关键词：国家　政体　政府制度发展　现代化　文化相对主义

费纳（Samuel E. Finer）的《政府史》共三卷34章（Finer，1997），英文版长达1701页，是20世纪西方政治学中有重大影响的巨著，其中文版即将由华东师范大学出版社出版。《政府史》的主要关注点是世界历史中政府形态的发展。《政府史》以各个国家的政府形态、统治方式和国家社会关系为核心，大致依照时间顺序，先把我们带入世界文明中最为古老的苏美尔城邦，述及萨尔贡、埃及、亚述、犹太、波斯、希腊、中国、罗马、印度、拜占庭、哈利发、中世纪欧洲、日本、奥斯曼帝国等地区和国家的政治史，然后把焦点转入文艺复兴和新教运动后的欧洲各国和美洲殖民地政治制度的突破性发展，最后，集中讨论影响当代世界的三大革命（美国革命、法国革命及工业革命），以及这些革命给世界政治、政府形态和国家社会关系所带来的前所未有的变化。

费纳长期以来一直是政治学界特别是英国政治学界的一个领军人物，他的不少早期著作皆是政治学和政治社会学领域的经典，特别是《马背上的人：军事力量在政治中的作用》（Finer，1962）。费纳在1982年开始撰写《政府史》时已经退休，1987年，费纳在一场心肌梗塞后幸免于难，此后，他在健康状况不断恶化的情况下坚持写作且进展迅速，直到1993年去世。去世前《政府史》已完成计划中36章的34章。《政府史》由费纳的夫人凯瑟琳·费纳及杰克·哈瓦德（Jack Hayward）进行编辑后出版。作者的去世使得《政府史》终止在工业革命。如果假以时日，想必费纳会对整个20世纪的政治发展，特别是苏联解体和全球化对国家政治发展的影响有所涉及，并且会在书末提供一个总结和展望，使读者能对全书有个更完整的了解。虽然《政府史》的不完整性给我们带来了遗憾，但读过《政府史》的人都承认，全书34章有一气呵成之感。直到最后几章，作者仍能广征博引，并以他所特有的睿智，为我们展现近代政治的关键发展及其背后的逻辑，锋芒丝毫不减。

《政府史》一书中没有涉及黑非洲，没有讨论欧洲殖民前的美洲，也没有分析任何东南亚的国家，甚至对日本的讨论也仅限于幕府时代以后。在导论中，费纳开门见山地说明了他选择案例的四个取舍原则，其中最主要的是政府的大小和规模，以及该政府在组织技术和统治理念上对后世所产生影响的大小。人类社会技术的发展可以分为两大类：集约性技术和延展性技术（intensive and extensive technology）（Mann，1986）。所谓集约性技术，是指那些能提高人类的生产效率、增强对自然资源的汲取和利用能力的技术，而延展性技术则指的是那些能提高人类（特别是国家）的组织和协调能力的技术。就古代中国而言，科层制、法治、常规军及科举制等等的发明都可以被看作是重要的延展性技术的发展。在工业革命前（特别是在18世纪前），推动文明进展的主要是延展性技术。因此，世界各地各个历史时期的政府对延展性技术发展的贡献就成了费纳写作的主轴之一。在导论的最后，费纳总结了各个国家和地区在这方面最为重要的贡献（Finer，1997：87-94）：亚述发明了帝国，波斯创造了世俗帝国，犹太王国发展了有限君主模式，中国贡献了科层制、常规军及科举制等等，希腊发明了公民概念和民主制，罗马共和国和罗马帝国发展了衡平政治（checks and balances）和法制，中世纪欧洲产生了无头封建制（注1）和教会与世俗政权的冲突性依存状态，复兴了希腊罗马政治的一些关键传统，并创造了代议制。英国创造了君主立宪，法国发明了民族主义和民主国家，美国则贡献了成文宪法、宪法对公民权的保护、司法审查以及联邦制。

在导论的其他部分，费纳集中讨论了书中常用的概念和社会机制。在定义了国家概念后，费纳讨论了历史上存在的不同国家形态、军事组织及军事技术和国家之间的关系，以及不同宗教与国家之间的不同关系。奇怪的是，费纳的导论没有对经济组织及生产力与国家及国家形态之间的相互影响进行讨论。因为在讨论具体的国家和地区政府史的时候，特别是在讨论中世纪后欧洲的发展时，费纳对经济组织形态、生产技术的发展以及生产力对国家政治的影响做了很深入的分析。《政府史》的分析框架强调国家组织和军事、宗教、经济的互动关系，有很深的韦伯思想的痕迹。但是，《政府史》却不是一本典型的历史社会学著作。当代大多数历史社会学著作一般都从一个或数个问题出发，然后针对这些问题提出因果式或互动关系式的解释框架。比如，在《民主与专制的社会起源》中（Moore，1966），摩尔提出了20世纪国家的现代化过程主要有三条路径：民主道路（如英国、法国、美国）、政治革命或法西斯道路（如日本、德国）和社会革命道路（如俄国、中国）。摩尔的问题是为什么不同的国家在现代化过程中会走向不同的道路。同样，在《强制、资本和欧洲国家，公元990—1992年》中（Tilly，1992），蒂利所想解答的是为什么欧洲国际政治在第二个千禧年会有如下的变化：第二千禧年伊始，地域广阔、商品经济不发达、政治上比较专制的内地农业国家（如波兰）能主导欧洲政治；第二千禧年中期，主导欧洲政治的则成了那些经济发达、资本密集、政治自由而地域有限的城邦国家（如威尼斯、比利时）；17世纪后，欧洲政治转而由那些既拥有大城市又占有很大周边地区的国家主导（如法国、英国）；18世纪后，欧洲各国则都先后走向了民族国家的道路。但是，正如笔者在评论许田波《古代中国和近现代欧洲的战争及国家形成》（Hui，2005）一书时所指出的，为了让不同时空不同历史背景下的案例有可比性，比较历史社会学家所提出的问题就必须相对单一，而问题越是单一，我们就越能提出许多在逻辑上合理却与经验事实毫不相干的解答（赵鼎新，2007）。费纳的《政府史》三卷所涉及的国家如此之多，要解答的问题和比较的视角也在各章节之间不断变化，因此那种在社会学中盛行的具有清晰问题意识的、分析型的、对称性比较方法对于费纳来说显然无法采用。

费纳整个分析框架的核心是一个简单的分类系统。他认为一个国家的性质（如组织形式、执政能力、合法性基础、所受到的制约等等）在很大程度上取决于以下四种力量在国家政治中的地位：宫廷、教会、贵族和论坛。这四个词汇都是转喻。最为简单地说，宫廷指的是专制政治，教会指的是神权政治，贵族指的是精英政治，而论坛指的是大众政治。在当代社会，宫廷与论坛的组合就形成了全权国家，而贵族与论坛结合则形成了代议制政府。在人类历史中，这四种力量中的任何一个都很难完全排斥其他力量而对政府进行全面控制，因此，大多数政府或多或少都是杂交型的。杂交型政府共有六种可能：宫廷/教会、宫廷/贵族、宫廷/论坛、论坛/教会、论坛/贵族、教会/贵族。其中，论坛/教会和教会/贵族类型的政体在历史上非常少，宫廷/教会和宫廷/贵族类型的政体非常普遍，宫廷/论坛和论坛/贵族型政体在古代时有出现，但是它们的普遍程度远不如现代。

费纳的这种机械的静态分类方法连亚里士多德时代的哲人都应该会接受，可在现代政治学和社会学中，这种把静态分类当作理论的做法早已过时。但费纳的智慧正体现在这一点上——他深深懂得，如果要想分析一个极其复杂的现象，并且在分析过程中不像当代许多比较历史社会学家一样对复杂现象进行过度简约，简约到让历史学家笑话，那么这个分析框架就必须不能与根据具体经验案例做出的种种分析和解释产生逻辑矛盾。有鉴于此，一个缺乏特定理论支持的分类框架反而有着更大的灵活性和普适性，或者说不会迫使作者为了证明其理论的正确性而忽视所面对的经验现象的复杂性。正是在这样的简单的分类系统下，费纳才能够对从苏美尔和萨尔贡发端的历史上的各类政府的组织形式、执政能力、合法性基础、所受到的制约，以及在与其他类似政府相比所具有的优缺点和历史地位做出具有洞察力的、深入的分析和评论。费纳并不是任何一个特定地区或国家历史的专家，他的具体描述与分析也不可能万无一失，地区史学专家们当然能指出费纳对政府史的具体描述中所出现的各种错误和纰漏，但我敢肯定地说，史学专家们所指出的相当一部分错误和纰漏很可能是出于专家们在视野和知识面上的局限而产生的误解，并且大多数专家在通读全书后一定会为费纳的知识面、历史感、睿智，以及许多分析和论点的精到程度所折服。

《政府史》涉及的内容虽然庞杂，但费纳在描述和分析上下五千年世界各国政治史时所达到的深度，以及所体现出的对各国历史卓越的把握能力，绝不亚于不同国家和地区的专业历史学家。笔者才疏学浅，对费纳笔下的不少国家和地区的历史了解有限，难以对费纳的历史描述和分析质量做出准确的判断，但是就笔者有一定了解的历史，比如希腊、罗马、中世纪欧洲、日本、近代欧洲和美洲的历史来说，我能感到费纳对这些历史案例的总体把握能力甚至超过了大量专家。当然，笔者最为之心折的还是费纳对中国历史的描述和分析。我阅读过大量西方学者所写的比较历史著作，一个普遍的感觉就是一个国家或地区越接近远东，该国家或地区的文化就与西方文化差别越大，西方学者就对该国家或地区的历史越发难以把握，他们对该国家或地区历史所进行的描述和分析也就可能越来越离谱。因此，即使是一些很优秀的学者，比如摩尔、斯考契波、豪、曼、麦克尼尔、琼斯、郎德思、古德斯通等等，他们虽然在分析中国历史形态时不乏真知灼见，但在对具体中国历史的描述和引证上却会时空倒错，并在历史背景不清的情况下犯有低级错误（如 Goldstone, 1991; Hall, 1986; Jones, 1981; Landes, 1998; Mann, 1986; McNeill, 1982; Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979）。但是费纳的《政府史》却不是这样。《政府史》专讲中国历史的有五个章节：先秦、汉朝、唐朝、明朝和清朝，其总长度达236页（注2），足够单独成书。费纳不懂中文，他在写作时所能利用的仅仅是在西方来说本身就欠发达的中国历史研究的成果，但是，就是在这样的条件下，除了先秦一章流于简单之外（西方先秦史研究可供费纳参考的文献太少了），其余四章在时空和历史背景上都十分清晰且罕见低级错误。作者对于儒家学说在中国历史上的重要性及其在不同朝代的变化，以及儒学怎么在宋朝开始从一个官方意识形态逐渐发展成为一个深入到民间的准宗教的分析，对于中国科层制的特性（比如它在功能上有与西方教会相类似的一面）、历代科层与皇权关系的紧张和变化、各朝代前期的皇帝在“内朝”与“外朝”权力分配时的两难选择、以及“内朝”与“外朝”关系一经定型后对整个朝代政治发生重大影响的分析，对于中国各个朝代对社会的渗透和控制能力及中国古代国家社会关系本质的分析，对于中国军事力量在政治中的边缘化和中国对各类宗教的宽容性的分析，对于康乾盛世的成就和局限以及大清帝国特殊的边疆策略及其背景和成果的分析，以及其他众多的分析，处处体现出宽广的学识和比较方法给作者带来的中国史专家无法企及的视角和真知灼见。

费纳反对文化相对主义。在他的眼里，不同的政府形态在政府形态发展中的地位以及在政府史上的地位的重要性完全不同。比如，他认为，城邦政府对于政府史来说很重要，但在政府形态的发展中它却是一个死胡同；神权政府与完全政教合一的政府对政府史和政府形态发展来说都不具有重大意义。费纳特别强调现代国家（以民族国家为主要特点）完全是西方的产物。《政府史》虽然没有专门讨论各个国家和地区自发产生工业资本主义的可能性，但是书中的信息十分明确：工业资本主义也完全是西方世界的产物。费纳认为，在18世纪时，世界上的其他文明都已经“达到了一种有意识的自满且不愿做出改变的状态。同时他们的政府也努力抵制任何外来的、任何有可能打破被他们视作无价之宝的平衡状态”，而欧洲却从西罗马帝国以来似乎始终感到浑身不自在且躁动不安。到了18世纪，欧洲社会的躁动不安从国家到经济到思想界更达到了全面的、无以复加的程度（Finer，1997：1473-1475）。费纳认为，现代国家和工业资本主义正是在这样一种躁动状态下跌跌撞撞地到来的（Finer，1997：1473-1651）。

费纳《政府史》的最后4、500页主要讲述的是近代西方政治的躁动不安和不断更新，但他的描述和分析方法十分清楚地告诉我们：政治发展并不是西方近代发展的惟一主轴。费纳为我们展现的是西方世界在政治、思想、军事、经济各个方面全面性的躁动不安，以及政治、思想、军事、经济力量之间在这全面性的躁动状态下相互依存、相互冲突和对历史发展的促进景象，其中许多可能已为大家熟悉：中世纪的独立城市促进了欧洲经济，复兴了罗马的共和政治，保证了城市阶层在欧洲政治过程中的重要作用（Finer，1997：950-1051）；文艺复兴和新教运动引进了世俗政治和科层制，破坏了主导欧洲世界达1300年之久的基督教世界及其世界观（Finer，1997：1261-1263），促进了不同的世俗理论和世俗性的历史终极理论的涌现和竞争（Finer，1997：1473）；欧洲的战争促进了国家在组织和税收等多方面的变化，促进了技术和生产能力的发展以及用暴力征服世界其他文明的能力；欧洲及整个西方的政府则不断在被动和主动的统治方法的更新过程中东跌西撞，既是在适应又是在推进西方世界在各个方面的不断变化。费纳认为，西方社会的这种多元的躁动不安的互动正是现代国家和工业资本主义兴起的源泉。

费纳书中对历史的分析方法在今天的西方世界已被视为老派。在文化相对主义和后现代理论盛行的西方历史学界，特别是在研究非西方历史的学者中，费纳所代表的观点被广泛地批判为“欧洲中心主义”，被视为“政治不正确”。在当下的美国，一个盛行的理论（所谓的“加州学派”）认为世界各个文明在许多方面（特别是在经济上）直到18世纪仍然在同一起跑线上。就中国而言，这些学者强调了帝制中国在悠久历史中的变化和更新能力，强调了在城市化与商业化水平、人均卡路里摄入量、技术的成熟水平等等方面，直到18世纪仍然在世界上处于领先地位或与西方同时期处于同等的发展水平（有些学者甚至认为直到19世纪中叶欧洲的发展水平也没有超过中国）。他们认为只是因为一些特殊的原因，比如幸运地获得并吸收了先进的东方技术（Hobson，2004），或幸运地发明了关键性技术（蒸汽机）（Goldstone，2000），或幸运地能在其发展的关键时期利用美洲的大量资源和向美洲新大陆移民而减轻其社会由于人口负担而产生的种种压力（Pomeranz，2000）等等，西方世界才能在19世纪脱颖而出，首先走向现代化。已被译成中文的彭慕兰的《大分流》就是这类研究的一个典型（Pomeranz，2000）。

上世纪80年代费纳开始写作《政府史》时，文化相对主义思想和后现代的学术和理论尚未在历史学界甚嚣尘上，但费纳似乎已经预料到这一颓废时代学术的到来。费纳在书中再三强调帝制中国在经济、农业和手工业生产技术等等多方面的发展，并分析了中国在明代的辉煌。他甚至强调直到大清帝国康乾盛世时，中国在许多方面，包括政治改良和政府行政能力、教育的扩展和对绅士阶层的整合能力、对边疆的控制手段和能力等等，都有着重大的提高，并且中国的经济能力和百姓生活水平直到18世纪在世界上并不落后。对于这些基本事实，费纳与那些持有文化相对主义学者的认识相去不远。但是，费纳马上指出：“汉学家们十分正确地指出了中国在历史上所经历的不断的和显著的变化。但是，中国政治虽然在一个长达两千多年历史的帝国模式下不断地丰富和改进着，欧洲政治却从日尔曼蛮族王国开始，其间经历了封建制、新君主制、绝对国家和议会制以及民主和代议制政府，经历了一次又一次断颈式的变化，两者性质截然不同”（Finer，1997：1303）。费纳进而指出：“当一个社会中的社会结构、政治结构和主流意识形态互为依存时，这一社会就会获得稳定；而当一个社会中一个至数个结构与其他结构产生冲突时，这样的社会就有了突变的可能”（Finer，1997：1303-1304）。在费纳眼里，中国社会就是前者，而欧洲和整个西方社会则是后者。现代国家和工业资本主义的到来并不是一个单一的技术问题、经济问题或生活质量指标、政治发展和思想“进步”等问题，它们跌跌撞撞的到来是西方社会政治、思想、经济和军事等因素相互冲突的结果。费纳的分析虽然没有专门针对“加州学派”，但是他明确地告诉了我们，“加州学派”的学者们为了强调中国在18世纪与西方的相似性而列举的一些经济指标和社会发展指标只能说明帝制中国仍然有着很大的改良能力，但决不能证明18世纪的中国与西方有着同样的把世界带到现代国家和工业资本主义的可能。

其实，西方的文化相对主义和后现代学者甚至在政治上也不见得比费纳这样的“欧洲中心主义”者要来得正确。费纳丝毫不隐瞒西方世界在“现代化”过程中的野蛮，但是他深切地知道现代国家和工业资本主义一旦在西方兴起后，其他国家人民要么在强权下过着悲惨的生活，要么就必须走向建立现代国家和发展工业资本主义的现代化道路。因此，在费纳的字里行间，我们至少能感到他为现代化在一部分发展中国家的率先成功而高兴。但是，那些文化相对主义者们却对发展中国家中的任何传统似乎都保有激情，往往有一种身处西方优越生活而把发展中国家当作香格里拉来欣赏的虚伪。幸亏中国在20世纪初就禁止缠小脚了，如果推迟到文化相对主义盛行的今天的话，西方的文化相对主义学者肯定会因为有一些已经缠了小脚的妇女不愿放脚而谴责中国无视妇女缠小脚的权力，并热情宣扬“步步金莲”文化中的优美成分。

西方文化相对主义者在政治上的表现还在于他们中许多人（比如彭慕兰）仍然把在西方兴起的工业资本主义看作是一个进步现象。正因为如此，他们决定从所谓的非欧洲中心主义的视角出发，认定在18世纪工业资本主义兴起前夕世界上大多数国家和地区都有一定的走向现代化的可能，并在历史资料中断章取义来支持他们的学术观点。但是，工业资本主义只不过是西方社会给世界带来的一个现实，并不是什么一定值得庆祝的历史现象。在其100多年的发展史中，工业资本主义虽然为人类社会带来了许多值得夸耀的变化，但同时也为我们带来了可以摧毁人类社会多次的核武器，正在耗尽地球上的不可再生资源，造成大规模的环境污染。中国的以儒家思想为核心的帝国模式在东亚的土地上延续了2000多年，而工业资本主义这种正反馈文化能否维持这么长时间很值得怀疑。如果我们假设不远的将来，工业资本主义统治下的人类为了争夺日益稀缺的不可再生资源而进行了一场全球性的战争，其中一小部分在这场浩劫中奇迹般地幸存了下来，那么，这些幸存下来的人将会怎么看待工业资本主义历史?那时候，人们可能就会把费纳的《政府史》的第三卷看作是一部分析为什么一个躁动不安的、缺乏负反馈机制的社会在西方而不是在其他地方率先实现的著作。在那时候，如果有人问及费纳的《政府史》和持有文化相对主义的“加州学派”的工作在政治上哪个更正确，有的学者就可能会说是费纳的《政府史》。这是因为，一旦工业资本主义被看作是负面现象后，“加州学派”的学者就犯了两次政治错误：他们错误地赋予工业资本主义正面的价值，同时错误地认为工业资本主义在18世纪的西方和同期世界其他重要文明中几乎有着同等的发生可能性，言下之意，就是世界所有文明在工业资本主义所带来的灾难这一问题上与西方负有同等责任。但是费纳《政府史》的观点却只犯了一次政治错误：错误地对西方社会在政治和经济上的现代化赋予正面的价值，但他却正确地指出了现代化是西方的产物，亦即世界其他文明不能为西方社会现代化中最为重要的一面（即工业资本主义）所带来的灾难，承担与西方同样的责任。

任何伟大的社会科学著作都会有自己的弱点，《政府史》也不例外。为了能包容世界政治发展过程中所产生的众多的、极其复杂的经验现象，费纳在《政府史》写作过程中所依据的理论仅仅是一个静态分类框架。但是，正是这一分类框架使得费纳能清楚地区分所要讨论的国家和地区政府的类型，并针对这一政府类型建立有效的比较视角。因此在读了《政府史》后，细心的读者可能会发现费纳书中各章节的比较视角众多且在不断变化，但他的比较却几乎总是来得恰到好处。问题是，静态分类框架不能用来解释动态变化，这就给费纳的分析带来了不少困难。为什么一个国家会在某一时期内兴起然后走向鼎盛和消亡?为什么某一政府形态会在某一地区和时期内兴起然后消亡?对于这样的动态性问题，《政府史》就不能提供像曼的《社会权力的源泉》这类著作所提供的洞见（Mann，1986，1993）。特别是，当《政府史》的第三卷进入近代西方社会的现代化进程后，费纳的笔触充满激情，分析流畅，对西方文明成就的骄傲跃然纸上。费纳认为现代国家和工业资本主义在西方的兴起绝非偶然，而是欧洲社会在政治、经济、思想和军事权力之间的相互依存和冲突的结果。因而，他为我们提供的是一个典型韦伯式的关于现代国家和工业资本主义在西方率先兴起原因的社会学分析。但正是在这样一个静态分类框架的限制下，费纳没有能把他超人的动态分析和宏观把握能力通过明确的理论展现出来。

其实，即使在费纳的分类框架下，做进一步理论探讨也是有益的。比如说，现代西方民主国家的政体接近于费纳分类框架的哪一种理想类型?费纳没有加以讨论。但是，对这一问题的明确说明应该是十分重要的。依愚见，现代西方民主国家的政体接近于费纳分类框架中的贵族/论坛型政体而不是论坛型政体。真正论坛型政体是卢梭所提倡的那种大民主。这类政体人类梦想过也曾经试图付诸实践过，但却从来没有真正实现过。又如，费纳指出在六种混合型政体中，宫廷/论坛政体和贵族/论坛型政体在现代社会中越来越普遍，而其他类型的政体却逐渐成了历史。政府形式的发展为什么会呈现这样的规律呢?费纳在其分类框架的局限下未能做出回答。但如果我们在费纳的分类框架中加入他本人也十分强调的政府合法性这一概念后，问题就变得清晰了：不同的政体有着不同的合法性基础。简单说，脱魅之后现代社会的权威结构已经越来越难以运用神秘的和传统的合法性技术来加以维持，而正是程序合法性在现代社会政治过程中地位的大大提升，才导致贵族/论坛型这种政府形式（如代议制政府）在世界上的地位大大上升。而现代型的宫廷/论坛政体（全权政府）其实只不过是现代政府发展过程中的一个不稳定变异。这是因为，虽然在现代宫廷/论坛政体形成初期，其寡头（宫廷）一定会由于多种原因而享有来自大众（即论坛）的广泛支持，但由于这种政体继承了宫廷政体的强大专制性并有着无限政府的性质，因此它一旦形成后肯定会利用其专制性去控制论坛，而不会像贵族/论坛型政体一样朝着政治精英（即贵族）竞争和百姓（即论坛）定期选举的程序政治发展。宫廷/论坛政体不能很好地与程序合法性相匹配，是其在现代社会中难以达成稳定状态的关键因素。

《政府史》的写作因费纳的去世而戛然终止。此书因为没有一个具有洞察力的结论而给读者带来很多遗憾。特别是在通读《政府史》洋洋三卷之后，笔者得到两个相反的印象。第一，在分析古代社会各个国家和地区的政府发展史时，费纳的一个隐含定理是：决定一个政治建构成功的条件随着时间的推移会不复存在；人们会利用某一政治建构的一些特性去为自己或自己所代表的某一群体谋取特殊利益，从而使一个本来运转良好的制度走向低效和腐败。因此，任何政府建构，即使在一个时期内被看作是很完美的建构，都会走向衰败。第二，在分析近代西方的政治发展中，费纳虽然没有忽略其过程的野蛮性，但在其对法国革命，特别是美国革命为世界所带来的新的政治制度的描述中，他那种在分析传统政治制度时所采用的对不同政治制度的历史地位和各种弱点进行评价的手法突然消失了。难道历史就终结在一种民主政治和资本主义相结合的体制上吗?难道费纳在分析古代社会时所运用的那个隐含定理在现代社会中突然就不发生作用了吗?如果费纳的那个隐含定理在现代社会中依然有效，那么现代民主政治和资本主义相结合的这种体制的历史地位、弱点和发展方向是什么?费纳不是一个历史终极论者，他毫不幼稚，但其巨著通过精采的描述和分析把我们从文明的起源一步步带到现代社会，却没有留下一个智者对未来社会的猜想。

费纳的《政府史》发表后好评如潮。《经济学家》杂志说：“没有一本在20世纪发表的政治学专著……能超过费纳的工作”（Economist，1997）。卢特瓦克说：“费纳的工作是‘政治科学’的最卓著者”（Luttwak，1997）。帕特逊说：“费纳的《政府史》是几代学术的结晶”（Paterson，1999：112）。鲍尔说：费纳的工作“丰富之极，以至于任何一个比较理论框架都无法对它进行概括”（Power，1999）。但是，费纳在80年代为了写作《政府史》而申请社会科学研究协会（Social Science Research Council）的科研经费时却被拒。其实，还是布里斯宾对《政府史》的态度比较客观地反映了西方主流政治学的现状（Brisbin，1999）。他批评费纳无视所有坚持新制度主义和理性选择理论的学者在国家形成方面所做的工作，批评费纳未能把《政府史》中所提出的不同政府类别转化为能解释各种不同假说的真正的变量。新制度主义和理性选择理论是西方政治学的主导理论，而以博弈论和统计学为核心的定量方法则是西方政治学的主导方法。费纳显然对这些理论和方法持保留意见。西方主流政治学非常现实，因而也十分短视。他们普遍轻视历史，有一种“只有当历史能为现实服务时我们才会服务于历史”的劲头（尼采语）。因此，像《政府史》这样一部以上下五千年政治为研究对象的、实际上采用历史社会学方法的巨著，就成为西方20世纪政治学领域的一个绝唱。

《经济学家》杂志说如果政治学有诺贝尔奖的话，费纳的三部曲就肯定会赢得此殊荣（Economist，1997）。我个人认为这一评价低估了费纳的工作。费纳的三部曲所需要的知识面、想象力、对历史现象的综合能力以及智慧，远非目前早已技术化了的物理学、化学和经济学的诺贝尔奖获奖工作所能比拟。

注释：

注1：与中世纪欧洲的无头封建制相对的是中国西周或日本幕府政治前的那种在封建贵族和领主之上还有国君统帅的有头封建制。

注2：本文中引用《政府史》内容时所用的页码均为英文版页码。

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作者单位：中国人民大学、芝加哥大学社会学系

《社会学研究》2008年第4期

CHARLIE ROSE: Joseph Stiglitz is here. He served as one of President Clinton’s top advisors and as chief economist at the World Bank. Today, he’s advising the Greek government as it faces a debt crisis that has rattled the European markets. Earlier in his career he was part of a team that won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001.

His new book is called “Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.” In this he writes that he fears the country faces a far longer and deeper recession with a financial system that is more vulnerable to another crisis.

Give me a sense of where you think we are.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, we’ve been brought back from the brink, but we’re not out of the woods. And let me tell you why I think we are still in a — you might say a precarious position.

While growth is starting to resume, it’s not likely to be sustained. It’s likely to get much weaker. But the core problems are two. First, a very high level of unemployment. More than one out of six Americans would like a full-time job and can’t get it. This includes people who have jobs but are working part time, can’t get a real job.

And 40 percent, more than 40 percent of those who are unemployed today are long-term unemployed, unemployed for more than six months. That’s so important because the longer you’re unemployed, you drain your cash reserves.

And particularly for young people, a period of should be building up skills, those skills, their training becomes weakened. And we know from previous downturns in the United States and elsewhere that young people who have experienced, or other people who’ve experience protracted periods of unemployment are much harder to bring back into the labor force. And when they do, their wages are markedly lower.

And then there’s the problem with the foreclosure, which is what started the crisis in the first place. The pace of foreclosures is expected to be higher in 2010 than in 2008 and ‘09. We’ve done nothing about the — almost nothing about the underwater mortgages where they owe more money than —

CHARLIE ROSE: Than the house is worth.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — than the house is worth. And more than 25 percent of those with mortgages are now underwater.

Now, there’s some additional problems that we’re about to face. Commercial real estate, about a half trillion dollars commercial real estate has to be rolled over.

CHARLIE ROSE: We have loans that are coming due, and they’ve got to —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — be rolled over somehow. Many of those are underwater. Many of those are securitized, and those are very difficult to roll over.

In the old days where you had conventional banking, the banks might have rolled them over holding their nose and closing their eyes in the view that — with the view that maybe with luck somewhere down the road things will get better.

Bank examiners, supervisors, are less willing to engage in what’s called forbearance because they’ve been very criticized for having not done their job in the last five years. And with securitization, it’s almost impossible to roll over these underwater mortgages.

The first of these problems came to the fore in the bankruptcy of Cifizen. And that was a multiple dollar failure.

CHARLIE ROSE: By one of the most reputable land development and real estate firms in the city of New York, and then when it came time to pay the loan, they couldn’t do it.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And that’s symptomatic of what we’re about to see over and over again.

Two more problems, if you’re not feeling bad enough. The states have a shortfall of about

CHARLIE ROSE: The states?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The states — of $200 billion a year in revenues, down from what it would normally be because of the recession. And the states — many of the states depend very heavily on property taxes. The states have balanced budget frameworks, which means that when the revenues go down, they either have to cut expenditures or raise taxes. That’s equivalent to a negative stimulus.

And so far the federal government’s been picking up about a third of that gap, but with the stimulus coming to an end in 2011, the question is, what will happen.

I just came back from California where you see the future, in a way — teachers, university professors on furlough two days a month on the way to being laid off. And, you know, a whole set of problems in a number of other states.

So these are among the sort of clouds hanging on the horizon —

CHARLIE ROSE: And so therefore you believe the consequences of all these things are?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That the economy will not be able to sustain the growth that we’ve seen in the last two quarters. There will be a marked slowdown, possibly into actually a double dip, which is another recession.

But the bottom line is for what most people care about, jobs, growth will be too slow to provide new jobs for the new entrants in the labor force, and certainly too slow reduce the unemployment from the very high level that it is.

So it’s going to be a lot of stress both in the labor market and the housing market unless we do something more than we’ve been doing.

CHARLIE ROSE: And what would that be?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that comes to the view, I think we need a second stimulus. We need a large second stimulus. A lot of deficit hawks are around there saying we can’t afford it. And I would say we can’t afford not to do it. And, you know —

CHARLIE ROSE: You have to put people to work first and then you can worry about the deficit.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Moreover, it was the shortsightedness of the banks that got us into this trouble. We ought to be looking not at the deficit but the long-term debt.

If we take — if a large fraction of this money goes into investments — education, technology, infrastructure — and we under-invested in the all these areas for years, all we need is a return of about five percent or six percent, and then we get more tax revenue from the growth in the short run, we get more tax revenue from the growth in the long run from these productive investments, and our long-term national debt will be lower as a result of running a deficit today.

And that’s what we should be focusing on.

CHARLIE ROSE: What size stimulus are you talking about?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the way I like to think about it is the size ought to be appropriate for the depth of the downturn. So, for instance, one of the key pieces of what I’ve been calling for is making up for the shortfall in revenues of the states.

So right now that shortfall is about $200 billion. If our economy remains weak, we’re going to have to make up for that. If the economy recovers, then the amount of money we have to put in would be that much less.

And if I were an optimist I would say it’s going to recover, but I don’t know, and I’m a little bit of a pessimist seeing the kinds of problems that we face.

CHARLIE ROSE: Some argue that we should have had a much larger stimulus — Paul Krugman for example. You’re in the same camp.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. That’s one of the points I said in “Freefall.” And even the president’s chairman of the council of economic advisors is said to have —

CHARLIE ROSE: Christina Romer.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Christina Romer said we needed $1.2 trillion. And what we’ve seen since then has been very clear they were optimistic about where we were going.

And it’s a really important point here. The stimulus has worked. A lot of people have looked and said unemployment has gone up and that proves the stimulus hasn’t worked. No, the stimulus worked. But if we hadn’t had the stimulus we would have had, say, 12 percent unemployment instead of 10 percent.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, but then they argue you could have designed a better stimulus.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. Again, something I say in my book. Clearly we could have done it. The big mistake we made was the tax cut. We knew from the experiment we did in February, 2008, the Bush tax cut, with the overhang of debt and with the uncertainty in the job market people would save a large fraction.

It makes them feel good, it’s important for their sense of well-being, but the nature of a stimulus is it has to stimulate. That means you have to have spending. And so a very large fraction of Americans have saved a significant part of that stimulus.

The other part that I think was a mistake was we didn’t give enough aid to the states in the way I described. And so you have this picture across the United States while the government — the federal government is putting money in, they’re contracting.

CHARLIE ROSE: Here’s what I don’t understand. Larry Summers early on — and I realize you and Larry have had —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Discussions.

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: Discussions, yes, have had intense discussions — said early on “timely, temporary, targeted” for stimulus. So that idea was out there. Were these targeted?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They were reasonably targeted, but not as targeted as they should have been.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK. You would have spent more money on jobs that would really train people for the future?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. And — that’s a long-run vision — and a recognition of the problem of the states that I talked about. And that is a way of putting money into the banks of the economy very quickly without creating a new bureaucracy because if you don’t put the money there they have to lay off workers.

And in a recession is exactly time that there’s so many demands. And people — young people who can’t get a job want a place in a university. They want to be able to at least build up their skills.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And the universities are contracting. It just doesn’t make any sense.

CHARLIE ROSE: I hear time and time again that the president made a mistake when he said we’re going to engage with the stimulus program and in other programs — education, climate change, and health care, that he should have said the issue is jobs, jobs, jobs. Do you buy that argument?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Not really, because the problem wasn’t lack of focus. The problem was a program that was not as strong as it should have been.

CHARLIE ROSE: Because of congress?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: One interpretation was a judgment about political feasibility. And my view on that was that if you compromise too much early and it turns out that you need more money later on, it would be difficult for you to accomplish what you really wanted. And that’s exactly the situation we’re now in, because it is now clear that we need a second stimulus, and many people are saying the stimulus didn’t work. So that was a political judgment that I think may have been flawed.

The second argument for why not enough was done in the area of mortgages and the banks, or not the right thing done in the area of mortgages and banks, was the influence of the financial sector that had gotten us into the trouble in the first place.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’re talking about the TARP program and the bank bailouts and the bailout of General Motors and Chrysler?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, and in particular — for instance, one of the — a lot of people said why don’t you give more money to homeowners so that they can restructure their mortgages. Let’s have trickle-up economics.

CHARLIE ROSE: My impression is that banks are modifying mortgages. Am I completely wrong about that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Very little.

CHARLIE ROSE: So it’s a good idea — they claim they’re doing it, but they’re not doing it enough?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And there’s one category which is a very important, the most important category where it’s almost not happening at all, and that’s the underwater mortgages. The one in four mortgages where they owe more money —

CHARLIE ROSE: Than the house is worth. What should be done about that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, what I advocate is what I call a “homeowners’ chapter 11.” And chapter 11 is a provision of our bankruptcy code that allows a restructuring of debt that says that if you owe more money than the company is worth, you convert bondholders into shareholders, and the shareholders get wiped out.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is your voice heard in the White House because of the tension that has existed in your relationship with Larry Summers?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I don’t think that’s the issue at all. I think there was —

CHARLIE ROSE: What’s the issue?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The issue is the influence of the financial markets, of the people who at first succeed in getting deregulation.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Then succeed in getting —

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, but let’s talk about it specifically. The people — are you talking about Larry Summers now who, because of his influence has — within the treasury with Bob Rubin — were able to get deregulation, were able to get Glass-Steagall repealed? Is that what we’re talking about?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s part of what we’re talking about. But it’s more pervasive than that, because it’s not only that they succeeded in getting this deregulation, you know, preventing regulation of the derivative, which the derivatives are what led to the problem at AIG, which cost American taxpayers so much money.

CHARLIE ROSE: And who was the woman that was surging them and trying to warn them?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Bjorn (ph), and she had said before the long-term capital management debacle —

CHARLIE ROSE: This was a debacle a number of years earlier.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That was back in 1998. The failure of one firm threatened to bring down the whole global financial market.

CHARLIE ROSE: And that was early warning.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That was an early warning. She said it before. She said after that, how can you doubt that? And yet they succeeded in not only not having the regulation but passing a law saying you could not regulate it.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have been much tougher than you are being here. You have said, for example, that Larry Summers and the Obama team are in the pockets of the banks and they need new faces who have no vested interest in the past.

You’re basically saying they came with a mindset to the Obama administration that was sort of — we want to make sure we take care of Wall Street so that when the time came and the crunch came and the emergency came they were not prepared for the kind of solutions that you believed were the right solution for the right moment.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. It’s a mindset —

CHARLIE ROSE: What’s the mindset?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, it’s the mindset that began with saying markets always work.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And that Adam Smith’s idea that the invisible hand, the pursuit of self-interests would lead —

CHARLIE ROSE: So you’re saying there was no difference in their attitude about market than was, say, Alan Greenspan?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. There was a picture on “Time” that described the three of them as “The Committee to Save the World.” And the fact is they approached the problems of regulation and managing the monetary system in a very —

CHARLIE ROSE: Are we talking about Summers, Rubin, and Greenspan, or are we talking about whom?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that group, but there were others.

One of the things I think is important in this area is not just to focus on individuals but to focus on ideas, and these ideas were very pervasive.

One of my concerns has been not only did they bring in, in some sense, the wrong mindset but because they were so closely affiliated with the mistakes of the past, it would be very difficult to get confidence.

CHARLIE ROSE: With great respect for a Nobel laureate, some might argue that Joe Stiglitz is a little bit outside and he’s screaming a bit because those guys were brought inside and he wasn’t.

And he had a Nobel Prize, experience at the World Bank, and had written a number of books and was, you know, a distinguished professor. So therefore he had all the credentials to be on the inside and he wasn’t, and they were. So now he’s saying those guys had a mindset that prevented them from fixing the problem.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, I really didn’t want to go inside. I had been through that experience. It was a very exciting time.

CHARLIE ROSE: For Clinton.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Under President Clinton. It was a very exciting time.

CHARLIE ROSE: With Bob Rubin.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: We often differed. I opposed the repeal of Glass-Steagall, he supported it.

But what has disturbed me is that others like Paul Volcker have been very — who share many of the same views, have been very — their views have been very reluctant to be heard.

CHARLIE ROSE: But they are heard now.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They are being heard, and that’s what I feel much better about.

CHARLIE ROSE: But being heard on one question, the big question of financial reform and the need for new kinds of regulation.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. And even that is not as much as I would — I think is necessary.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: We’re about a third of the way.

CHARLIE ROSE: What will be the two-thirds that are missing?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, for instance, Volcker has focused a great deal on making sure that the depository institutions, commercial banks, do not engage in proprietary trading, that they’re not too big to fail.

CHARLIE ROSE: That they don’t have hedge funds or private equity firms.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. I’ve also been concerned that you can have too big to fail institutions that are not deposit-taking institutions — investment banks, that once you separate the two, you can still —

CHARLIE ROSE: But he seems to be arguing to me and others that there’s no such thing as too big to fail if, in fact, you’re not a depository institution.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. And that’s where, I think, we differ.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, that’s one place you differ.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And so, for instance, we wound up bailing out AIG and we bailed out —

CHARLIE ROSE: Should we have bailed out AIG or should we — what was the alternative?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The alternative was to say let it go and if —

CHARLIE ROSE: What does “let it go” mean?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Let it go bankrupt.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And if some parts of our financial institutions have problems, need money, like Goldman Sachs, then give them money — not give them money, lend then money in a way that will get back —

CHARLIE ROSE: In the same way they did with Citigroup? You lend them money for a piece of the equity, or just lend them money —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: One of my criticisms is that when you give them money, you get back appropriate compensation. So the form would have been such as something like Warren Buffett. When he gave money to Goldman Sachs he got back warrants and preferred shares.

CHARLIE ROSE: And a 10 percent return.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And a very high return. And so we should have done just as well as Warren Buffett. Why can’t we negotiate terms — that was an arm’s length deal not affected by politics.

CHARLIE ROSE: So in other words, the United States government should have been a Warren Buffett negotiating the deals it made with commercial institutions, with financial institutions that were in trouble.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. And other countries have done a better job in providing money to their banks and getting back value than the United States. So that’s what we should have done there.

Another area that we need to do something about is do more in breaking up the too big to fail banks. I think, you know, the notion that these too big to fail banks can be trusted in any way seems to be — you know, the one thing economists agree on is that incentives matter. And if you have an incentive to engage in excessive risk taking, you will.

And the question there is whether the failure of this institution engaging in financial activities would send significant ripples through the economy that anybody could say to us if you don’t save that institution it will have sufficient consequences through the financial system.

You know, there are other set of issues with General Motors for jobs —

CHARLIE ROSE: And how do you measure that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that’s not an easy question, but there are models that can look at what happens if you pull out one institution out of the financial web. One of the big advances in recent years in research, particularly the Bank of England, have been to look at these networks of financial interdependence. Some of my own research is actually focused on exactly that kind of question.

CHARLIE ROSE: I think government of the Bank of England, Mervin King — is that his name?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is in favor of breaking up the banks.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, he says, and I agree, if you’re too big to fail you’re too big to be.

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: And you buy that.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I buy that.

CHARLIE ROSE: Universal banks is not by definition a bad idea, is it?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I think what you have to look at in the context of the American economy are the costs versus the benefits.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There are some benefits, but what we’ve seen are the costs far outweigh those benefits.

An important point to remember is the services that they provide won’t disappear. They will be provided, but organized differently.

CHARLIE ROSE: And more efficiently.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And I think more efficiently.

And the point is right now we can’t — the big banks are effectively subsidized and they have a competitive advantage not based on greater efficiency, but the fact is that because everybody knows they’re too big to fail they can get capital at a lower interest rate, and that gives them a big advantage over every smaller institution.

CHARLIE ROSE: You believe that the American capitalist system should look much more like the European Scandinavian model, which is sometimes called “capitalism with a human face.”

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right.

CHARLIE ROSE: What do you mean?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There are a couple of dimensions of this. One is we have to recognize that we need to get a balance between the market and the government. And the government plays an important role not just in restraining bad behavior but also promoting innovation. The Internet, which has transformed our society, was financed by —

CHARLIE ROSE: By the government.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: By the government.

CHARLIE ROSE: The Pentagon, in fact.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The revolutions in biology that are extending our lives begin with basic research that is funded by the government. So that —

CHARLIE ROSE: And done at the university level and at NIH and wherever.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: So that gives you an important constructive role for government.

CHARLIE ROSE: But we already do that, don’t we?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: But part of the debate is the extent to which we do it. Part of the debate is the extent to which we — the role of the government in restraining the bad behavior, the regulation that we talked about in the financial sector.

So that’s part of our debate. And then the other part of the debate is the extent of social protections that you provide.

CHARLIE ROSE: The safety net.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The safety net. And that —

CHARLIE ROSE: So therefore has France — being exhibit one — been better off in the economic crisis than we have because they had more influence of the state in their economy and had a firmer safety net?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, both France and Germany have — you know, they’ve been very badly hit, but on the other hand, the amount of suffering of the individuals has not been as bad.

I’ll give you one example. One of the things that we’re now — a number of places are beginning to imitate in the United States is where they put people into part-time work so that they share the work. They’ve recognized the system isn’t working well, and that rather than having, as the United States, one out of six Americans — one out of ten Americans who can’t get a job, what they’re doing is sharing the work more broadly.

CHARLIE ROSE: All right, let me just continue down this. You suggest that capitalism has some moral failings.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: An example, for instance, was in the financial market the —

CHARLIE ROSE: “Moral depravity of the financial sector,” I think, is the term you used.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. And the example I give is the discovery that was made a few years ago that there was money at the bottom of the pyramid and they did everything they could to move that money from the bottom of the pyramid to the top, including predatory lending, the credit card abuses.

The point I was making here was that, well, one of the criticisms — and I think a justified criticism — of the financial sector was that it didn’t manage risk-taking well. It didn’t allocate capital to where it was best used. But it went beyond that.

CHARLIE ROSE: But when you get to that point, that’s where people in the financial community come back, push back to you and others, and Paul Volcker as well.

They’re saying the kind of financial reform you’re talking about, too big to fail and all that was not the problem. The problem was leverage and risk and the capital requirements. If those had been enforced you wouldn’t have had the problem. And you’re not going to solve the problem, they argue, by some elimination of proprietary trading.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There’s no single thing that is going to solve this kind of problem.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right, the potential of another crisis.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Of another crisis. I agree absolutely we have to do something about leverage. You have to do something about hidden leverage, which was part of what the credit default swaps were all about. So I agree with them on that.

But conflicts of interest are what caused problems. The conflicts of interest were en route of the Enron, World.com scandals.

CHARLIE ROSE: But that’s just fraud and corruption.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: But that fraud and corruption undermine confidence in the market economy and contribute, contribute — I don’t say — contribute to an economic downturn when it exists on the scale that it did in the United States.

CHARLIE ROSE: You don’t think globalization is such a great idea.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, actually what I said is globalization can be a very positive thing if it’s managed well.

CHARLIE ROSE: And so what is wrong about globalization as it exists today?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, let me give you one example. What we did when we talked about globalization is we talked about unfettered capital markets moving across borders with very little regulation. The result of that is that you can have a country with inadequate — a very small country with inadequate regulation putting in jeopardy savers, individuals all over the world.

Iceland is an example. So that’s an example where people in the U.K., people in the Netherlands suffered. And now it’s coming back, now people in Iceland are suffering from globalization. They were told let our banks — let your banks become global marketplaces, you’ll all benefit. What they’re seeing is they’re being asked to mortgage their future for generations to come.

They’re probably going to vote against it on Saturday, but that’s — that is an example of globalization that has not been managed well.

CHARLIE ROSE: You think Greece will be all right in the end?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. I think that Europe is going to come —

CHARLIE ROSE: To the rescue.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — to the rescue. And let me make it clear. When you use the word “rescue,” the fact is that Greece with its debt to GDP income ratio of 120 percent is perfectly capable —

CHARLIE ROSE: Debt to GDP.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Debt to GDP — of make it’s — fulfilling its commitments. When you face a speculative attack and interest rates soar, then you have a problem. And I think Europe realizes that that’s what this is.

CHARLIE ROSE: If they don’t act it will spread to other places like Spain and Portugal and maybe even Italy.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. So what is at stake here is the integrity of the Euro and European Union, which is why I felt so confident that they would eventually come to the rescue.

CHARLIE ROSE: One of the reasons I like you so much is you have opinions and you have ideas, and they are interesting and controversial. You’re not thrilled by the World Bank or the IMF.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the IMF has changed a little bit.

CHARLIE ROSE: So they’re more to your liking?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They’ve reformed to a considerable degree.

CHARLIE ROSE: Meaning they’re not creating such tough standards to receive their money?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. Or to put it the way I would put it —

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: Which is a better way.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: In the East Asia crisis, they demanded what we call pro-cyclical policies that converted downturns into recessions, recessions into depressions. If you look at their programs more recently, most of them have been much less in that way. Some of them have actually been very, very helpful.

So I think that’s part of the change of — in the global debate, and that’s why many people in Greece say if Europe doesn’t come to itself, the IMF is not necessarily that bad of an alternative.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’re not thrilled by the dollar remaining the reserve currency of the world.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: No.

CHARLIE ROSE: That puts you and the president of France in the same boat.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: A dollar-based reserve system is not working. It’s fraying.

CHARLIE ROSE: And they’re going down to Brazil and doing some interesting things to sort of —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And they’re very worried, and you can understand that, that with the buildup of the —

CHARLIE ROSE: Go ahead.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: With the buildup of the U.S. debt and the blowing up of the balance sheet of the Fed, they’re worried that the value of their huge holdings of U.S. dollars will be diminished in one way or another. So China, for instance, has $2.3 trillion of reserves.

CHARLIE ROSE: Two billion dollars a day.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And it is estimated somewhere between around two-thirds of that is probably in dollars, and they worry that the current system puts them at great risk.

So there’s a demand by the countries that hold large amounts of reserves to move to an alternative system. And other countries have expressed a view this way. They say in a 21st century, to have the currency of one country be the basis of a global financial system doesn’t make a lot of sense.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’d like to see a government bank.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I point out in the book that if you had taken that $700 billion that went into TARP and used just a fraction of that to create a new institution to provide money to, say, small or medium-size enterprises, we would have had a flow of new credit that is so essential to getting the American economy going again.

Instead we focused on the past. We focused on institutions that have proven themselves not having done an adequate job in allocating capital. They’re focusing on dealing with past mistakes.

And one of the basic lessons in economics is bygones should be bygones. And unfortunately it’s very hard to get existing institutions to do that. And that was just one — it was a way of thinking about what we might have done that would have —

CHARLIE ROSE: So it wasn’t so much a prescription for the future. It’s looking at the past and figuring out what might have been a better try go at solving the problem.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly.

CHARLIE ROSE: But how about nationalization? Do you think we should have had more nationalization, as your Nobel colleague Paul Krugman suggested, even if it was temporary?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s not the word I would have used. I would have used the word “conservatorship.” I would have said playing by the rules of capitalism.

CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The rules of capitalism say that if somebody owes more money than they can pay, a firm owes more money than it can pay, it goes into bankruptcy, which means the shareholders get wiped out, the bondholders become the new shareholders. That’s the rules of capitalism.

We suspended those rules. Now, in the case of banks, there’s a couple particular provisions. The first is that you don’t wait until the company’s absolutely bankrupt before you do something. You want to make sure that you’re not left holding the bag.

And secondly, the government has a special role because the government ensures the deposits. So if it goes belly up, the taxpayer, FDIC, winds up filling the hole.

And that gives it — those are the only differences between that and ordinary bankruptcy. So that’s what I wanted them to do. If they had done that, they would not have needed the huge amounts of taxpayer money.

CHARLIE ROSE: Do you think they’ll get some of it back?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Oh, they’ll get some of the money bank. But the numbers look like very clearly that there will be a significant shortfall, over $100 billion, and most of those calculations do not really provide — talk about appropriate compensation for what we call the time value of money, the risk that we bore.

And so when you say we got the money back, we should have gotten far more than the money back given the risk that we bore.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have an international reputation, are known well around the world, and with admiration. You also saw the kinds of factors coming together that created the crisis that we had to go through. Do you believe that if you had had power to go with your observation you would have been able to prevent the crisis?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I think we could have made sure that it was much less deep than it currently is. We might have been able to prevent it.

And why that’s so relevant to the current policy debate is that right now our financial sector is in some ways more dysfunctional than it was in 2007.

And so as I look at where we are unless, we make some very significant reforms in both the structure of the financial sector and the regulation of the financial sector, I think there is a significant risk that we will some time — five years, ten years — face another crisis of the kind that we’ve just been through.

CHARLIE ROSE: Joseph Stiglitz, won the Nobel Prize in economics. “Freefall: American, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.” Thank you. Pleasure to see you.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Thank you. Nice to see you.

CHARLIE ROSE: Back in a moment. Stay with us.

www.charlierose.com/view/content/10885

罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase） 王宁

　　静态世界中的资源分配是经济学研究的核心问题。在这个想象中的世界，商品和服务的种类都是既定的，甚至允许把未来的商品和服务以跨期贸易（intertemporal trade）的方式计算在内。此外，生产技术也是给定的。所以，无论从整个系统还是从参与者的角度出发，这都是一个静态的世界。

　　就系统的层面看来，这个世界本质上是封闭的，并不存在奈特（Knightian）或者凯恩斯（Keynesian）理论所述的新变化或不确定性。未来世界与现行世界一样可以被明确规定。在个体层面上，经济主体并不考虑创新产品或新的生产方式。前提是所有经济主体皆可平等获得既定的生产技术，这样，研究者不必考虑经济主体的学习空间。

　　在这个静态的世界，任何资源的配置都将以利益最大化为目标，所有潜在的交易收益都将在市场均衡的条件下实现。这种均衡通常被认为是一个价格向量：包含生产要素在内的所有商品和服务的供求形势共同决定了价格。由此看来，这种理论被称为价格理论也就不足为怪了。

　　价格理论之所以意义重大，是因为它有助于我们理解在一个封闭且分权化的体系内的资源配置问题。亚当·斯密的经典思想是，一个纯粹的分权化的经济体系背后似乎有一只“看不见的手”神奇地引导着秩序。而价格理论将这位经济学家洞察力强大的成果进一步理论化了。不过，现代的价格理论固然更为严谨，却也存在盲点和纰漏。这一理论最明显的疏漏在于，它没有体现生产的作用。

　　在实际生产中商品和服务是怎样产生的？新型商品和服务以及新的生产方式如何创造并传播？生产和创新应如何组织？商品和服务的生产方式以及新产品的发明又是由什么因素决定的？这一系列问题很难通过经济学通常的研究议程解决。其特殊之处在于，经济学理论很少涉及生产过程的研究。

　　当经济模型中所有的商品和服务作为给定条件时，生产的过程就几乎被完全忽略了。似乎只需使用一个生产函数就足以将生产要素转化为相应的商品和服务。但是，对于任何现实世界中的经济体系，企业在考虑资源配置问题之前，必须首先决定生产哪些商品和服务，并学习相关生产技术。此后，企业必须实际组织生产过程，毕竟它们并不能魔法般地将生产要素转化为消费者所需的商品和服务。上述的每一步都可能出现各种各样的差错，比如选错目标商品，高估或低估消费需求，处理雇佣关系或客户关系不当。因此，很多新兴企业纷纷折戟商场，销声匿迹。这些企业的错误或许拖累了其他公司，但是同时也为其他企业提供了前车之鉴，帮助它们存活得更久。

挑战传统理论

　　生产的基本特点之一是它的生产性或创造性。正是生产的这种特点才产生了新的产品。其实，它挑战着经济学的首要假设：稀缺性。的确，如果不是受到这无处不在的稀缺性的限制，人们就不必做选择。要是没有选择的必要，也就没有了经济学存在的意义。不过，生产的的确确就是稀缺性的对立力量。尽管生产不会否定稀缺性的局限，但它会不断向外推移稀缺性的限制边界。

　　生产通常包括两个过程，产品开发和生产组织。产品开发涉及运用想象力设计新产品（以及思考其生产方式）。之后便是实际的生产过程，或者将投入转化为产出的经济组织。如果经济分析仅仅关注资源配置，而低估组织生产的重要性，那么产品开发也仍旧不会受到太多重视。产品开发环节在经济学和商界中往往都是被保守的秘密。由于主要涉及思维的展开和发散，这一环节充满了不确定性。此外，产品开发也是一个不存在标准答案和无法预测的过程。许多创新产品其实都来自于意外的发现。基于生产过程的以上特点，要在主流经济学的概念框架下对其进行研究十分困难。

　　稀缺性使选择成为必需，从而引发了利益冲突。通过产权界定和竞争来化解冲突的方法长久以来就是、也还将继续作为经济分析的重要内容。从这个角度来研究生产的某些方面是可以的，的确也有人做过这方面的研究。但是生产，特别是产品开发环节，实质上是由另一种动力驱动的——往往是思想的碰撞超越了利益的争夺。人类产生想法的能力似乎是无限的，这意味着需要竞争来实现优胜劣汰。在稀缺性的限制下，传统的、基于权利的研究方法可能管用。这一理论却并不适用于研究生产环节。

　　生产过程的初期是开发生产商品和服务。在产品开发环节，首先是想象和设计新产品。然后企业家们学习、试验继而实现实际生产，并由企业组织生产、彼此协调。最终包括创意在内的生产要素都被汇集、转化成为了实际的商品和服务。在整个过程中，企业不得不与不同经济主体签订合约，以获得各种的投入原料，这包括生产要素以及中间产品。因为所有合约的不完善性不可避免，所以它们通常被非合同关系纳入和补充。另外，即使企业是生产游戏中的焦点，它们并没有、也不可能脱离其他经济主体独自运作。其他经济主体包括家庭、工会、银行、律所和会计师事务所、政府及非政府监管部门、学校和其他研究机构等。企业和这众多经济主体之间的关系错综复杂。同时，出于各种原因（如扩张自身利益，减少贫困，或者以某种道德标准或社会价值观为原则整顿经济），其他经济主体在经济活动中往往存在某种利益立场。因此，它们试图在各种议题上与商业公司合作。结果，企业的作为和做法以及行为的后果很大程度上都受到了社会中各种运作因素的影响；这些因素包括政府、法律法规、社会传统和道德准则等。

　　这样看来，经济体系显然是机构性密集行为的结果。要在此强调的是，机构并不是惟一的。现实世界中经济体系的运作，涉及和依赖各种机构组织的参与。很少有机构是可以被指定或固定的。经济主体常常被迫临时与新建机构合作，并不断学习以改善机构运作，使生产实施顺利、经济继续发展。这些机构的失败对于经济的深远影响不言而喻。即使近来各机构的经济角色受到越来越多的肯定，甚至被经济学家理论化，但经济学的理论导向却并没有发生根本性的转变。经济学仍然是一门关于选择的科学，资源配置仍然是经济学的核心问题。在此框架内，各机构的参与很可能被当作固定的分类变量，而不会被认为是一个使贸易分工成为可能的实验和学习的环节。

　　要广义的理解生产结构，市场与国家相对的两分法观点现在十分流行，人们普遍认为市场和国家可以而且应该彼此分离。但这却是个大错特错的观点。自由市场的概念并不意味着市场运作完全不受国家政治影响力的干预，也不等于人们可以任意开设和经营市场。自由市场只表示市场对所有经济主体都是开放的，也就是说，个人或企业都享有进入和退出市场的自由。在这里，市场的含义拓展了，它不仅包括流通生产要素和产品的常规经济市场，而且还强调生产结构的市场自由，即参与者可以自由尝试和选择组织协调生产。从广义上理解，自由市场的存在不可能脱离有力的政权、运作良好的法制，以及其他的基础制度。从这个研究项目的角度出发，政权、法制和其他制度在经济发展中扮演的角色正好认可、保护并拓展了此处定义的广义市场，同时也降低了这个市场的经营成本。显然，这个角色的意义远比提供第三方执行力或公共商品更包罗万象。但这恰恰涉及了一个经验性的问题：我们再也不能依靠单一的理论来为国家干预披上合理的外衣，无论这干预是为了保护产权，或者为了纠正市场失灵，还是为了供给公共商品，抑或为了外部性的内在化。

　　由此看来，生产结构为经济学家提供了可供深入发掘的研究议题。以经济学作为分析工具，的确大大拓展了经济帝国主义旗帜下的研究领域，但是却轻易忽略了首要的生产问题。如果某个经济体系不能持续创造和生产商品和服务，并以日益低廉的价格提供给消费者，那么这个经济体系就是失败的。如果经济学不重视经济的脉搏——生产问题，那么这种经济学的发展方向就是被误导的。

　　为了让经济学转向研究生产的结构，我们可以将这一学科由不使用数字的应用数学转化为一门实证科学。这样一来，研究者将把经济体系看作一个生机勃勃不断发展的系统，它与人类的身体或者其他有机物非常类似，其内部包含很多相互依存的子系统——也许是法律系统，政治系统，教育系统等——不同系统间又彼此相联，皆嵌入更大规模的社会系统之中。这个开放的世界充满生机，与静态或机械的世界截然不同。

　　我们以往对于经济的分析早已人为地分解为零散部件，需要用将经济体系视为有机活体的综合性眼光来平衡。各种产品、资本设备乃至生产知识的积累并不能使经济体成为有机物。经济是由人来经营的；所以不管属于合约性质还是非合约性质，人际关系都将渗入整个经济体系。而无论好坏，正是人的参与使得经济体系成为了富有活力不断发展的系统。做经济研究时，我们要充分认识到这样一个事实，那就是，人类是兼具社会性、政治性、道德性和情感性的动物。

　　由于对生产结构这样的现实议题的关注，我们提出的研究项目将带来另一裨益。一般来说，实际经济理论（相对于分析工具或抽象原理而言）的发展或多或少都是由现实生活中的经济问题驱动的。该理论的大致方向和其参数的设定方式都明显受到当时特定社会条件和主流文化预设价值观的影响。自西方经验中发展而来的现存经济理论将在多大程度上有助于阐释中国经济的现实，这是个需要谨慎对待的实证性问题。如若将中国经济研究视为应用或检验现存经济理论的途径之一，那就是错上加错了。如果把中国经济硬套入现有理论，研究者一则无异于冒着削足适履的风险；二则也错失了拓展经济理论视野的宝贵机会。我们认为，以中国经济为大背景研究生产结构（包括中国市场变革中出现的新挑战）将为丰富经济理论及深入理解经济运作带来极大的可能。

研究中国的十个方向

　　生产结构研究的层面是多样的，从公司、产业到区域经济、国家经济甚至全球经济都可以入手。研究者可以针对特定历史时间点或者时间段的情况进行调查。当然，下面的十个问题并不能囊括所有研究方向，只为起到抛砖引玉的作用，就此次专题讨论会研究项目的范围和特点提供建议。由于很少有研究会关注生产结构的问题，在此列出的大多数问题在本质上都是基于实证经验的。一方面，在阐释问题和理论推理之前，研究者首先需要查明事实；另一方面，如果对探寻的方向没有一个大致的概念，研究者很容易迷失在纷繁复杂的现实世界和庞大杂乱的事实数据中。

　　本文旨在协助各位展开研究之路。这趟智慧旅程固然不需要路线指引或者蓝图规划，但是正确的研究方向以及开放好奇和切合常理的态度却必不可少。

　　1.企业内部是如何组织的？尽管任何正式组织皆具有其层级结构，但它们的运作不可能仅仅或者主要依赖于命令和服从。激励和人际关系对企业的运作同样不可或缺。企业的这一特性是如何与其他特性以及其整体运作情况（生产力和创作力）相关联的？中国大多数私营企业都是在过去20年间发展起来的。如果能对中国企业的兴起和发展做一个系统的研究，那一定会非常有趣。

　　2.企业如何协调彼此之间的交易？合同在构建商业关系中固然起到了作用，但不可避免的问题是，合同往往是不完善的。而企业之间的社会关系以及企业管理者间的个人关系可能比定义企业间的商业关系更为重要。那么企业协调彼此交易的方式又是怎么影响到其与上游供应商、下游客户及竞争对手打交道的成本的呢？

　　3.至少从亚当·斯密开始，经济学家们就已经认识到劳动分工在经济生产中的作用至关重要。但是企业中的劳动分工模式是什么样的呢？如果这种模式的确存在，那么它是由哪些因素决定的？当生产线中出现进一步的专业化分工，业内现有企业是否会迅速占据一席之地，还是会让位于新出现的公司（而新公司很可能是从现有企业分拆出来的）？如果专业化分工存在局限性，那么这种局限性取决于什么？

　　4.英国经济学家阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔（Alfred Marshall）早已指出，现代经济的发展与有机组织的演化相似，一方面不同部门间越来越专业化，另一方面又要求各部门间紧密联系和相互依存。这种矛盾是如何反映在生产结构中的，又是如何被生产结构所解决（注意不是消除）？

　　5.企业如何在创新力竞争中出奇制胜？尽管经济理论几乎只强调价格竞争的重要性，但产品创新方面的竞争对企业的存亡却更为重要（在这里我们指的是广义的创新）。创新很少凭空出现，它更有可能是基于已有的想法和元素的重组。同时，由于任何知识都只能学习而无法复制，所以企业为了能够更加“巧妙地”模仿，也必须多少有点创新力。因此，将这些企业所谓的“生产”称作“创造”或者说“创造性破坏”，也许更为贴切。“创造性破坏”将生产要素转化成一系列固定的商品和服务。那么这种广泛意义上的“创新”又是如何实现的？

　　6.长期以来，创业精神一直被认为是经济活力的终极动力，美国经济学家熊彼特（Schumpeter）所说的“创造性破坏”就与之密不可分。从生产结构的角度来看，创业精神是一个经济过程，而不是某种心理特征。因此，新产品（包括商品和服务）的出现和过时产品的消失不仅仅可以为分析动态生产结构提供有趣的角度，还会为研究创业精神提供肥沃的土壤。不妨以某个行业为例，研究在众多企业盛衰沉浮的大背景下由技术创新产生的新产品如何与现有产品竞争。接下来，我们不禁要问，中国的企业家和创业精神来自何处？它们又是如何推动了中国经济的变革？

　　7.产业的本土化在中国或其他国家都是普遍现象。不同情况下的产业本土化是如何运作的？本土化并不是在华企业所独有的，这意味着必然存在某些普遍的经济力量导致了生产的地理集中。另一方面，中国当地政府在促进产业本土化的进程中无疑起到了重要作用。那么在中国，政治权力和经济力量是如何相互作用，从而共塑生产的本土结构的呢？

　　8.由于经济是一个保持开放和不断发展的体系，它必将受到社会中各种运作因素的影响。在诸多因素中，法律法规、文化规范和信任机制会对企业、地区或国家的生产结构和经济形势带来什么样的影响？既然经济总是在不断变化，那么随着时间推移，上述因素又会如何影响生产结构变化的方式？

　　9.在中国经济的发展进程中，国家权力的强大影响力无处不在。中央与地方政府之间的紧张状态，以及各地方政府间的相互较劲，又进一步让中国的政治与经济关系更为错综复杂。实际上，这并非仅仅是“中国特色”。在18世纪-19世纪，美国各州政府也曾以同样积极活跃的姿态参与到经济活动当中。从何时起，政府对待经济的态度只是保持活跃参与而不是人为干扰呢？中国政府的存在又将在哪些方面改变我们对前面一系列问题的答案？

　　10.中国幅员辽阔，人口众多，加之地域差异性大，分权化特征明显，这一切使中国经济具有了丰富性和多样性。区域竞争被广泛认为是了解中国经济的重要因素。不过，至今尚未出现从地方各级的层面（乡镇、县、市、省、地区）对中国经济进行系统的比较研究。比如，通过横向比较100个县的经济情况，可以为分析中国经济的发展规律提供充足可靠的数据库。

　　本文将用做2010年度芝加哥“生产的工业结构”讨论会的与会指南。讨论会将于7月19日至23日在芝加哥大学法学院举行。届时，数位中国著名的经济学家将应邀出席，共同探讨“生产的工业结构”议题。与会者将就中国经济的语境下，生产的工业结构进行实证分析，并提交相关论文。本文旨在帮助读者明确该讨论会关注的研究领域。

　　以百岁高龄组织这场研讨会，科斯教授坚信，通过研究生产结构，中国的经济学家定能为经济学发展贡献独创性的理论与思考，而这将是世界经济学与中国经济学界的双赢。科斯教授认为，如果中国国内能开展此项研究，未来的50至100年间经济学能藉此发展得更加完善，也更能反映经济活动的真实面貌。 （龚橙 翻译）

　　罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）为1991年诺贝尔经济学奖得主，芝加哥大学法学院教授

　　王宁为亚利桑那州立大学政策及全球研究学院助理教授

In 2000, the United States had a balanced federal budget. Today, America has a deficit problem that threatens the country’s future. It is compounded by former President George W. Bush’s fiscal recklessness, the economic crisis that began with September 2008′s financial collapse, President Barack Obama’s spending ambitions, and the mysterious ability of the weakened Republican Party to create political deadlock in Congress.

Under Bush, spending was increased, taxes were cut, and the result was huge deficits financed by borrowing. Then came the “Great Recession,” as it is being called (I call it a depression because of its probable long-term economic and political consequences). The public debt (the important component of the national debt — the part that is more than an accounting entity — that is really owed), which the Bush administration’s deficits had caused to double, soared further. It soared because of falling tax revenues, rising unemployment benefits, and rising government expenditures to fight the depression (such as Obama’s $787 billion stimulus plan). The public debt reached $7.5 trillion by the end of fiscal year 2009 (Sept. 30, 2009) and is expected to increase another $1.6 trillion this fiscal year and another $1.3 trillion next year. That means it may exceed $10 trillion by Sept. 30, 2011. Almost half the debt is owned by foreigners, and the interest payments to them are a drain on American wealth. Interest rates on the debt will rise as the world economy recovers, increasing competition for capital.

The United States has a deeply wounded economy. At this writing, transfer payments by the government to individuals and families (Social Security, unemployment benefits, tax credits, etc.) exceed the taxes being collected from the household sector. At the same time, private investment net of depreciation is negative. This means that private savings are being borrowed by the government, combined with the government’s foreign borrowing, and then transferred to households to enable them to maintain their accustomed level of consumption. People are saving more, but government borrowing overwhelms their saving, with the result that aggregate saving — public plus private — is negative. So: negative savings, negative private investment, an incredible ratio of household debt to disposable income (1.25 to 1, though down from 1.39 to 1 in 2007), massive government borrowing to finance private consumption — not a nice combination.

When the American economy does finally recover, tax revenues will rise, unemployment benefits will fall, and depression-fighting programs will end — so annual deficits should decline. But realistically, this means only that the public debt will grow more slowly than it will be growing this year and next.

The international dimensions of public debt growing slowly or rapidly from a very high level deserve consideration. At some point, the value of the dollar relative to other currencies will fall; this effect will be accelerated if, as is not unlikely, the “easy money” policy of the Federal Reserve, instituted to fight the depression, results in significant inflation. A falling dollar may endanger the dollar’s status as an international reserve currency. Foreign contracts are often denominated in dollars rather than in a local currency. If an oil producer in a Middle Eastern country sells oil to a refinery in a South American country, neither party may be happy to have payment made in the currency of the other party’s country because by the time payment is due, the value of the currency may have changed to the advantage of the other party. By providing that payment will be made in U.S. dollars, the parties can hedge against changes in the value of the local currencies. For such hedging to be effective, however, the value of the dollar has to be stable. If it becomes unstable, the dollar may cease to be the principal international reserve currency, accounting at present for almost two-thirds of international currency reserves — a status that allows the United States to run a trade deficit (up to a point) costlessly because foreign countries need to hold U.S. dollar reserves to supply dollars in exchange for local currencies to businesses that have dollar-denominated contracts.

It is true that as growing deficits reduce the value of the dollar relative to other currencies, while making imports more expensive, American exports will grow, implying a shift of workers and capital from services to manufacturing. But the shift, reversing a long-term decline in manufacturing relative to services, may be a painful and protracted one, just as China’s transition from an export-led manufacturing economy to a domestic consumer economy is likely to be painful and protracted. Any major restructuring of a country’s economy will produce heavy unemployment as a byproduct until the restructuring is complete.

The adjustments that will be needed — if the economy does not outgrow an increasing burden of debt — to maintain the U.S. economic position in the world may be especially painful and difficult because of features of the American political scene that suggest that the country might be becoming in important respects ungovernable. The perfection of interest-group politics has brought about a situation in which, to exaggerate just a bit, taxes can’t be increased, spending programs can’t be cut, and new spending is irresistible. If one may judge by the Bush administration’s fiscal improvidence, these tendencies are bipartisan.

America used to have a liberal and a conservative party, though both were loose coalitions lacking European-style rigid ideological uniformity. The Democrats, the liberal party, favored big government and therefore big government spending — and therefore high taxes to pay for the big spending. The conservative party, the Republicans, opposed big government and big government spending, and therefore favored low taxes. These were coherent positions. For Democrats, however, favoring heavy taxes was a political albatross, while for Republicans the albatross was opposing big government spending. Beginning with Ronald Reagan and continuing with George W. Bush, Republicans squared the circle by abandoning their opposition to big spending while redoubling their commitment to low taxes. Belatedly, the Obama administration has decided that while still favoring big government spending (indeed more than recent Democratic administrations have done), it too wants to keep taxes low — not as low as the Republicans want, but low enough that deficits that swamp those of the Reagan and Bush years are looming.

The decline of bipartisanship is lamentable; it is small consolation that fiscal imprudence is bipartisan. The parties play leapfrog when it comes to spending. From the standpoint of economic policy, the United States has only one party, and it is the party of profligacy.

As real interest rates rise as a consequence of a growing public debt and declining demand for the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency, U.S. savings rates will rise and, by reducing consumption expenditures, slow economic activity. Economic growth may also fall as more and more resources are poured into keeping alive elderly people, most of whom are not highly productive members of society from an economic standpoint. The United States may find itself in the same kind of downward economic spiral that developing countries often find themselves in.

American political culture is sick, but the broader social culture may also impede renewed economic progress. America’s growth has been promoted by the “can-do” attitude of its people, their rejection of fatalism, their individualism — qualities conducive to innovation, ambition, and hard work. But the rejection of fatalism is also a major factor in the country’s soaring medical costs, as its old people (and often their children) insist that every effort be made, at taxpayer expense, to extend their lives. As a result, 25 percent of Medicare costs are incurred in treating elderly people in the last few months of life. American individualism is also a barrier to fiscal belt-tightening through tax hikes or spending cuts. A can-do attitude can and often does express itself in a refusal to worry about looming crises. Americans can overcome any challenge. So not to worry! Qualities that promote a country’s fortunes in one era may undermine them in another.

Because of the low U.S. inflation rate and the Federal Reserve’s determination to keep interest rates very low, the dollar has become a favorite tool of the “carry trade,” endangering the world economy. By borrowing U.S. dollars cheaply (because U.S. interest rates are being artificially depressed by the Federal Reserve in an effort to ease credit and by doing so stimulate economic growth) and exchanging them for foreign currencies to lend or invest, traders can earn generous profits — though not without great risk. The carry trade may be a factor in recent rises in commodity prices; indeed, there is fear of new bubbles as a result of all the dollars sloshing around in the world economy. This poses dangers for the global economy because the carry trade is susceptible to runs. If a speculator borrows dollars in the short term to minimize interest expense and uses them to buy rupees, say, and the dollar surges in value relative to the rupee, the speculator may have to sell his rupees in a hurry to repay his lenders. If so, the value of the rupee will fall farther relative to the dollar, which may precipitate a run on rupees as speculators unload them. And because of the integration of the world’s financial systems, a run on a foreign currency can harm other countries’ economies.

The Fed has made clear that it intends to keep short-term interest rates rock-bottom low for some time, reassuring the carry traders that the Fed is not going to pull the rug out from under them by open market operations designed to reduce U.S. bank balances, a policy that would increase the value of the dollar in relation to other currencies by reducing the amount of money in circulation (the U.S. money supply is essentially the sum of all U.S. bank balances), and by doing so would increase interest rates on dollar loans. The Obama administration is doing nothing, moreover, to prevent the dollar from falling in value relative to other currencies — the government wants it to fall in order to spur exports, import substitution, and a mild inflation — and a falling dollar makes the carry trade more profitable. The carry trader borrows dollars with which to buy currencies that can be invested at higher interest rates than the cost of borrowing the dollars — and then, after cashing out the investment, he returns to the lenders dollars worth less than when he borrowed them.

The Greek fiscal crisis has caused the value of the dollar to rise sharply against the euro, and if this new valuation of the dollar persists it will hurt U.S. exports and could also trigger a crisis in the carry trade. This is a further illustration of how globally connected the U.S. economy has become — and why getting America’s fiscal house in order is an urgent priority.

NYT: Skepticism for Obama’s Fiscal Policy

Review

Stiglitz’s view of the crisis describes a possible road—a better road—than the one taken by the Obama administration. And his book concludes with broader proposals for a better balance between market and civil society, domestically and globally. What makes Stiglitz special is that, along with Paul Krugman, he is the rare progressive in a profession whose norms resist tampering with the verdicts of markets or the power of private capital and also one of the few world-class technical economists who can write lucidly for a lay audience. The tone of this book is good-humored and public-minded. (Bob Kuttner – The American Prospect)

Product Description

Nobel Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz explains the current financial crisis—and the coming global economic order. The current global financial crisis carries a “made-in-America” label. In this forthright and incisive book, Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz explains how America exported bad economics, bad policies, and bad behavior to the rest of the world, only to cobble together a haphazard and ineffective response when the markets finally seized up. Drawing on his academic expertise, his years spent shaping policy in the Clinton administration and at the World Bank, and his more recent role as head of a UN commission charged with reforming the global financial system, Stiglitz outlines a way forward building on ideas that he has championed his entire career: restoring the balance between markets and government, addressing the inequalities of the global financial system, and demanding more good ideas (and less ideology) from economists.

Freefall is an instant classic, combining an enthralling whodunit account of the current crisis with a bracing discussion of the broader economic issues at stake. .

About the Author

Winner of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics, Joseph E. Stiglitz is the author of Making Globalization Work; Globalization and Its Discontents; and, with Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War. He was chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and served as senior vice president and chief economist at the World Bank. He teaches at Columbia University and lives in New York City.

罗伯特·曼戈贝拉·昂格尔（Roberto Mangabeira Unger）：《重新想象的自由贸易：劳动的世界分工与经济学方法》（Free Trade Reimagined: The World Division of Labor and the Method of Economics），高健译，北京大学出版社2009年。@豆瓣@小组

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内容简介

本书从对自由贸易理论和实践的批评开始，但昂格尔并非在为贸易保护作辩护，而是对自由贸易论者和贸易保护主义者一贯的争论所立足的条件进行批驳和修正。他之所以涉足这场重要的论辩，是为了促使我们对那些用来解释经济活动的基本理论进行反思。他指出，我们可以采取一种不同于既有经济学方法的方法来理解当代经济现象，这种方法更现实，也更有助于揭示那些一直隐藏的变革的可能性。

昂格尔声称，对于全球化，我们不必局限于接受还是拒绝这两种选择，而可以开展一种截然不同的全球化。较之物和资金的流动，人和观念的流动要更为重要，而改革现有市场经济制度的自由与建立在这些制度基础上的商品交换的自由则是同等重要的。

本书谈论的不只是经济学，它还要求一种严谨的想象，以反抗今天的生活和思想中所特有的那种专制态度。

书评

很少有人的思想能和曼戈贝拉·昂格尔一样丰富。在这本非同凡响的著作中，昂格尔把他的注意力转到一个亟待创新也急需输入新鲜血液的学术领域，这就是围绕自由贸易所进行的那些老掉牙的争论。——丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik），《一种经济学 多种药方》的作者，哈佛大学

昂格尔对自由贸易的评论含义深刻且引人注目。他的核心观点（在我看来是绝对不容置疑的）是，一个国家的比较优势始终是由公共当局与私人利益共同建构的。本文对作者的观点进行了淋漓尽致的阐述，处处展现了作者的才华。无论对那些笃信自由贸易理论的人，还是那些坚持该理论从根本上就存在缺陷的人，本文都是一个清晰且分量十足的挑战。——查尔斯·萨贝尔（Charles Sabel），哥伦比亚大学法学院

罗伯特·曼戈贝拉·昂格尔（Roberto Mangabeira Unger），1947年出生于里约热内卢，1970年开始任教于哈佛大学法学院，1976年获终身教职，2004年当选为美国艺术与科学研究院院士，2007-2009年担任巴西战略事务部部长。昂格尔是当代著名法学家，是批判法学运动的领军人物，也是政治活动家，长期活跃于巴西政坛。主要著作有《知识与政治》、《现代社会中的法律》、《激情：论人格》、《批判法学运动》、《政治学：构成社会理论》、《被实现的民主》、《法律分析应当为何》。

高健，同济大学经济学硕士，现于爱丁堡大学攻读经济社会史博士学位。译有《谁搞垮了通用：百年汽车巨头的十年拯救之路》（合译，人民邮电出版社，2009年8月）。

科斯给 Markets, Firms and Property Rights: A Celebration of the Research of Ronald Coase 会议的发言：“市场、企业与财产权”（2009年11月23日录制）。

下载音频文件[MP3]

视频：

Ronald Coase: Centennial Coase Lecture [2003]