? Do you think we should have had more nationalization, as your Nobel colleague Paul Krugman suggested, even if it was temporary?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s not the word I would have used. I would have used the word “conservatorship.” I would have said playing by the rules of capitalism.

CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The rules of capitalism say that if somebody owes more money than they can pay, a firm owes more money than it can pay, it goes into bankruptcy, which means the shareholders get wiped out, the bondholders become the new shareholders. That’s the rules of capitalism.

We suspended those rules. Now, in the case of banks, there’s a couple particular provisions. The first is that you don’t wait until the company’s absolutely bankrupt before you do something. You want to make sure that you’re not left holding the bag.

And secondly, the government has a special role because the government ensures the deposits. So if it goes belly up, the taxpayer, FDIC, winds up filling the hole.

And that gives it — those are the only differences between that and ordinary bankruptcy. So that’s what I wanted them to do. If they had done that, they would not have needed the huge amounts of taxpayer money.

CHARLIE ROSE: Do you think they’ll get some of it back?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Oh, they’ll get some of the money bank. But the numbers look like very clearly that there will be a significant shortfall, over $100 billion, and most of those calculations do not really provide — talk about appropriate compensation for what we call the time value of money, the risk that we bore.

And so when you say we got the money back, we should have gotten far more than the money back given the risk that we bore.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have an international reputation, are known well around the world, and with admiration. You also saw the kinds of factors coming together that created the crisis that we had to go through. Do you believe that if you had had power to go with your observation you would have been able to prevent the crisis?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I think we could have made sure that it was much less deep than it currently is. We might have been able to prevent it.

And why that’s so relevant to the current policy debate is that right now our financial sector is in some ways more dysfunctional than it was in 2007.

And so as I look at where we are unless, we make some very significant reforms in both the structure of the financial sector and the regulation of the financial sector, I think there is a significant risk that we will some time — five years, ten years — face another crisis of the kind that we’ve just been through.

CHARLIE ROSE: Joseph Stiglitz, won the Nobel Prize in economics. “Freefall: American, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.” Thank you. Pleasure to see you.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Thank you. Nice to see you.

CHARLIE ROSE: Back in a moment. Stay with us.

www.charlierose.com/view/content/10885

Content

Following up on his timely and well-received book, A Failure of Capitalism, Richard Posner steps back to take a longer view of the continuing crisis of democratic capitalism as the American and world economies crawl gradually back from the depths to which they had fallen in the autumn of 2008 and the winter of 2009.

By means of a lucid narrative of the crisis and a series of analytical chapters pinpointing critical issues of economic collapse and gradual recovery, Posner helps non-technical readers understand business-cycle and financial economics, and financial and governmental institutions, practices, and transactions, while maintaining a neutrality impossible for persons professionally committed to one theory or another. He calls for fresh thinking about the business cycle that would build on the original ideas of Keynes. Central to these ideas is that of uncertainty as opposed to risk. Risk can be quantified and measured. Uncertainty cannot, and in this lies the inherent instability of a capitalist economy.

As we emerge from the financial earthquake, a deficit aftershock rumbles. It is in reference to that potential aftershock, as well as to the government’s stumbling efforts at financial regulatory reform, that Posner raises the question of the adequacy of our democratic institutions to the economic challenges heightened by the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis and the government’s energetic response to it have enormously increased the national debt at the same time that structural defects in the American political system may make it impossible to pay down the debt by any means other than inflation or devaluation.

Table of contents

Introduction

Part I: An Analytic Narrative of the Crisis

The Calm before the Storm: 2001–2006
To the Abyss: December 2007–September 2008
The Spectre of the Great Depression: October 2008–March 2009
Bottoming Out: Spring 2009–Autumn 2009
The Movement for Financial Regulatory Reform: June–December 2009
Depression and Aftershock: 2007–?

Part II: What Lessons Have We Learned from the Crisis?

The Fragility of Finance
Keynes Redux
The Economics of Uncertainty
The Crisis of Macroeconomics

Part III: The Way Forward

Reform You Can Believe In
America in aWorld Economy
Index

不知道是不是由于某些封面设计不佳的原因，塞先生才对封面变得苛刻起来。不过，丑陋的局面即将改变了，《卫报》报道，塞林格作品将以新的系列封面重印上市：

Before his death, JD Salinger’s publisher, Hamish Hamilton, worked with him to produce jackets for reissues of his books (originally planned for June, they are now due out next month). …

Simon Prosser, publishing director, Hamish Hamilton: “There are strict rules about JD Salinger’s covers. The only copy allowed on the books, back or front, is the author name and the title. Nothing else at all: no quotes, no cover blurb, no biography. We’re not really sure why this is, but it gives you definite guidelines. Last year we decided it was probably time to re-design the covers, and we wanted a unique typeface that stood out. We commissioned Seb Lester, the highly regarded type designer, to hand-draw a font; that font, on the cover of these re-issues, is a one-off and is known in-house here at Hamish Hamilton as the ‘Salinger’.”

这套新封面是 Seb Lester 设计的，相当赏心悦目：

This collection, originally published as Nine Stories in the US in 1953, contains some of Salinger’s greatest short fiction, including the title story (first published in the New Yorker in 1950), in which an army sergeant recalls his meeting with a young girl before he was sent to war, and A Perfect Day for Bananafish, the first of Salinger’s stories of the Glass family.


Salinger’s third book, published in 1961, takes us deeper into the verbose, intellectual, fragile lives of the Glasses – a brilliant but brittle family of Upper West Side New Yorkers – through the doings of two of the younger members of the clan, brother and sister Franny and Zooey.

The third instalment in the Glass family saga is narrated by Buddy, the second of the Glass brothers. His purpose is to introduce us to his older brother, Seymour, whose suicide is the subject of Salinger’s earlier story, A Perfect Day for Bananafish.

Salinger’s most famous work, The Catcher in the Rye has sold more than 65m copies around the world since its publication in 1951. The story of three days in the life of Holden Caulfield – whose irritable ennui and contempt for what he calls ‘phoneys’ have made him a poster-boy for adolescent disenchantment – as he drifts around New York after being expelled from school, is widely held up as a defining novel of the 20th century.

上述新书将由企鹅集团旗下的 Hamish Hamilton 出版社出版，塞迷们可以买来收藏了。