CHARLIE ROSE: Joseph Stiglitz is here. He served as one of President Clinton’s top advisors and as chief economist at the World Bank. Today, he’s advising the Greek government as it faces a debt crisis that has rattled the European markets. Earlier in his career he was part of a team that won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001.

His new book is called “Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.” In this he writes that he fears the country faces a far longer and deeper recession with a financial system that is more vulnerable to another crisis.

Give me a sense of where you think we are.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, we’ve been brought back from the brink, but we’re not out of the woods. And let me tell you why I think we are still in a — you might say a precarious position.

While growth is starting to resume, it’s not likely to be sustained. It’s likely to get much weaker. But the core problems are two. First, a very high level of unemployment. More than one out of six Americans would like a full-time job and can’t get it. This includes people who have jobs but are working part time, can’t get a real job.

And 40 percent, more than 40 percent of those who are unemployed today are long-term unemployed, unemployed for more than six months. That’s so important because the longer you’re unemployed, you drain your cash reserves.

And particularly for young people, a period of should be building up skills, those skills, their training becomes weakened. And we know from previous downturns in the United States and elsewhere that young people who have experienced, or other people who’ve experience protracted periods of unemployment are much harder to bring back into the labor force. And when they do, their wages are markedly lower.

And then there’s the problem with the foreclosure, which is what started the crisis in the first place. The pace of foreclosures is expected to be higher in 2010 than in 2008 and ‘09. We’ve done nothing about the — almost nothing about the underwater mortgages where they owe more money than —

CHARLIE ROSE: Than the house is worth.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — than the house is worth. And more than 25 percent of those with mortgages are now underwater.

Now, there’s some additional problems that we’re about to face. Commercial real estate, about a half trillion dollars commercial real estate has to be rolled over.

CHARLIE ROSE: We have loans that are coming due, and they’ve got to —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — be rolled over somehow. Many of those are underwater. Many of those are securitized, and those are very difficult to roll over.

In the old days where you had conventional banking, the banks might have rolled them over holding their nose and closing their eyes in the view that — with the view that maybe with luck somewhere down the road things will get better.

Bank examiners, supervisors, are less willing to engage in what’s called forbearance because they’ve been very criticized for having not done their job in the last five years. And with securitization, it’s almost impossible to roll over these underwater mortgages.

The first of these problems came to the fore in the bankruptcy of Cifizen. And that was a multiple dollar failure.

CHARLIE ROSE: By one of the most reputable land development and real estate firms in the city of New York, and then when it came time to pay the loan, they couldn’t do it.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And that’s symptomatic of what we’re about to see over and over again.

Two more problems, if you’re not feeling bad enough. The states have a shortfall of about

CHARLIE ROSE: The states?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The states — of $200 billion a year in revenues, down from what it would normally be because of the recession. And the states — many of the states depend very heavily on property taxes. The states have balanced budget frameworks, which means that when the revenues go down, they either have to cut expenditures or raise taxes. That’s equivalent to a negative stimulus.

And so far the federal government’s been picking up about a third of that gap, but with the stimulus coming to an end in 2011, the question is, what will happen.

I just came back from California where you see the future, in a way — teachers, university professors on furlough two days a month on the way to being laid off. And, you know, a whole set of problems in a number of other states.

So these are among the sort of clouds hanging on the horizon —

CHARLIE ROSE: And so therefore you believe the consequences of all these things are?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That the economy will not be able to sustain the growth that we’ve seen in the last two quarters. There will be a marked slowdown, possibly into actually a double dip, which is another recession.

But the bottom line is for what most people care about, jobs, growth will be too slow to provide new jobs for the new entrants in the labor force, and certainly too slow reduce the unemployment from the very high level that it is.

So it’s going to be a lot of stress both in the labor market and the housing market unless we do something more than we’ve been doing.

CHARLIE ROSE: And what would that be?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that comes to the view, I think we need a second stimulus. We need a large second stimulus. A lot of deficit hawks are around there saying we can’t afford it. And I would say we can’t afford not to do it. And, you know —

CHARLIE ROSE: You have to put people to work first and then you can worry about the deficit.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Moreover, it was the shortsightedness of the banks that got us into this trouble. We ought to be looking not at the deficit but the long-term debt.

If we take — if a large fraction of this money goes into investments — education, technology, infrastructure — and we under-invested in the all these areas for years, all we need is a return of about five percent or six percent, and then we get more tax revenue from the growth in the short run, we get more tax revenue from the growth in the long run from these productive investments, and our long-term national debt will be lower as a result of running a deficit today.

And that’s what we should be focusing on.

CHARLIE ROSE: What size stimulus are you talking about?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the way I like to think about it is the size ought to be appropriate for the depth of the downturn. So, for instance, one of the key pieces of what I’ve been calling for is making up for the shortfall in revenues of the states.

So right now that shortfall is about $200 billion. If our economy remains weak, we’re going to have to make up for that. If the economy recovers, then the amount of money we have to put in would be that much less.

And if I were an optimist I would say it’s going to recover, but I don’t know, and I’m a little bit of a pessimist seeing the kinds of problems that we face.

CHARLIE ROSE: Some argue that we should have had a much larger stimulus — Paul Krugman for example. You’re in the same camp.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. That’s one of the points I said in “Freefall.” And even the president’s chairman of the council of economic advisors is said to have —

CHARLIE ROSE: Christina Romer.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Christina Romer said we needed $1.2 trillion. And what we’ve seen since then has been very clear they were optimistic about where we were going.

And it’s a really important point here. The stimulus has worked. A lot of people have looked and said unemployment has gone up and that proves the stimulus hasn’t worked. No, the stimulus worked. But if we hadn’t had the stimulus we would have had, say, 12 percent unemployment instead of 10 percent.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, but then they argue you could have designed a better stimulus.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. Again, something I say in my book. Clearly we could have done it. The big mistake we made was the tax cut. We knew from the experiment we did in February, 2008, the Bush tax cut, with the overhang of debt and with the uncertainty in the job market people would save a large fraction.

It makes them feel good, it’s important for their sense of well-being, but the nature of a stimulus is it has to stimulate. That means you have to have spending. And so a very large fraction of Americans have saved a significant part of that stimulus.

The other part that I think was a mistake was we didn’t give enough aid to the states in the way I described. And so you have this picture across the United States while the government — the federal government is putting money in, they’re contracting.

CHARLIE ROSE: Here’s what I don’t understand. Larry Summers early on — and I realize you and Larry have had —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Discussions.

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: Discussions, yes, have had intense discussions — said early on “timely, temporary, targeted” for stimulus. So that idea was out there. Were these targeted?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They were reasonably targeted, but not as targeted as they should have been.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK. You would have spent more money on jobs that would really train people for the future?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. And — that’s a long-run vision — and a recognition of the problem of the states that I talked about. And that is a way of putting money into the banks of the economy very quickly without creating a new bureaucracy because if you don’t put the money there they have to lay off workers.

And in a recession is exactly time that there’s so many demands. And people — young people who can’t get a job want a place in a university. They want to be able to at least build up their skills.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And the universities are contracting. It just doesn’t make any sense.

CHARLIE ROSE: I hear time and time again that the president made a mistake when he said we’re going to engage with the stimulus program and in other programs — education, climate change, and health care, that he should have said the issue is jobs, jobs, jobs. Do you buy that argument?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Not really, because the problem wasn’t lack of focus. The problem was a program that was not as strong as it should have been.

CHARLIE ROSE: Because of congress?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: One interpretation was a judgment about political feasibility. And my view on that was that if you compromise too much early and it turns out that you need more money later on, it would be difficult for you to accomplish what you really wanted. And that’s exactly the situation we’re now in, because it is now clear that we need a second stimulus, and many people are saying the stimulus didn’t work. So that was a political judgment that I think may have been flawed.

The second argument for why not enough was done in the area of mortgages and the banks, or not the right thing done in the area of mortgages and banks, was the influence of the financial sector that had gotten us into the trouble in the first place.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’re talking about the TARP program and the bank bailouts and the bailout of General Motors and Chrysler?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, and in particular — for instance, one of the — a lot of people said why don’t you give more money to homeowners so that they can restructure their mortgages. Let’s have trickle-up economics.

CHARLIE ROSE: My impression is that banks are modifying mortgages. Am I completely wrong about that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Very little.

CHARLIE ROSE: So it’s a good idea — they claim they’re doing it, but they’re not doing it enough?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And there’s one category which is a very important, the most important category where it’s almost not happening at all, and that’s the underwater mortgages. The one in four mortgages where they owe more money —

CHARLIE ROSE: Than the house is worth. What should be done about that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, what I advocate is what I call a “homeowners’ chapter 11.” And chapter 11 is a provision of our bankruptcy code that allows a restructuring of debt that says that if you owe more money than the company is worth, you convert bondholders into shareholders, and the shareholders get wiped out.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is your voice heard in the White House because of the tension that has existed in your relationship with Larry Summers?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I don’t think that’s the issue at all. I think there was —

CHARLIE ROSE: What’s the issue?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The issue is the influence of the financial markets, of the people who at first succeed in getting deregulation.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Then succeed in getting —

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, but let’s talk about it specifically. The people — are you talking about Larry Summers now who, because of his influence has — within the treasury with Bob Rubin — were able to get deregulation, were able to get Glass-Steagall repealed? Is that what we’re talking about?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s part of what we’re talking about. But it’s more pervasive than that, because it’s not only that they succeeded in getting this deregulation, you know, preventing regulation of the derivative, which the derivatives are what led to the problem at AIG, which cost American taxpayers so much money.

CHARLIE ROSE: And who was the woman that was surging them and trying to warn them?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Bjorn (ph), and she had said before the long-term capital management debacle —

CHARLIE ROSE: This was a debacle a number of years earlier.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That was back in 1998. The failure of one firm threatened to bring down the whole global financial market.

CHARLIE ROSE: And that was early warning.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That was an early warning. She said it before. She said after that, how can you doubt that? And yet they succeeded in not only not having the regulation but passing a law saying you could not regulate it.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have been much tougher than you are being here. You have said, for example, that Larry Summers and the Obama team are in the pockets of the banks and they need new faces who have no vested interest in the past.

You’re basically saying they came with a mindset to the Obama administration that was sort of — we want to make sure we take care of Wall Street so that when the time came and the crunch came and the emergency came they were not prepared for the kind of solutions that you believed were the right solution for the right moment.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. It’s a mindset —

CHARLIE ROSE: What’s the mindset?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, it’s the mindset that began with saying markets always work.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And that Adam Smith’s idea that the invisible hand, the pursuit of self-interests would lead —

CHARLIE ROSE: So you’re saying there was no difference in their attitude about market than was, say, Alan Greenspan?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. There was a picture on “Time” that described the three of them as “The Committee to Save the World.” And the fact is they approached the problems of regulation and managing the monetary system in a very —

CHARLIE ROSE: Are we talking about Summers, Rubin, and Greenspan, or are we talking about whom?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that group, but there were others.

One of the things I think is important in this area is not just to focus on individuals but to focus on ideas, and these ideas were very pervasive.

One of my concerns has been not only did they bring in, in some sense, the wrong mindset but because they were so closely affiliated with the mistakes of the past, it would be very difficult to get confidence.

CHARLIE ROSE: With great respect for a Nobel laureate, some might argue that Joe Stiglitz is a little bit outside and he’s screaming a bit because those guys were brought inside and he wasn’t.

And he had a Nobel Prize, experience at the World Bank, and had written a number of books and was, you know, a distinguished professor. So therefore he had all the credentials to be on the inside and he wasn’t, and they were. So now he’s saying those guys had a mindset that prevented them from fixing the problem.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, I really didn’t want to go inside. I had been through that experience. It was a very exciting time.

CHARLIE ROSE: For Clinton.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Under President Clinton. It was a very exciting time.

CHARLIE ROSE: With Bob Rubin.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: We often differed. I opposed the repeal of Glass-Steagall, he supported it.

But what has disturbed me is that others like Paul Volcker have been very — who share many of the same views, have been very — their views have been very reluctant to be heard.

CHARLIE ROSE: But they are heard now.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They are being heard, and that’s what I feel much better about.

CHARLIE ROSE: But being heard on one question, the big question of financial reform and the need for new kinds of regulation.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. And even that is not as much as I would — I think is necessary.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: We’re about a third of the way.

CHARLIE ROSE: What will be the two-thirds that are missing?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, for instance, Volcker has focused a great deal on making sure that the depository institutions, commercial banks, do not engage in proprietary trading, that they’re not too big to fail.

CHARLIE ROSE: That they don’t have hedge funds or private equity firms.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. I’ve also been concerned that you can have too big to fail institutions that are not deposit-taking institutions — investment banks, that once you separate the two, you can still —

CHARLIE ROSE: But he seems to be arguing to me and others that there’s no such thing as too big to fail if, in fact, you’re not a depository institution.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. And that’s where, I think, we differ.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK, that’s one place you differ.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And so, for instance, we wound up bailing out AIG and we bailed out —

CHARLIE ROSE: Should we have bailed out AIG or should we — what was the alternative?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The alternative was to say let it go and if —

CHARLIE ROSE: What does “let it go” mean?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Let it go bankrupt.

CHARLIE ROSE: OK.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And if some parts of our financial institutions have problems, need money, like Goldman Sachs, then give them money — not give them money, lend then money in a way that will get back —

CHARLIE ROSE: In the same way they did with Citigroup? You lend them money for a piece of the equity, or just lend them money —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: One of my criticisms is that when you give them money, you get back appropriate compensation. So the form would have been such as something like Warren Buffett. When he gave money to Goldman Sachs he got back warrants and preferred shares.

CHARLIE ROSE: And a 10 percent return.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And a very high return. And so we should have done just as well as Warren Buffett. Why can’t we negotiate terms — that was an arm’s length deal not affected by politics.

CHARLIE ROSE: So in other words, the United States government should have been a Warren Buffett negotiating the deals it made with commercial institutions, with financial institutions that were in trouble.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. And other countries have done a better job in providing money to their banks and getting back value than the United States. So that’s what we should have done there.

Another area that we need to do something about is do more in breaking up the too big to fail banks. I think, you know, the notion that these too big to fail banks can be trusted in any way seems to be — you know, the one thing economists agree on is that incentives matter. And if you have an incentive to engage in excessive risk taking, you will.

And the question there is whether the failure of this institution engaging in financial activities would send significant ripples through the economy that anybody could say to us if you don’t save that institution it will have sufficient consequences through the financial system.

You know, there are other set of issues with General Motors for jobs —

CHARLIE ROSE: And how do you measure that?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, that’s not an easy question, but there are models that can look at what happens if you pull out one institution out of the financial web. One of the big advances in recent years in research, particularly the Bank of England, have been to look at these networks of financial interdependence. Some of my own research is actually focused on exactly that kind of question.

CHARLIE ROSE: I think government of the Bank of England, Mervin King — is that his name?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is in favor of breaking up the banks.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, he says, and I agree, if you’re too big to fail you’re too big to be.

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: And you buy that.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I buy that.

CHARLIE ROSE: Universal banks is not by definition a bad idea, is it?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I think what you have to look at in the context of the American economy are the costs versus the benefits.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There are some benefits, but what we’ve seen are the costs far outweigh those benefits.

An important point to remember is the services that they provide won’t disappear. They will be provided, but organized differently.

CHARLIE ROSE: And more efficiently.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And I think more efficiently.

And the point is right now we can’t — the big banks are effectively subsidized and they have a competitive advantage not based on greater efficiency, but the fact is that because everybody knows they’re too big to fail they can get capital at a lower interest rate, and that gives them a big advantage over every smaller institution.

CHARLIE ROSE: You believe that the American capitalist system should look much more like the European Scandinavian model, which is sometimes called “capitalism with a human face.”

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right.

CHARLIE ROSE: What do you mean?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There are a couple of dimensions of this. One is we have to recognize that we need to get a balance between the market and the government. And the government plays an important role not just in restraining bad behavior but also promoting innovation. The Internet, which has transformed our society, was financed by —

CHARLIE ROSE: By the government.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: By the government.

CHARLIE ROSE: The Pentagon, in fact.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The revolutions in biology that are extending our lives begin with basic research that is funded by the government. So that —

CHARLIE ROSE: And done at the university level and at NIH and wherever.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: So that gives you an important constructive role for government.

CHARLIE ROSE: But we already do that, don’t we?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: But part of the debate is the extent to which we do it. Part of the debate is the extent to which we — the role of the government in restraining the bad behavior, the regulation that we talked about in the financial sector.

So that’s part of our debate. And then the other part of the debate is the extent of social protections that you provide.

CHARLIE ROSE: The safety net.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The safety net. And that —

CHARLIE ROSE: So therefore has France — being exhibit one — been better off in the economic crisis than we have because they had more influence of the state in their economy and had a firmer safety net?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes, both France and Germany have — you know, they’ve been very badly hit, but on the other hand, the amount of suffering of the individuals has not been as bad.

I’ll give you one example. One of the things that we’re now — a number of places are beginning to imitate in the United States is where they put people into part-time work so that they share the work. They’ve recognized the system isn’t working well, and that rather than having, as the United States, one out of six Americans — one out of ten Americans who can’t get a job, what they’re doing is sharing the work more broadly.

CHARLIE ROSE: All right, let me just continue down this. You suggest that capitalism has some moral failings.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: An example, for instance, was in the financial market the —

CHARLIE ROSE: “Moral depravity of the financial sector,” I think, is the term you used.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. And the example I give is the discovery that was made a few years ago that there was money at the bottom of the pyramid and they did everything they could to move that money from the bottom of the pyramid to the top, including predatory lending, the credit card abuses.

The point I was making here was that, well, one of the criticisms — and I think a justified criticism — of the financial sector was that it didn’t manage risk-taking well. It didn’t allocate capital to where it was best used. But it went beyond that.

CHARLIE ROSE: But when you get to that point, that’s where people in the financial community come back, push back to you and others, and Paul Volcker as well.

They’re saying the kind of financial reform you’re talking about, too big to fail and all that was not the problem. The problem was leverage and risk and the capital requirements. If those had been enforced you wouldn’t have had the problem. And you’re not going to solve the problem, they argue, by some elimination of proprietary trading.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: There’s no single thing that is going to solve this kind of problem.

CHARLIE ROSE: Right, the potential of another crisis.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Of another crisis. I agree absolutely we have to do something about leverage. You have to do something about hidden leverage, which was part of what the credit default swaps were all about. So I agree with them on that.

But conflicts of interest are what caused problems. The conflicts of interest were en route of the Enron, World.com scandals.

CHARLIE ROSE: But that’s just fraud and corruption.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: But that fraud and corruption undermine confidence in the market economy and contribute, contribute — I don’t say — contribute to an economic downturn when it exists on the scale that it did in the United States.

CHARLIE ROSE: You don’t think globalization is such a great idea.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, actually what I said is globalization can be a very positive thing if it’s managed well.

CHARLIE ROSE: And so what is wrong about globalization as it exists today?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, let me give you one example. What we did when we talked about globalization is we talked about unfettered capital markets moving across borders with very little regulation. The result of that is that you can have a country with inadequate — a very small country with inadequate regulation putting in jeopardy savers, individuals all over the world.

Iceland is an example. So that’s an example where people in the U.K., people in the Netherlands suffered. And now it’s coming back, now people in Iceland are suffering from globalization. They were told let our banks — let your banks become global marketplaces, you’ll all benefit. What they’re seeing is they’re being asked to mortgage their future for generations to come.

They’re probably going to vote against it on Saturday, but that’s — that is an example of globalization that has not been managed well.

CHARLIE ROSE: You think Greece will be all right in the end?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Yes. I think that Europe is going to come —

CHARLIE ROSE: To the rescue.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: — to the rescue. And let me make it clear. When you use the word “rescue,” the fact is that Greece with its debt to GDP income ratio of 120 percent is perfectly capable —

CHARLIE ROSE: Debt to GDP.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Debt to GDP — of make it’s — fulfilling its commitments. When you face a speculative attack and interest rates soar, then you have a problem. And I think Europe realizes that that’s what this is.

CHARLIE ROSE: If they don’t act it will spread to other places like Spain and Portugal and maybe even Italy.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly. So what is at stake here is the integrity of the Euro and European Union, which is why I felt so confident that they would eventually come to the rescue.

CHARLIE ROSE: One of the reasons I like you so much is you have opinions and you have ideas, and they are interesting and controversial. You’re not thrilled by the World Bank or the IMF.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the IMF has changed a little bit.

CHARLIE ROSE: So they’re more to your liking?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: They’ve reformed to a considerable degree.

CHARLIE ROSE: Meaning they’re not creating such tough standards to receive their money?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s right. Or to put it the way I would put it —

(LAUGHTER)

CHARLIE ROSE: Which is a better way.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: In the East Asia crisis, they demanded what we call pro-cyclical policies that converted downturns into recessions, recessions into depressions. If you look at their programs more recently, most of them have been much less in that way. Some of them have actually been very, very helpful.

So I think that’s part of the change of — in the global debate, and that’s why many people in Greece say if Europe doesn’t come to itself, the IMF is not necessarily that bad of an alternative.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’re not thrilled by the dollar remaining the reserve currency of the world.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: No.

CHARLIE ROSE: That puts you and the president of France in the same boat.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: A dollar-based reserve system is not working. It’s fraying.

CHARLIE ROSE: And they’re going down to Brazil and doing some interesting things to sort of —

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And they’re very worried, and you can understand that, that with the buildup of the —

CHARLIE ROSE: Go ahead.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: With the buildup of the U.S. debt and the blowing up of the balance sheet of the Fed, they’re worried that the value of their huge holdings of U.S. dollars will be diminished in one way or another. So China, for instance, has $2.3 trillion of reserves.

CHARLIE ROSE: Two billion dollars a day.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: And it is estimated somewhere between around two-thirds of that is probably in dollars, and they worry that the current system puts them at great risk.

So there’s a demand by the countries that hold large amounts of reserves to move to an alternative system. And other countries have expressed a view this way. They say in a 21st century, to have the currency of one country be the basis of a global financial system doesn’t make a lot of sense.

CHARLIE ROSE: You’d like to see a government bank.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I point out in the book that if you had taken that $700 billion that went into TARP and used just a fraction of that to create a new institution to provide money to, say, small or medium-size enterprises, we would have had a flow of new credit that is so essential to getting the American economy going again.

Instead we focused on the past. We focused on institutions that have proven themselves not having done an adequate job in allocating capital. They’re focusing on dealing with past mistakes.

And one of the basic lessons in economics is bygones should be bygones. And unfortunately it’s very hard to get existing institutions to do that. And that was just one — it was a way of thinking about what we might have done that would have —

CHARLIE ROSE: So it wasn’t so much a prescription for the future. It’s looking at the past and figuring out what might have been a better try go at solving the problem.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Exactly.

CHARLIE ROSE: But how about nationalization? Do you think we should have had more nationalization, as your Nobel colleague Paul Krugman suggested, even if it was temporary?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That’s not the word I would have used. I would have used the word “conservatorship.” I would have said playing by the rules of capitalism.

CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: The rules of capitalism say that if somebody owes more money than they can pay, a firm owes more money than it can pay, it goes into bankruptcy, which means the shareholders get wiped out, the bondholders become the new shareholders. That’s the rules of capitalism.

We suspended those rules. Now, in the case of banks, there’s a couple particular provisions. The first is that you don’t wait until the company’s absolutely bankrupt before you do something. You want to make sure that you’re not left holding the bag.

And secondly, the government has a special role because the government ensures the deposits. So if it goes belly up, the taxpayer, FDIC, winds up filling the hole.

And that gives it — those are the only differences between that and ordinary bankruptcy. So that’s what I wanted them to do. If they had done that, they would not have needed the huge amounts of taxpayer money.

CHARLIE ROSE: Do you think they’ll get some of it back?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Oh, they’ll get some of the money bank. But the numbers look like very clearly that there will be a significant shortfall, over $100 billion, and most of those calculations do not really provide — talk about appropriate compensation for what we call the time value of money, the risk that we bore.

And so when you say we got the money back, we should have gotten far more than the money back given the risk that we bore.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have an international reputation, are known well around the world, and with admiration. You also saw the kinds of factors coming together that created the crisis that we had to go through. Do you believe that if you had had power to go with your observation you would have been able to prevent the crisis?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: I think we could have made sure that it was much less deep than it currently is. We might have been able to prevent it.

And why that’s so relevant to the current policy debate is that right now our financial sector is in some ways more dysfunctional than it was in 2007.

And so as I look at where we are unless, we make some very significant reforms in both the structure of the financial sector and the regulation of the financial sector, I think there is a significant risk that we will some time — five years, ten years — face another crisis of the kind that we’ve just been through.

CHARLIE ROSE: Joseph Stiglitz, won the Nobel Prize in economics. “Freefall: American, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.” Thank you. Pleasure to see you.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Thank you. Nice to see you.

CHARLIE ROSE: Back in a moment. Stay with us.

www.charlierose.com/view/content/10885

罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase） 王宁

　　静态世界中的资源分配是经济学研究的核心问题。在这个想象中的世界，商品和服务的种类都是既定的，甚至允许把未来的商品和服务以跨期贸易（intertemporal trade）的方式计算在内。此外，生产技术也是给定的。所以，无论从整个系统还是从参与者的角度出发，这都是一个静态的世界。

　　就系统的层面看来，这个世界本质上是封闭的，并不存在奈特（Knightian）或者凯恩斯（Keynesian）理论所述的新变化或不确定性。未来世界与现行世界一样可以被明确规定。在个体层面上，经济主体并不考虑创新产品或新的生产方式。前提是所有经济主体皆可平等获得既定的生产技术，这样，研究者不必考虑经济主体的学习空间。

　　在这个静态的世界，任何资源的配置都将以利益最大化为目标，所有潜在的交易收益都将在市场均衡的条件下实现。这种均衡通常被认为是一个价格向量：包含生产要素在内的所有商品和服务的供求形势共同决定了价格。由此看来，这种理论被称为价格理论也就不足为怪了。

　　价格理论之所以意义重大，是因为它有助于我们理解在一个封闭且分权化的体系内的资源配置问题。亚当·斯密的经典思想是，一个纯粹的分权化的经济体系背后似乎有一只“看不见的手”神奇地引导着秩序。而价格理论将这位经济学家洞察力强大的成果进一步理论化了。不过，现代的价格理论固然更为严谨，却也存在盲点和纰漏。这一理论最明显的疏漏在于，它没有体现生产的作用。

　　在实际生产中商品和服务是怎样产生的？新型商品和服务以及新的生产方式如何创造并传播？生产和创新应如何组织？商品和服务的生产方式以及新产品的发明又是由什么因素决定的？这一系列问题很难通过经济学通常的研究议程解决。其特殊之处在于，经济学理论很少涉及生产过程的研究。

　　当经济模型中所有的商品和服务作为给定条件时，生产的过程就几乎被完全忽略了。似乎只需使用一个生产函数就足以将生产要素转化为相应的商品和服务。但是，对于任何现实世界中的经济体系，企业在考虑资源配置问题之前，必须首先决定生产哪些商品和服务，并学习相关生产技术。此后，企业必须实际组织生产过程，毕竟它们并不能魔法般地将生产要素转化为消费者所需的商品和服务。上述的每一步都可能出现各种各样的差错，比如选错目标商品，高估或低估消费需求，处理雇佣关系或客户关系不当。因此，很多新兴企业纷纷折戟商场，销声匿迹。这些企业的错误或许拖累了其他公司，但是同时也为其他企业提供了前车之鉴，帮助它们存活得更久。

挑战传统理论

　　生产的基本特点之一是它的生产性或创造性。正是生产的这种特点才产生了新的产品。其实，它挑战着经济学的首要假设：稀缺性。的确，如果不是受到这无处不在的稀缺性的限制，人们就不必做选择。要是没有选择的必要，也就没有了经济学存在的意义。不过，生产的的确确就是稀缺性的对立力量。尽管生产不会否定稀缺性的局限，但它会不断向外推移稀缺性的限制边界。

　　生产通常包括两个过程，产品开发和生产组织。产品开发涉及运用想象力设计新产品（以及思考其生产方式）。之后便是实际的生产过程，或者将投入转化为产出的经济组织。如果经济分析仅仅关注资源配置，而低估组织生产的重要性，那么产品开发也仍旧不会受到太多重视。产品开发环节在经济学和商界中往往都是被保守的秘密。由于主要涉及思维的展开和发散，这一环节充满了不确定性。此外，产品开发也是一个不存在标准答案和无法预测的过程。许多创新产品其实都来自于意外的发现。基于生产过程的以上特点，要在主流经济学的概念框架下对其进行研究十分困难。

　　稀缺性使选择成为必需，从而引发了利益冲突。通过产权界定和竞争来化解冲突的方法长久以来就是、也还将继续作为经济分析的重要内容。从这个角度来研究生产的某些方面是可以的，的确也有人做过这方面的研究。但是生产，特别是产品开发环节，实质上是由另一种动力驱动的——往往是思想的碰撞超越了利益的争夺。人类产生想法的能力似乎是无限的，这意味着需要竞争来实现优胜劣汰。在稀缺性的限制下，传统的、基于权利的研究方法可能管用。这一理论却并不适用于研究生产环节。

　　生产过程的初期是开发生产商品和服务。在产品开发环节，首先是想象和设计新产品。然后企业家们学习、试验继而实现实际生产，并由企业组织生产、彼此协调。最终包括创意在内的生产要素都被汇集、转化成为了实际的商品和服务。在整个过程中，企业不得不与不同经济主体签订合约，以获得各种的投入原料，这包括生产要素以及中间产品。因为所有合约的不完善性不可避免，所以它们通常被非合同关系纳入和补充。另外，即使企业是生产游戏中的焦点，它们并没有、也不可能脱离其他经济主体独自运作。其他经济主体包括家庭、工会、银行、律所和会计师事务所、政府及非政府监管部门、学校和其他研究机构等。企业和这众多经济主体之间的关系错综复杂。同时，出于各种原因（如扩张自身利益，减少贫困，或者以某种道德标准或社会价值观为原则整顿经济），其他经济主体在经济活动中往往存在某种利益立场。因此，它们试图在各种议题上与商业公司合作。结果，企业的作为和做法以及行为的后果很大程度上都受到了社会中各种运作因素的影响；这些因素包括政府、法律法规、社会传统和道德准则等。

　　这样看来，经济体系显然是机构性密集行为的结果。要在此强调的是，机构并不是惟一的。现实世界中经济体系的运作，涉及和依赖各种机构组织的参与。很少有机构是可以被指定或固定的。经济主体常常被迫临时与新建机构合作，并不断学习以改善机构运作，使生产实施顺利、经济继续发展。这些机构的失败对于经济的深远影响不言而喻。即使近来各机构的经济角色受到越来越多的肯定，甚至被经济学家理论化，但经济学的理论导向却并没有发生根本性的转变。经济学仍然是一门关于选择的科学，资源配置仍然是经济学的核心问题。在此框架内，各机构的参与很可能被当作固定的分类变量，而不会被认为是一个使贸易分工成为可能的实验和学习的环节。

　　要广义的理解生产结构，市场与国家相对的两分法观点现在十分流行，人们普遍认为市场和国家可以而且应该彼此分离。但这却是个大错特错的观点。自由市场的概念并不意味着市场运作完全不受国家政治影响力的干预，也不等于人们可以任意开设和经营市场。自由市场只表示市场对所有经济主体都是开放的，也就是说，个人或企业都享有进入和退出市场的自由。在这里，市场的含义拓展了，它不仅包括流通生产要素和产品的常规经济市场，而且还强调生产结构的市场自由，即参与者可以自由尝试和选择组织协调生产。从广义上理解，自由市场的存在不可能脱离有力的政权、运作良好的法制，以及其他的基础制度。从这个研究项目的角度出发，政权、法制和其他制度在经济发展中扮演的角色正好认可、保护并拓展了此处定义的广义市场，同时也降低了这个市场的经营成本。显然，这个角色的意义远比提供第三方执行力或公共商品更包罗万象。但这恰恰涉及了一个经验性的问题：我们再也不能依靠单一的理论来为国家干预披上合理的外衣，无论这干预是为了保护产权，或者为了纠正市场失灵，还是为了供给公共商品，抑或为了外部性的内在化。

　　由此看来，生产结构为经济学家提供了可供深入发掘的研究议题。以经济学作为分析工具，的确大大拓展了经济帝国主义旗帜下的研究领域，但是却轻易忽略了首要的生产问题。如果某个经济体系不能持续创造和生产商品和服务，并以日益低廉的价格提供给消费者，那么这个经济体系就是失败的。如果经济学不重视经济的脉搏——生产问题，那么这种经济学的发展方向就是被误导的。

　　为了让经济学转向研究生产的结构，我们可以将这一学科由不使用数字的应用数学转化为一门实证科学。这样一来，研究者将把经济体系看作一个生机勃勃不断发展的系统，它与人类的身体或者其他有机物非常类似，其内部包含很多相互依存的子系统——也许是法律系统，政治系统，教育系统等——不同系统间又彼此相联，皆嵌入更大规模的社会系统之中。这个开放的世界充满生机，与静态或机械的世界截然不同。

　　我们以往对于经济的分析早已人为地分解为零散部件，需要用将经济体系视为有机活体的综合性眼光来平衡。各种产品、资本设备乃至生产知识的积累并不能使经济体成为有机物。经济是由人来经营的；所以不管属于合约性质还是非合约性质，人际关系都将渗入整个经济体系。而无论好坏，正是人的参与使得经济体系成为了富有活力不断发展的系统。做经济研究时，我们要充分认识到这样一个事实，那就是，人类是兼具社会性、政治性、道德性和情感性的动物。

　　由于对生产结构这样的现实议题的关注，我们提出的研究项目将带来另一裨益。一般来说，实际经济理论（相对于分析工具或抽象原理而言）的发展或多或少都是由现实生活中的经济问题驱动的。该理论的大致方向和其参数的设定方式都明显受到当时特定社会条件和主流文化预设价值观的影响。自西方经验中发展而来的现存经济理论将在多大程度上有助于阐释中国经济的现实，这是个需要谨慎对待的实证性问题。如若将中国经济研究视为应用或检验现存经济理论的途径之一，那就是错上加错了。如果把中国经济硬套入现有理论，研究者一则无异于冒着削足适履的风险；二则也错失了拓展经济理论视野的宝贵机会。我们认为，以中国经济为大背景研究生产结构（包括中国市场变革中出现的新挑战）将为丰富经济理论及深入理解经济运作带来极大的可能。

研究中国的十个方向

　　生产结构研究的层面是多样的，从公司、产业到区域经济、国家经济甚至全球经济都可以入手。研究者可以针对特定历史时间点或者时间段的情况进行调查。当然，下面的十个问题并不能囊括所有研究方向，只为起到抛砖引玉的作用，就此次专题讨论会研究项目的范围和特点提供建议。由于很少有研究会关注生产结构的问题，在此列出的大多数问题在本质上都是基于实证经验的。一方面，在阐释问题和理论推理之前，研究者首先需要查明事实；另一方面，如果对探寻的方向没有一个大致的概念，研究者很容易迷失在纷繁复杂的现实世界和庞大杂乱的事实数据中。

　　本文旨在协助各位展开研究之路。这趟智慧旅程固然不需要路线指引或者蓝图规划，但是正确的研究方向以及开放好奇和切合常理的态度却必不可少。

　　1.企业内部是如何组织的？尽管任何正式组织皆具有其层级结构，但它们的运作不可能仅仅或者主要依赖于命令和服从。激励和人际关系对企业的运作同样不可或缺。企业的这一特性是如何与其他特性以及其整体运作情况（生产力和创作力）相关联的？中国大多数私营企业都是在过去20年间发展起来的。如果能对中国企业的兴起和发展做一个系统的研究，那一定会非常有趣。

　　2.企业如何协调彼此之间的交易？合同在构建商业关系中固然起到了作用，但不可避免的问题是，合同往往是不完善的。而企业之间的社会关系以及企业管理者间的个人关系可能比定义企业间的商业关系更为重要。那么企业协调彼此交易的方式又是怎么影响到其与上游供应商、下游客户及竞争对手打交道的成本的呢？

　　3.至少从亚当·斯密开始，经济学家们就已经认识到劳动分工在经济生产中的作用至关重要。但是企业中的劳动分工模式是什么样的呢？如果这种模式的确存在，那么它是由哪些因素决定的？当生产线中出现进一步的专业化分工，业内现有企业是否会迅速占据一席之地，还是会让位于新出现的公司（而新公司很可能是从现有企业分拆出来的）？如果专业化分工存在局限性，那么这种局限性取决于什么？

　　4.英国经济学家阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔（Alfred Marshall）早已指出，现代经济的发展与有机组织的演化相似，一方面不同部门间越来越专业化，另一方面又要求各部门间紧密联系和相互依存。这种矛盾是如何反映在生产结构中的，又是如何被生产结构所解决（注意不是消除）？

　　5.企业如何在创新力竞争中出奇制胜？尽管经济理论几乎只强调价格竞争的重要性，但产品创新方面的竞争对企业的存亡却更为重要（在这里我们指的是广义的创新）。创新很少凭空出现，它更有可能是基于已有的想法和元素的重组。同时，由于任何知识都只能学习而无法复制，所以企业为了能够更加“巧妙地”模仿，也必须多少有点创新力。因此，将这些企业所谓的“生产”称作“创造”或者说“创造性破坏”，也许更为贴切。“创造性破坏”将生产要素转化成一系列固定的商品和服务。那么这种广泛意义上的“创新”又是如何实现的？

　　6.长期以来，创业精神一直被认为是经济活力的终极动力，美国经济学家熊彼特（Schumpeter）所说的“创造性破坏”就与之密不可分。从生产结构的角度来看，创业精神是一个经济过程，而不是某种心理特征。因此，新产品（包括商品和服务）的出现和过时产品的消失不仅仅可以为分析动态生产结构提供有趣的角度，还会为研究创业精神提供肥沃的土壤。不妨以某个行业为例，研究在众多企业盛衰沉浮的大背景下由技术创新产生的新产品如何与现有产品竞争。接下来，我们不禁要问，中国的企业家和创业精神来自何处？它们又是如何推动了中国经济的变革？

　　7.产业的本土化在中国或其他国家都是普遍现象。不同情况下的产业本土化是如何运作的？本土化并不是在华企业所独有的，这意味着必然存在某些普遍的经济力量导致了生产的地理集中。另一方面，中国当地政府在促进产业本土化的进程中无疑起到了重要作用。那么在中国，政治权力和经济力量是如何相互作用，从而共塑生产的本土结构的呢？

　　8.由于经济是一个保持开放和不断发展的体系，它必将受到社会中各种运作因素的影响。在诸多因素中，法律法规、文化规范和信任机制会对企业、地区或国家的生产结构和经济形势带来什么样的影响？既然经济总是在不断变化，那么随着时间推移，上述因素又会如何影响生产结构变化的方式？

　　9.在中国经济的发展进程中，国家权力的强大影响力无处不在。中央与地方政府之间的紧张状态，以及各地方政府间的相互较劲，又进一步让中国的政治与经济关系更为错综复杂。实际上，这并非仅仅是“中国特色”。在18世纪-19世纪，美国各州政府也曾以同样积极活跃的姿态参与到经济活动当中。从何时起，政府对待经济的态度只是保持活跃参与而不是人为干扰呢？中国政府的存在又将在哪些方面改变我们对前面一系列问题的答案？

　　10.中国幅员辽阔，人口众多，加之地域差异性大，分权化特征明显，这一切使中国经济具有了丰富性和多样性。区域竞争被广泛认为是了解中国经济的重要因素。不过，至今尚未出现从地方各级的层面（乡镇、县、市、省、地区）对中国经济进行系统的比较研究。比如，通过横向比较100个县的经济情况，可以为分析中国经济的发展规律提供充足可靠的数据库。

　　本文将用做2010年度芝加哥“生产的工业结构”讨论会的与会指南。讨论会将于7月19日至23日在芝加哥大学法学院举行。届时，数位中国著名的经济学家将应邀出席，共同探讨“生产的工业结构”议题。与会者将就中国经济的语境下，生产的工业结构进行实证分析，并提交相关论文。本文旨在帮助读者明确该讨论会关注的研究领域。

　　以百岁高龄组织这场研讨会，科斯教授坚信，通过研究生产结构，中国的经济学家定能为经济学发展贡献独创性的理论与思考，而这将是世界经济学与中国经济学界的双赢。科斯教授认为，如果中国国内能开展此项研究，未来的50至100年间经济学能藉此发展得更加完善，也更能反映经济活动的真实面貌。 （龚橙 翻译）

　　罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）为1991年诺贝尔经济学奖得主，芝加哥大学法学院教授

　　王宁为亚利桑那州立大学政策及全球研究学院助理教授

In 2000, the United States had a balanced federal budget. Today, America has a deficit problem that threatens the country’s future. It is compounded by former President George W. Bush’s fiscal recklessness, the economic crisis that began with September 2008’s financial collapse, President Barack Obama’s spending ambitions, and the mysterious ability of the weakened Republican Party to create political deadlock in Congress.

Under Bush, spending was increased, taxes were cut, and the result was huge deficits financed by borrowing. Then came the “Great Recession,” as it is being called (I call it a depression because of its probable long-term economic and political consequences). The public debt (the important component of the national debt — the part that is more than an accounting entity — that is really owed), which the Bush administration’s deficits had caused to double, soared further. It soared because of falling tax revenues, rising unemployment benefits, and rising government expenditures to fight the depression (such as Obama’s $787 billion stimulus plan). The public debt reached $7.5 trillion by the end of fiscal year 2009 (Sept. 30, 2009) and is expected to increase another $1.6 trillion this fiscal year and another $1.3 trillion next year. That means it may exceed $10 trillion by Sept. 30, 2011. Almost half the debt is owned by foreigners, and the interest payments to them are a drain on American wealth. Interest rates on the debt will rise as the world economy recovers, increasing competition for capital.

The United States has a deeply wounded economy. At this writing, transfer payments by the government to individuals and families (Social Security, unemployment benefits, tax credits, etc.) exceed the taxes being collected from the household sector. At the same time, private investment net of depreciation is negative. This means that private savings are being borrowed by the government, combined with the government’s foreign borrowing, and then transferred to households to enable them to maintain their accustomed level of consumption. People are saving more, but government borrowing overwhelms their saving, with the result that aggregate saving — public plus private — is negative. So: negative savings, negative private investment, an incredible ratio of household debt to disposable income (1.25 to 1, though down from 1.39 to 1 in 2007), massive government borrowing to finance private consumption — not a nice combination.

When the American economy does finally recover, tax revenues will rise, unemployment benefits will fall, and depression-fighting programs will end — so annual deficits should decline. But realistically, this means only that the public debt will grow more slowly than it will be growing this year and next.

The international dimensions of public debt growing slowly or rapidly from a very high level deserve consideration. At some point, the value of the dollar relative to other currencies will fall; this effect will be accelerated if, as is not unlikely, the “easy money” policy of the Federal Reserve, instituted to fight the depression, results in significant inflation. A falling dollar may endanger the dollar’s status as an international reserve currency. Foreign contracts are often denominated in dollars rather than in a local currency. If an oil producer in a Middle Eastern country sells oil to a refinery in a South American country, neither party may be happy to have payment made in the currency of the other party’s country because by the time payment is due, the value of the currency may have changed to the advantage of the other party. By providing that payment will be made in U.S. dollars, the parties can hedge against changes in the value of the local currencies. For such hedging to be effective, however, the value of the dollar has to be stable. If it becomes unstable, the dollar may cease to be the principal international reserve currency, accounting at present for almost two-thirds of international currency reserves — a status that allows the United States to run a trade deficit (up to a point) costlessly because foreign countries need to hold U.S. dollar reserves to supply dollars in exchange for local currencies to businesses that have dollar-denominated contracts.

It is true that as growing deficits reduce the value of the dollar relative to other currencies, while making imports more expensive, American exports will grow, implying a shift of workers and capital from services to manufacturing. But the shift, reversing a long-term decline in manufacturing relative to services, may be a painful and protracted one, just as China’s transition from an export-led manufacturing economy to a domestic consumer economy is likely to be painful and protracted. Any major restructuring of a country’s economy will produce heavy unemployment as a byproduct until the restructuring is complete.

The adjustments that will be needed — if the economy does not outgrow an increasing burden of debt — to maintain the U.S. economic position in the world may be especially painful and difficult because of features of the American political scene that suggest that the country might be becoming in important respects ungovernable. The perfection of interest-group politics has brought about a situation in which, to exaggerate just a bit, taxes can’t be increased, spending programs can’t be cut, and new spending is irresistible. If one may judge by the Bush administration’s fiscal improvidence, these tendencies are bipartisan.

America used to have a liberal and a conservative party, though both were loose coalitions lacking European-style rigid ideological uniformity. The Democrats, the liberal party, favored big government and therefore big government spending — and therefore high taxes to pay for the big spending. The conservative party, the Republicans, opposed big government and big government spending, and therefore favored low taxes. These were coherent positions. For Democrats, however, favoring heavy taxes was a political albatross, while for Republicans the albatross was opposing big government spending. Beginning with Ronald Reagan and continuing with George W. Bush, Republicans squared the circle by abandoning their opposition to big spending while redoubling their commitment to low taxes. Belatedly, the Obama administration has decided that while still favoring big government spending (indeed more than recent Democratic administrations have done), it too wants to keep taxes low — not as low as the Republicans want, but low enough that deficits that swamp those of the Reagan and Bush years are looming.

The decline of bipartisanship is lamentable; it is small consolation that fiscal imprudence is bipartisan. The parties play leapfrog when it comes to spending. From the standpoint of economic policy, the United States has only one party, and it is the party of profligacy.

As real interest rates rise as a consequence of a growing public debt and declining demand for the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency, U.S. savings rates will rise and, by reducing consumption expenditures, slow economic activity. Economic growth may also fall as more and more resources are poured into keeping alive elderly people, most of whom are not highly productive members of society from an economic standpoint. The United States may find itself in the same kind of downward economic spiral that developing countries often find themselves in.

American political culture is sick, but the broader social culture may also impede renewed economic progress. America’s growth has been promoted by the “can-do” attitude of its people, their rejection of fatalism, their individualism — qualities conducive to innovation, ambition, and hard work. But the rejection of fatalism is also a major factor in the country’s soaring medical costs, as its old people (and often their children) insist that every effort be made, at taxpayer expense, to extend their lives. As a result, 25 percent of Medicare costs are incurred in treating elderly people in the last few months of life. American individualism is also a barrier to fiscal belt-tightening through tax hikes or spending cuts. A can-do attitude can and often does express itself in a refusal to worry about looming crises. Americans can overcome any challenge. So not to worry! Qualities that promote a country’s fortunes in one era may undermine them in another.

Because of the low U.S. inflation rate and the Federal Reserve’s determination to keep interest rates very low, the dollar has become a favorite tool of the “carry trade,” endangering the world economy. By borrowing U.S. dollars cheaply (because U.S. interest rates are being artificially depressed by the Federal Reserve in an effort to ease credit and by doing so stimulate economic growth) and exchanging them for foreign currencies to lend or invest, traders can earn generous profits — though not without great risk. The carry trade may be a factor in recent rises in commodity prices; indeed, there is fear of new bubbles as a result of all the dollars sloshing around in the world economy. This poses dangers for the global economy because the carry trade is susceptible to runs. If a speculator borrows dollars in the short term to minimize interest expense and uses them to buy rupees, say, and the dollar surges in value relative to the rupee, the speculator may have to sell his rupees in a hurry to repay his lenders. If so, the value of the rupee will fall farther relative to the dollar, which may precipitate a run on rupees as speculators unload them. And because of the integration of the world’s financial systems, a run on a foreign currency can harm other countries’ economies.

The Fed has made clear that it intends to keep short-term interest rates rock-bottom low for some time, reassuring the carry traders that the Fed is not going to pull the rug out from under them by open market operations designed to reduce U.S. bank balances, a policy that would increase the value of the dollar in relation to other currencies by reducing the amount of money in circulation (the U.S. money supply is essentially the sum of all U.S. bank balances), and by doing so would increase interest rates on dollar loans. The Obama administration is doing nothing, moreover, to prevent the dollar from falling in value relative to other currencies — the government wants it to fall in order to spur exports, import substitution, and a mild inflation — and a falling dollar makes the carry trade more profitable. The carry trader borrows dollars with which to buy currencies that can be invested at higher interest rates than the cost of borrowing the dollars — and then, after cashing out the investment, he returns to the lenders dollars worth less than when he borrowed them.

The Greek fiscal crisis has caused the value of the dollar to rise sharply against the euro, and if this new valuation of the dollar persists it will hurt U.S. exports and could also trigger a crisis in the carry trade. This is a further illustration of how globally connected the U.S. economy has become — and why getting America’s fiscal house in order is an urgent priority.

NYT: Skepticism for Obama’s Fiscal Policy

Review

Stiglitz’s view of the crisis describes a possible road—a better road—than the one taken by the Obama administration. And his book concludes with broader proposals for a better balance between market and civil society, domestically and globally. What makes Stiglitz special is that, along with Paul Krugman, he is the rare progressive in a profession whose norms resist tampering with the verdicts of markets or the power of private capital and also one of the few world-class technical economists who can write lucidly for a lay audience. The tone of this book is good-humored and public-minded. (Bob Kuttner – The American Prospect)

Product Description

Nobel Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz explains the current financial crisis—and the coming global economic order. The current global financial crisis carries a “made-in-America” label. In this forthright and incisive book, Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz explains how America exported bad economics, bad policies, and bad behavior to the rest of the world, only to cobble together a haphazard and ineffective response when the markets finally seized up. Drawing on his academic expertise, his years spent shaping policy in the Clinton administration and at the World Bank, and his more recent role as head of a UN commission charged with reforming the global financial system, Stiglitz outlines a way forward building on ideas that he has championed his entire career: restoring the balance between markets and government, addressing the inequalities of the global financial system, and demanding more good ideas (and less ideology) from economists.

Freefall is an instant classic, combining an enthralling whodunit account of the current crisis with a bracing discussion of the broader economic issues at stake. .

About the Author

Winner of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics, Joseph E. Stiglitz is the author of Making Globalization Work; Globalization and Its Discontents; and, with Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War. He was chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and served as senior vice president and chief economist at the World Bank. He teaches at Columbia University and lives in New York City.

罗伯特·曼戈贝拉·昂格尔（Roberto Mangabeira Unger）：《重新想象的自由贸易：劳动的世界分工与经济学方法》（Free Trade Reimagined: The World Division of Labor and the Method of Economics），高健译，北京大学出版社2009年。@豆瓣@小组

购买本书：卓越网；当当网。

内容简介

本书从对自由贸易理论和实践的批评开始，但昂格尔并非在为贸易保护作辩护，而是对自由贸易论者和贸易保护主义者一贯的争论所立足的条件进行批驳和修正。他之所以涉足这场重要的论辩，是为了促使我们对那些用来解释经济活动的基本理论进行反思。他指出，我们可以采取一种不同于既有经济学方法的方法来理解当代经济现象，这种方法更现实，也更有助于揭示那些一直隐藏的变革的可能性。

昂格尔声称，对于全球化，我们不必局限于接受还是拒绝这两种选择，而可以开展一种截然不同的全球化。较之物和资金的流动，人和观念的流动要更为重要，而改革现有市场经济制度的自由与建立在这些制度基础上的商品交换的自由则是同等重要的。

本书谈论的不只是经济学，它还要求一种严谨的想象，以反抗今天的生活和思想中所特有的那种专制态度。

书评

很少有人的思想能和曼戈贝拉·昂格尔一样丰富。在这本非同凡响的著作中，昂格尔把他的注意力转到一个亟待创新也急需输入新鲜血液的学术领域，这就是围绕自由贸易所进行的那些老掉牙的争论。——丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik），《一种经济学 多种药方》的作者，哈佛大学

昂格尔对自由贸易的评论含义深刻且引人注目。他的核心观点（在我看来是绝对不容置疑的）是，一个国家的比较优势始终是由公共当局与私人利益共同建构的。本文对作者的观点进行了淋漓尽致的阐述，处处展现了作者的才华。无论对那些笃信自由贸易理论的人，还是那些坚持该理论从根本上就存在缺陷的人，本文都是一个清晰且分量十足的挑战。——查尔斯·萨贝尔（Charles Sabel），哥伦比亚大学法学院

罗伯特·曼戈贝拉·昂格尔（Roberto Mangabeira Unger），1947年出生于里约热内卢，1970年开始任教于哈佛大学法学院，1976年获终身教职，2004年当选为美国艺术与科学研究院院士，2007年回到巴西，担任巴西战略事务部部长。昂格尔是当代著名法学家，是批判法学运动的领军人物，也是政治活动家，长期活跃于巴西政坛。主要著作有《知识与政治》、《现代社会中的法律》、《激情：论人格》、《批判法学运动》、《政治学：构成社会理论》、《被实现的民主》、《法律分析应当为何》。

高健，同济大学经济学硕士，现于爱丁堡大学攻读经济社会史博士学位。译有《谁搞垮了通用：百年汽车巨头的十年拯救之路》（合译，人民邮电出版社，2009年8月）。

科斯给 Markets, Firms and Property Rights: A Celebration of the Research of Ronald Coase 会议的发言：“市场、企业与财产权”（2009年11月23日录制）。

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视频：

Ronald Coase: Centennial Coase Lecture [2003]

Book Description

Climate change and justice are so closely associated that many people take it for granted that a global climate treaty should–indeed, must–directly address both issues together. But, in fact, this would be a serious mistake, one that, by dooming effective international limits on greenhouse gases, would actually make the world’s poor and developing nations far worse off. This is the provocative and original argument of Climate Change Justice. Eric Posner and David Weisbach strongly favor both a climate change agreement and efforts to improve economic justice. But they make a powerful case that the best–and possibly only–way to get an effective climate treaty is to exclude measures designed to redistribute wealth or address historical wrongs against underdeveloped countries.

In clear language, Climate Change Justice proposes four basic principles for designing the only kind of climate treaty that will work–a forward-looking agreement that requires every country to make greenhouse–gas reductions but still makes every country better off in its own view. This kind of treaty has the best chance of actually controlling climate change and improving the welfare of people around the world.

Eric A. Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. David Weisbach is Walter J. Blum Professor of Law and Kearney Director of the Program in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School.

Endorsements

“To attract broad participation from the major countries emitting greenhouse gases, both rich and poor, a climate change treaty has to be cost-effective and perceived as fair. In this book, while agreeing that fairness matters, Posner and Weisbach make a provocative case that fairness has been widely misunderstood.”–Jonathan B. Wiener, Duke University

“This incisive book points the only way forward on climate change. Posner and Weisbach carefully weigh the arguments on a wide range of issues, from what policies have the strongest merit to how we should value the welfare of future generations. The analysis is provocative, judicious, and accessible. Read these pages. They will clarify your thinking.”–Richard J. Zeckhauser, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

“There is no challenge facing the world that combines the importance and the apparent intractability of the threat of global climate change. The central problem is the necessity of including all major emitting countries–both developed and developing–in a meaningful international agreement. This raises exceptionally difficult questions regarding distributional equity. Eric Posner and David Weisbach take on these questions, and in the process provide an excellent roadmap to the playing field, and–more important–some surprising and enlightening answers. This book should be on the must-read list of anyone seriously concerned about global climate policy.”–Robert N. Stavins, professor and director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements

“Taking a clear, unflinching, and rigorous approach, this book pierces simplistic views of climate change justice, and makes a strong case for addressing climate change and justice separately. It will change the debate.”–Michael P. Vandenbergh, director of the Climate Change Research Network

“This is the most sustained and broad-gauged discussion of climate justice that I know of. Serious future debates about the subject will have to deal with this book and its arguments. It will interest general readers as well as specialists in climate policy.”–Richard Stewart, author of Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

中国是怎么走向统一的？

一个国家为了赢得战争就必须拥有良好的军队、有效的经济生产和税收能力以及对国家的管理能力。战争因此会促进国家机器的发展和国家战争能力的进一步增强。当一个地区国家力量的发展形成了“一山难容二虎” 的局面时，统一就在这一地区成了可能。在古代，一个地区的统一基本上都是长期军事竞争下的结果。但是，虽然国家力量在战争中总会得到发展，它的发展程度却会受到一个地区所特有的结构条件的约束，战争与国家力量的发展之间并不具有一个简单的线性关系。比如，罗马垮台后欧洲逐渐形成了四个主要权力阶层：国王、贵族、教廷和后起的城市中产阶级。欧洲中世纪的战争虽然也大大增强了国家的力量（比如，英法两国在百年战争（公元1337～1453）的推动下同时产生了隶属于国王的常规军和对百姓的直接税收能力），但是在贵族、教廷和城市中产阶级多重力量的钳制下，欧洲的国家力量始终不能得到中国式的发展。

与欧洲相比，春秋战国时代中国的社会结构显得十分简单。春秋之初，中国社会仅有两个权力阶层：君主和贵族。春秋早期，中国北方地区国家的军队大多数由贵族所控制，因此战争往往有助于该地区贵族势力的发展（在同一时期，鲁国出现了“三桓”，齐国出现了“田氏” ，宋国出现了“七穆” ，而晋国则出现了“六卿” ）。公元前6世纪～前5世纪中叶，北方各国的贵族势力不断坐大。于是就出现了“封建危机”，导致了“田氏代齐” 和“三家分晋”。当年的贵族摇身一变成了国君。

在晋国，魏、韩、赵等贵族势力在分晋之前，已经在自己控制的领土上逐渐推行旨在削弱他们属下的贵族势力的、以郡县制为中心的、非世袭性官僚体制，并在土地所有制、税收与法制上作了不同程度的改革。三家分晋后，为了进一步加强君权以及国家的战争动员能力，魏、韩、赵三国先后发起了在法家哲学思想指导下的全面性的改革。“三晋” 中，魏国率先进行了改革。此后魏国实力大增，称雄战国，迫使其他国家加以效仿，于是就形成了一个从公元前5世纪后半叶至前4世纪中叶的旨在强国厉兵的法家改革浪潮。由于没有欧洲式的教廷势力和城市中产阶级势力的抗拒，更加上北方各国的贵族势力在“封建危机”后均走向式微，战国时的国家因此就能在战争的推动下几乎毫无阻挡地走向强大。显然，中国强大的官僚制国家并不是通常所说的“治水农业”的产物，而是产生于春秋战国时代战争背景下国家和社会的互动。

在战国诸雄中，秦国的贵族势力相对薄弱，因此改革更为容易推行。同时，秦国因为发起改革较晚而能借鉴他国之经验。因此秦国能采取相比其他各国来说更为彻底的改革。改革后，秦国借助其有利的地势，从渭水顺流攻击“三晋”，依长江直下包抄楚国，不久就在战国七雄中取得一国独大的地位。一个“一山难容二虎” 的局面逐渐成型。

我们知道“国际社会”、“国际法”和“主权”观念的产生，以及民族主义的形成是近代欧洲没有能形成大统一的两个重大原因。“国际社会” 等观念不但约束了欧洲各国的行事方式，而且保证了不同的国家在面对“国际规则违反者”时能团结起来（这就是为什么在面对路易十四、拿破仑和希特勒时，欧洲都最终能达成持续的团结，直至胜利）。同样，民族主义的产生促进了统治精英和百姓对异族统治者的反感，从而大大加强了征服的代价。在中国，法家改革的成功和法家思想在政治层面上的一家独大使得“现实主义”成了战国时期国际关系的唯一准则。任何类似于“国际社会”、“国际法”和“主权”等以价值为主导的国际关系观在战国时期都失去了市场。于是乎，不但反秦“合纵”难以持续，各国还“以邻为壑” 试图把秦国这一祸水引向他方。秦国因此能施行“远交近攻”，各个击破，把中国带向统一。

法家改革的成功还避免了一种“类民族主义思想”在当时中国的形成，这也加速了中国的统一进程。为了吸引民众从军，国家一般会采取以下三种方法（当然，一个具体的国家不会仅仅依赖一种策略来动员民众加入战争）：1.用金钱来雇佣民众；2.通过一种意识形态，使得人们觉得是在为自己的命运而战；3.采取“大棒加胡萝卜” 的方法通过强制来胁迫民众从军，并通过奖励勇敢来鼓励献身。理论上来说，强制性能力差而财源滚滚的国家会采取第一种方法，强制性能力很强的国家会采取第三种方法，而财源不够同时强制性能力不强的国家会采取第二种方法（现代民族主义正是在这一背景下在欧洲形成的）。战国时代法家改革的成功大大加强了国家的强制性能力，使得当时的统治者无须通过煽情让人们觉得他们是在为自己的命运而战，而直接采取了“大棒加胡萝卜” 的方法通过强制性手段来迫使民众从军，这就阻止了“类民族主义思想” 在当时中国的形成，从而大大便利了中国的统一进程。（楚国的法家改革比较不成功，楚国延续了数百年的贵族势力因此也得以延续。正是由于有着很强的贵族文化和贵族认同的存在，使得楚国成了战国七雄中唯一出现了像屈原这样能被今天的历史学家塑造为“爱国主义者”的地方。）

在描述战国晚期的历史时，《史记》里出现了如下类型的记载：秦国在打仗前会派奸细到他国传播比如他国的将军将要投靠秦国的谣言，使得他国的国王撤免（甚至是杀害）这一将军，并任命了一个无能的替换，从而导致了秦国的军事胜利。对于这类记载，传统史家往往会通过指责他国国王的无能来解释。事实上，这儿有着一个很简单的规律：一旦没有“民族主义” 和“爱国主义” 这类思潮，国家就会像一个个公司，政治家们可以自由跳槽，择木而栖。在这一结构下，大公司（秦国）不会惧怕它的CEO去他方屈就，而小公司则得时时防范雇员跳槽，《史记》中的这类故事正是在这一背景下出现的。民族主义的缺乏也在这一意义上加速了中国的统一进程。

中国的大一统局面是怎么得以维持的？

秦朝在始皇帝统一中国15年后就走向崩溃。但是，秦朝所建立的大一统帝国模式却成了今后两千多年中国社会的主流历史形态，即使是南北朝时代的长期分裂和儒学式微也未能彻底打破这一状态。中国的大一统局面是怎么得以维持和发展的呢？这儿我想就这一问题作出回答。

我的分析将从古代帝国所面临的一个共同困境入手——有限的运输能力和交通手段一直是古代帝国所需面对的一个重大约束条件。面对这一问题，古代帝国采取过以下对策：第一，通过军事威慑和外交手段迫使周边的部落领袖向中央政权效忠，虽然效忠后当地的政治仍然由地方部落领袖自治管理。第二，通过强制周边部落的领袖把他们的儿子送往中央作为人质，以加强对周边的控制。以上两种方法有着共同的弊病，那就是一旦中央政权走向衰落，周边的贵族马上就会“树倒猢狲散” ，甚至是转而效忠于敌国，从而加速帝国的垮台。当年周武王克商，牧野之战商朝一日而亡，其背后就是这一原因。古代帝国的第三个常用控制手段就是向周边地区派出特使或官员，对其进行直接控制。这一方法当然比起前两种方法有效。但是，在通讯和控制极其不便的情况下，我们不能保证派出人员不与地方势力勾结，甚至经营独立王国，造成尾大不掉。因此，为了提高对帝国辽阔国土的管理能力和减低控制代价，古代帝国的下一步发展就是形成统一的精英文化，甚至是精英的认同感。以文化的同质性来弥补直接控制能力的不足。罗马帝国的发展就达到了这一境界。在罗马帝国的成熟期，罗马各省的贵族都在露天剧场中看奴隶角斗，在罗马浴池洗澡，享受着相似的世俗生活，有着一定的认同感。一般来说，一个帝国会同时运用以上四种方法对周边地区实行控制，但是成熟的帝国主要会运用第三、第四种方法，而较为原始的帝国依赖的主要是第一和第二种方法。

中华帝国的政治控制手段也不外乎于以上四种。但是，在中国的历史进程中，这些控制手段的发展却也展示出了自己的特殊性并对中国历史产生了重大的影响。西周建立之初，其统治者面临来自宗室成员和商朝旧势力的严重威胁。对此，周初的统治者采取了两个对后世有着深远影响的创举性对策。第一，为了与商朝遗民达成和解，周的统治者声称他们推翻商朝的举动具有正义性：商王因其暴虐的统治而丧失了天命，周则是天命的合法继承者。“天命观”在其出现时有着强烈的宣传性质。但随着时间的推移，它在中国政治思想中扮演了越来越重要的角色。在春秋战国时代，被后世所标称为儒家的学者将天命思想加以系统化，此后，该思想体系逐渐被神圣化并最终成为中国帝制时代王朝合法性的基础论述。但是，“天命观” 的背后却暗含着“造反有理”的思想，即人民有权推翻不称职的统治者。中国历史上难以计数的农民起义无一例外都带有这一观念的胎记。第二，接受了商王朝一日而亡的教训，西周的统治者开创了一个新型的帝国形态；他们不再在占领土地上树立自己的傀儡，而是派遣王室成员到各战略要地建立邦国，并建立了一套复杂的礼仪系统对各邦国诸侯进行控制。西周统治者的这一创造性的手法不但加强了其对周边地区的有效控制，更为重要的是它还深化了血缘关系在中国政治中持续的重要性，为儒学的产生提供了基础。

西汉时，经汉武帝的推崇，由董仲舒等多人改造而成的“官方儒学”上升为政治显学和国家意识形态。此后两千多年中国的政治形态基本上可以被看作是一个“儒法国家”，即一个奉儒家学说为合法性基础，同时采用工具主义的法家作为御民之术的、中央集权的官僚制国家。在这一政治体制中，皇帝被神圣化为“天子”，而“天命”的解释权则掌握在从知识精英中选任的儒士型科层官僚手中。这一政治体制在国家政权与儒家精英之间建立了一个相互依赖的共存关系，为国家的统治提供了合法性基础，为臣民的生活提供了道德准则，在社会精英层面上维持了一个同质性的文化，为社会下层群体提供了一定程度的从政入仕的机会。我在以下的分析中想要指出的是，官方儒学的产生给予了帝国的精英统一的文化和认同感，弥补了帝国控制能力的不足，这就是大一统局面在两千多年中能得以维持的关键。

罗马帝国的精英阶层也有着同质性的文化。但是，罗马的同质性文化是世俗性的。罗马的世俗性文化在基督教兴起后受到了挑战。基督教的教义和礼仪极其简单，容易在平民中传播，生命力很强。罗马帝国根本就没有能力加以镇压和扑灭。同时，罗马帝国也很难将基督教树立为像儒学一样的帝国政治学说。这是因为基督教强调 “上帝面前人人平等”，非常有损帝国权威的树立。同时，基督教还强调“因信称义” （justification by faith），或者说只要相信上帝的都是上帝的子民。它因此而造就了一个超越罗马帝国的认同感，减弱了人们对帝国的情感。基督教力量的壮大不但促进了罗马帝国的灭亡，而且还为欧洲在罗马帝国崩溃后达成统一加大了难度。在整个中世纪，天主教教廷一方面需要国家的保护，另一方面又不希望国家力量变得太强大，从而侵蚀教会利益，欧洲就这样在国家和宗教的合作和竞争中四分五裂，再也不能恢复昔日罗马时代大一统的“辉煌”。

在中国，自汉武帝后，儒学始终保持着作为一个统治意识形态的优势。即使是在儒学相对式微的南北朝时代，如日中天的佛教也无法取代儒学而成为中国的统治意识形态。与儒学相比，佛教有着一种为统治阶级所不喜欢的“佛祖面前人人平等”的情怀。况且，佛教追求来世轻视今世，难以与经世致用的儒学在政治层面进行竞争。这就是为什么当时北朝的统治者会从兴佛转向抑佛甚至是灭佛，为什么魏孝文帝会主动发起对自己族群文化的打击，并着力提高儒学在北魏的统治地位。魏孝文帝的所作所为都在无意间为中国重新回归大一统局面做了准备。

中国历史上有着周期性的“朝代循环”。但是稍作考察我们就可以发现，这朝代循环的背后并不具有什么周期性规律。如果有什么规律的话，它应的也是“一样生百样死” 这样一句俗话。中国每个朝代的倒台原因非常不同，但是新的大一统局面形成的背后却都有着相似的原因，那即是统治阶级在上台后马上会发觉儒学是最为适合的统治意识形态，并且为了获取政治稳定他们必须取得儒家知识分子的支持。汉朝时就已形成的“儒法国家” 政治形态就这样在新的条件下不断被“复制”，虽然这一复制在每一朝代都会因为受到当时的结构与人事的调节而显得不尽相同。

就这样，儒学为中华帝国提供了一个同质性的文化和认同感基础，从而在很大程度上弥补了古代帝国控制能力有限这一局限。儒学的存在使得帝国这一国家形态在中国这块土地上发展出了一个难以逾越的高峰：古代中国有着强有力的国家，发达的官僚体制和精英层面上的认同感。除了当时的百姓尚没有现代意义上的民族认同感外，中华帝国在很大程度上犹如一个现代“民族国家”。19世纪末以来，中国的历史学家一般都会把中华帝国的这一形态看作是中国社会发展的桎梏。而现代的学者更会把诸如“反右”、“大饥荒”、“文革”等灾难看作是由于中国长期大一统而带来的“东方专制” 文化的结果。其实，类似的灾难性国家政策在德国、日本、前苏联、柬埔寨、伊拉克等等许多文化和历史完全不同的国家中都发生过。它们构成了“现代化”的黑暗面，属于后发展国家在帝国主义、民族主义和国内政治多重互动下走向极端的例子。当然，由于有着长期大一统而带来的强国家传统，中国在错误和正确的道路上都会走得很快。这就是为什么我们的国家能在将全国飞快地带入史无前例的“大饥荒”和“文革”后，马上又能把全民带入一场致富运动，在世界上创造了另一种奇迹。

《文化纵横》2009年第6期

阅读更多赵鼎新的文章。

桑吉夫·戈伊尔（Sanjeev Goyal）：《社会关系：网络经济学导论》（Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks），吴谦立译，北京大学出版社2009年。@豆瓣@小组

购买本书：当当网；卓越网。

内容简介

网络渗透在社会和经济生活的每个角落，并且在解释众多的社会和经济现象方面，扮演着一个突出的角色。直至1990年代以前，网络在标准的经济学中并没有多少声誉，但从那时起，网络理论的研究蓬勃发展。这方面研究的核心思想，是理性的参与者个体之间的关系模式会影响其行动，并且决定其收益。这些关系的重要性，反过来又激发了对网络形成的过程进行研究。

在《社会关系》一书里，桑吉夫·戈伊尔把有关网络和经济活动的当代思维置于具体的场景里。他为这方面的研究开发出一个总体的架构。在本书的第一部分里，他展示了对于个体的收益，其在网络里所处的位置具有显著的效应，有鉴于此，每个个体自然都要采取行动建立关系，使得网络对自己有利。这个思想激发了本书的第二部分，由此发展出建立在个体动因基础上的网络形成的一般理论。戈伊尔评估了现有研究发现的坚固性，并且指出了尚未有解的实质性问题。《社会关系》把简单实例与正式模型和完整的数学证明结合在一起，是网络经济理论的一本简明扼要而又自成一体的著作，应该成为经济学及相关学科研究生必备的参考资料。

书评

网络正在成为一个崭新而令人振奋的跨学科研究领域，它整合了来自许多领域里的思想，包括社会学、经济学以及计算机科学。这些学科各自研究网络及其社会背景如何影响最终结果。《社会关系》从经济学的角度，为这个欣欣向荣的研究领域作了出色的介绍。有志者无论从哪个角度在这个领域里进行研究，这本书都具有不可估量的价值。——爱娃·塔多斯(Eva Tardos)，康奈尔大学计算机科学系

桑吉夫·戈伊尔是这个领域的主要贡献者，他为这个领域的研究展示了一幅清晰而广泛的图像。《社会关系》分析了两个重要问题。网络的互动结构如何影响经济结果，以及如果人们有意识地选择与之建立关联的对象，网络将会如何演变？——阿兰·科曼(Alan Kirman)，法国联合大学，埃克斯—马赛第三大学，法国高等社会科学研究院

过去十年里，对于讯息、社会以及生物网络的研究占据了主导地位，但是我们能够碰到的最复杂而又互相联接的经济系统，将会成为网络研究最大的受益者之一。戈伊尔的《社会关系》是网络经济学的第一本综合著作，在这个迷人的征途上迈出了第一步。 ——阿尔伯特—拉斯罗·巴拉巴斯(Albert-Laszlo Barabasi)，美国圣母大学物理系

经济学对社会网络的研究是一个崭新而令人兴奋的途径。《社会关系》为之提供了一个综述。本书提供的说明涵盖广泛的领域，包括信息—分享网络、企业间的研究—协作网络以及劳动力—市场网络，也能为非经济学家阅读，它回答了两个主要的问题：个体间的关系模式如何影响其行为、结果的有效性和信息的传播？建立关系的终极动因是什么？高度推荐本书。 ——加布里埃尔·德芒格(Gabrielle Demange)，法国高等社会科学研究院

桑吉夫·戈伊尔（Sanjeev Goyal）：剑桥大学经济学教授。网络研究在经济学领域的开创者之一。他的研究成果在顶尖的国际学术杂志上发表，包括《计量经济学》(Econometrica)、《政治经济学杂志》（Journal of Political Economy）、《经济学评论》（The Review of Economic Studies）、《经济学理论杂志》（The Journal of Economic Theory）。

吴谦立：美国波士顿大学经济学博士，现为 Rydex SGI 资深基金经理。曾于哈佛大学、复旦大学、马里兰大学客座讲学。著有《公司治理》、《公平披露公平吗？》，译有《拯救日本》、《财务骗术》。

李小科 译

每一次危机都会有它的结束。眼下的情况虽有些惨淡萧瑟，但此次危机终将会过去。没有哪一次危机，尤其像影响如此剧烈的当下危机，在其消退之时不给我们留下一笔遗产。就此次危机而言，留给我们的将是一次在世界范围内展开思想交恶战——哪一种经济制度可以给最大多数的民众提供最大的福祉。这场思想观念之战的激烈，没有什么地方比得过它在第三世界国家达到的程度；占世界人口80%的亚非拉居民，他们当中有14亿人每天仅靠1.25美元维持生存，他们对这个问题的关注和争论热度超过以往。在美国，称某人为社会主义者也许只不过是非常廉价的用语（a cheap shot）。然而，在大多数国家，资本主义与社会主义斗争，至少与被许多美国人贴上社会主义标签的那些东西之间的斗争，仍然很激烈。在当下的经济危机当中，不可能有赢者，只有失败者；而最大的失败莫过于对美国式资本主义的支持了。在将来很长的一段时间里，这种恶果将伴随着我们。

1989年柏林墙的倒塌，标志着共产主义思想已不再可行。共产主义面临的问题早在数年前就显现出来了。但在1989年以后，人们很难在为其辩护。有一度曾出现这样的情况，仿佛共产主义的失败意味着资本主义的必然胜利，而且将以美国式的资本主义取得胜利。弗兰西斯·福山将民主的市场资本主义定义为社会发展的最后一个阶段，以此宣告“历史的终结”。事实上，历史学家可能会将1989年后的20世纪看作美国人的短暂胜利。随着许多大银行和金融机构的倒闭，接连不断的经济动荡和危险投机，这一短暂胜利要结束了。同样，关于“市场原教旨主义”的争论也不再持续，人们不会再围绕“无约束的市场自身是否将确保经济的繁荣和增长”这样的问题争论不休。今天，只有那些上当受骗者仍在坚持市场具有自我调节性，在相信我们依靠市场参与者的利已行为就可确保任何事情的规范运作和有序运行。

这场经济论争在发展中国家进行得尤为起劲。尽管我们这些身处西方的人渐已忘记，在190年前，全世界GDP的三分之一出自中国。但在突然间，殖民剥削和不平等的商业贸易以及发生在欧美的技术革命，将发展中国家远远地撇在了后边；到1950年时，中国经济只占世界GDP的5%。在19世纪中期，英法两国向中国发动战争，促使它开放世界贸易。这就是第二次鸦片战争。这场战争之所以如此命名，原因在于西方国家除了毒品以外，再无其他有价值的东西能向中国出售；它们利用人们吸嗜成瘾后对毒品产生的依赖，向中国市场顷向鸦片。这是西方为了平衡贸易支付差额而做出的最早尝试。

殖民主义为发展中国家留下了一笔复杂的遗产，但有一点却很清楚，殖民地的人们认为，他们曾被残酷地剥削。对于新崛起的领导人来说，马克思主义理论为他们的经历提供了解释；它揭示道，从本质上讲剥削是资本主义制度的基础。二战以后，众多的殖民地迎来独立；这种政治独立终结了经济殖民主义。在诸如非洲这样的地区，以提供很小回报来榨取其自然资源，蹂躏其环境。这种行为的掠夺性显而易见。在其他地方，这种情况却不是很严重。在世界大多数地方，像国际货币基金组织（I.M.F）和世界银行这样的全球性机构，开始被看作后殖民时代的统治工具。这些机构推行市场原教旨主义（又称“新古典自由主义”）；后者被美国人理想化为“自由、无约束的市场”。它们督促金融机构实行“三化”：非管制化、私有化和贸易自由化。

世界银行和I.M.F说，它们所做的一切都是为了发展中国家的利益。它们为一批信奉自由市场的经济学家所支持，其中大多数来自自由市场经济学的大本营—-芝加哥大学。最终，“芝加哥人”的计划没有带来他们曾经许诺的硕果。收入停滞不前；哪里有增长，哪里的财富就流向社会顶层。经济危机在特定国家发生得愈来愈频繁——单在过去30年里，就出现过上百次的剧烈危机。

发展中国家的人们越来越不相信，西方人提供帮助的动机是出于利他主义。这一点也不感到意外。他们感觉，自由市场这套花言巧语，即人们通常所说的“华盛顿共识”，只不过是对原有商业利益的包装。西方人的伪善更加重了他们的这种猜疑。欧洲和美国并没有向第三世界国家的农产品开放它们的市场，而第三世界国家可提供的又只有农产品。欧美国家在强迫第三世界国家撤销后者为发展其民族工业而设立的相关优惠，而在此同时，欧美国家却向本国的家场主提供大量的补贴。

自由市场思想原来只是新的剥削形式的一种托辞。“私有化”意味着，外国人可廉价购买发展中国家的矿产和石油。它意味着，他们可以从类似这样的垄断或类垄断当中谋取更多的利润。“自由化”意味着，他们可以从他们的放贷中获取更高的回报；当放贷失败时，I.M.F. 强迫损失社会化，即让所有人为其银行埋单。它也意味着，外国分司可以消灭新兴的行业，即打压创业者的发展。资本在流动，但劳动力却不能流动——除非一个人特有天赋，他可以在全求市场上谋得一分好工作。

当然，这种景象有点以偏概全。在亚洲，一直有人在抑制华盛顿共识。他们对资本的流动采取了多种限制。中国和印度这两位亚洲巨人，都采用各自的方式管理和经营它们的经济，并取得了前所未有的增长。但在其他地方，尤其那些受世界银行操纵的国家，情况却并没有好展。

今天，关于思想观念间的论争在到处蔓延。即使在发展境况已经很好的国家，一些受教育人士和权威人士也认为，当下的游戏规则并不公平；对身处发展中国家，发展境况并不好的弱势朋友，他们深表同情。

对于第三世界批评美国式资本主义的人士来说，美国对当下危机所做的反应只是最后的救命稻草。在十年前东亚发生金融危机期间，美国和I. M. F.要求那些遭受危机影响的国家通过消减支出来减少赤字。这种作法导致爱兹病在泰国等地重新复苏，而对象印尼这样的国家来说，这种作法意味着缩减对饥饿群体的食物补贴。美国和I.M.F.强迫这些国家提高它们的利率，有的甚至超过了50%。他们责备印尼对其银行的严管，要求印尼政府停止“救市”。它们“哀叹”：这开了一个多么糟糕的先例！这是对自由市场这座瑞士闹钟机制多么粗暴干涉！！

美国就对危机与当年对东亚危机的策略形成强烈的反差和对照，也并不是没有被人注意到。为了让美国摆脱危机，我们正亲历和目睹支出与旁大赤字的增长，利率甚至被降为零。银行正得到各种资助。而在华盛顿为应对美国危机出谋划策的一些人，正是当年处理过东亚危机的人。第三世界国家不禁要问，为美国何以要为自己开出不同的药方？

第三世界的许多人为多年来受到的伤害而感到寒心：他们应该接受美国的制度，效仿我们的政策，向美国银行开放他们的市场，以便他们能从中学到“好”的银行规则，在危机降临之时，以“跳楼”价（并非偶然地）将他们的公司和银行出售给美国。不错，华盛顿说，它是一种伤痛，但最终会更好。美国两头出击，把它的财长派往向世界各地。在发展中国家的许多人眼里，能让美国金融巨头天衣无缝地从华尔街迈向华盛顿，又从华盛顿转回华尔街的那扇十字转门，曾带给他们很高的信誉；这些人似乎把财富的权力与政治的权力结合在一起。美国的金融巨头相信，对美国或对世界有利的事情就有利于金融市场；在这一点上他们是正确的。但当他们认为对华尔街有利的事情也有利于美国或有利于世界时，他们却是错误的。

发展中国家认真仔细地审视美国经济的失败，其动机并不是出于幸灾乐祸，它们更多地是想要真正了解，究竟哪一种经济制度将对他们来说奏效。事实上，这些国家都倾向于看到美国经济在短期内快速复苏。他们清楚，他们付不起美国为复苏其经济所做的尝试和努力；他们明白，支出量增加也不会很快见效；他们知道，在未来几年里，美国衰退的余波将额外增加2亿贫困人口。他们越来越相信，美国所倡导的一切经济理念只能远离，不可亲近。

世界对美国式的资本主义模式感到失望，我们为什么应该对此在乎和关注呢? 我们提倡的意识形态已经失去昔日的光环，但这也许是一件好事，它诱蚀得已经不需要再进行修补了。如果每一个人都按着美国的路子走，即使这种作法能够行得通，那么我们还能够再存活下去吗？

毫无疑问，我们的影响将变小，我们不可能再被树为榜样，这种情况正在当下发生。美国曾是全球资本的中枢，因为其他国家相信，我们有应对风险、分配金融资源的专门人才。但现在没有人会这样认为了。汇聚当今世界大部积累的亚洲，已在建立它自己的金融中心。我们不再是资本资源的老大。世界头三大银行现在都是中国人的。美国的最大银行退居第5位。

长久以来，美元是储备货币，各国为增加对其货币和政府的信心而储备美元。但各国的中央银行现在渐渐看清，美元不再是好的价值储备。美元的价值已经在蒸发和下滑。此次危机发生后，美国债务猛长，加上联邦储备金监察小组的巨额借贷，将人们对美元前途的担忧推向高点。中国人已经公开叫板，提议另设一种新的储备货币，以取代美元。

与此同时，用于应对危机的支出，挤占了其他必须开支。对贫穷国家，我们很少慷慨解囊。但事情正变得更糟，中国对非洲的基础设施投资，已经远远超过世界银行与非洲发展银行投资的总合，从而让美国相形见绌。此次危机发生后，非洲国家跑向北京求助，而不是跑到华盛顿。

这我里更为关注的是观念领域的问题。我担心，发展中国家的许多人士在更为清楚地看到美国经济和社会制度的缺点后，他们将得出错误的结论。少数国家，包括美国自身，将很好地从中吸取教训。它们将意识到，成功需要一个能将市场与政府摆正的体制，在这种体制中，有一个强有力的国家在进行有效监管。它们意识到，特殊利益的权力必须被扼制。

但对许多其他国家来说，后果却很糟糕和极为可悲。前共产主义国家在其战后体制失败后，曾普遍转向市场资本主义，弥尔顿·弗里德曼取代马克思成为它们的上帝。新宗教也没有能帮它们把问题解决好。许多国家可能就此得出结论，这不但是那种没有约束的资本主义，即美国式的资本主义的失败，而且是市场经济这一观念的失败，认为市场经济在任何情况下都不可行。旧式的共产主义虽然将不会再被人们捡起，但各种形式的过分干预市场将会再度胎头。穷人饱受市场原教旨主义之苦，因为我们曾奉行的是财富由低层穷人流向顶端富人的经济学，而不是由顶端流向低层的经济学。但在这些新的政权体制下，穷人仍将饱受煎熬，因为新的政权体制将不会带来增长。如果没有发展，那里就不可能有可持续的减贫。不依重市场，就不会有成功的经济。贫穷滋生不满。衰退最终难以避免，无论采取什么措施也无法解决，尤其是那些因为民众对美国式资本主义愤恨而上台的政府，将会导致更大的贫困。全球稳定和美国安全的重要性显而易见。

美国与受过美式教育的全球精英们曾共享一些共同的价值观。经济危机让这些精英们威信扫地。我们已经给那些反对美国的腐化资本主义的批评家们提供了充足弹药，从而去广泛宣传反对市场理论。我们还在继续给他们提供这样的弹药。在最近的G-20峰会上，我们承诺不奉行保护主义，但我们即在我们的刺激方案中加进了一项“只购买美国货”（ “buy American”）的条款。后来，为了缓解来自欧盟的反对，我们修改了这项条款，但在事实上却歧视了贫穷国家。全球化使我们更具依赖性；发生一个地区的事情，影响着世界上的另外一个地区，这一点已经被我们所遇到的经济困难以及由其引起的广泛影响所说明。要解决全球问题，就必须有一定的合作和信任，包括分享一些共同的价值观。但这种信任却从来没有牢固过，而且当下还正在被削弱。

另外一个恶果就是对民主的信心。在发展中国家，人们在注视着华盛顿，在思考它的政府管理体制。人们看到的是，华盛顿及其体制允许华尔街根据巨头们根据自身的利益书写规则，从而将风险加给整个全球经济；而危机一旦降临时，华盛顿又转向华尔街求助，索取经济复苏的药方。他们看到接二连三的重新分配，财富从普通民众那里源源不断地流向金字塔的顶端。总之，他们看到了在美国的民主制中存在的、有关政治责任（political accountability）的根本问题。在他们看清这一切后，距离得出“民主制本身是一个致命的错误，而且必将如此”这一结论仅一步之遥。

美国经济终久将复苏，我们海外的盟友也将如此。在很长一段时间里，美国仍将是最受世界敬仰的国度，我们仍将是最富有的国家。不管你喜欢还是不喜欢，我们的行为常被密切关注，我们的成功在被竞相模仿。但我们的失败常受到鄙视。这将我的话题又带回到弗兰西斯·福山。当他认为自由民主制和市场经济的力量终将胜利，且不可能再会有回头时，他错了。但当他相信民主和市场的力量是实现世界正义和世界繁荣的必要条件时，他是正确的。的这次经济危机在很大响度上是由美国的行为酿成，它对民主和市场等核心价值观的打击，远远大于任何极权体制曾对这些价值观曾经造成的损害。其实，世界可能正在朝历史的终结（目的）前进，我们现在只是航行在逆风段而已。

Wall Street’s Toxic Message

By Joseph E. Stiglitz. July 2009

Every crisis comes to an end—and, bleak as things seem now, the current economic crisis too shall pass. But no crisis, especially one of this severity, recedes without leaving a legacy. And among this one’s legacies will be a worldwide battle over ideas—over what kind of economic system is likely to deliver the greatest benefit to the most people. Nowhere is that battle raging more hotly than in the Third World, among the 80 percent of the world’s population that lives in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, 1.4 billion of whom subsist on less than $1.25 a day. In America, calling someone a socialist may be nothing more than a cheap shot. In much of the world, however, the battle between capitalism and socialism—or at least something that many Americans would label as socialism—still rages. While there may be no winners in the current economic crisis, there are losers, and among the big losers is support for American-style capitalism. This has consequences we’ll be living with for a long time to come.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, marked the end of Communism as a viable idea. Yes, the problems with Communism had been manifest for decades. But after 1989 it was hard for anyone to say a word in its defense. For a while, it seemed that the defeat of Communism meant the sure victory of capitalism, particularly in its American form. Francis Fukuyama went as far as to proclaim “the end of history,” defining democratic market capitalism as the final stage of social development, and declaring that all humanity was now heading in this direction. In truth, historians will mark the 20 years since 1989 as the short period of American triumphalism. With the collapse of great banks and financial houses, and the ensuing economic turmoil and chaotic attempts at rescue, that period is over. So, too, is the debate over “market fundamentalism,” the notion that unfettered markets, all by themselves, can ensure economic prosperity and growth. Today only the deluded would argue that markets are self-correcting or that we can rely on the self-interested behavior of market participants to guarantee that everything works honestly and properly.

The economic debate takes on particular potency in the developing world. Although we in the West tend to forget, 190 years ago one-third of the world’s gross domestic product was in China. But then, rather suddenly, colonial exploitation and unfair trade agreements, combined with a technological revolution in Europe and America, left the developing countries far behind, to the point where, by 1950, China’s economy constituted less than 5 percent of the world’s G.D.P. In the mid–19th century the United Kingdom and France actually waged a war to open China to global trade. This was the Second Opium War, so named because the West had little of value to sell to China other than drugs, which it had been dumping into Chinese markets, with the collateral effect of causing widespread addiction. It was an early attempt by the West to correct a balance-of-payments problem.

Colonialism left a mixed legacy in the developing world—but one clear result was the view among people there that they had been cruelly exploited. Among many emerging leaders, Marxist theory provided an interpretation of their experience; it suggested that exploitation was in fact the underpinning of the capitalist system. The political independence that came to scores of colonies after World War II did not put an end to economic colonialism. In some regions, such as Africa, the exploitation—the extraction of natural resources and the rape of the environment, all in return for a pittance—was obvious. Elsewhere it was more subtle. In many parts of the world, global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank came to be seen as instruments of post-colonial control. These institutions pushed market fundamentalism (“neoliberalism,” it was often called), a notion idealized by Americans as “free and unfettered markets.” They pressed for financial-sector deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization.

The World Bank and the I.M.F. said they were doing all this for the benefit of the developing world. They were backed up by teams of free-market economists, many from that cathedral of free-market economics, the University of Chicago. In the end, the programs of “the Chicago boys” didn’t bring the promised results. Incomes stagnated. Where there was growth, the wealth went to those at the top. Economic crises in individual countries became ever more frequent—there have been more than a hundred severe ones in the past 30 years alone.

Not surprisingly, people in developing countries became less and less convinced that Western help was motivated by altruism. They suspected that the free-market rhetoric—“the Washington consensus,” as it is known in shorthand—was just a cover for the old commercial interests. Suspicions were reinforced by the West’s own hypocrisy. Europe and America didn’t open up their own markets to the agricultural produce of the Third World, which was often all these poor countries had to offer. They forced developing countries to eliminate subsidies aimed at creating new industries, even as they provided massive subsidies to their own farmers.

Free-market ideology turned out to be an excuse for new forms of exploitation. “Privatization” meant that foreigners could buy mines and oil fields in developing countries at low prices. It meant they could reap large profits from monopolies and quasi-monopolies, such as in telecommunications. “Liberalization” meant that they could get high returns on their loans—and when loans went bad, the I.M.F. forced the socialization of the losses, meaning that the screws were put on entire populations to pay the banks back. It meant, too, that foreign firms could wipe out nascent industries, suppressing the development of entrepreneurial talent. While capital flowed freely, labor did not—except in the case of the most talented individuals, who found good jobs in a global marketplace.

This picture is, obviously, painted with too broad a brush. There were always those in Asia who resisted the Washington consensus. They put restrictions on capital flows. The giants of Asia—China and India—managed their economies their own way, producing unprecedented growth. But elsewhere, and especially in the countries where the World Bank and the I.M.F. held sway, things did not go well.

And everywhere, the debate over ideas continued. Even in countries that have done very well, there is a conviction among the educated and influential that the rules of the game have not been fair. They believe that they have done well despite the unfair rules, and they sympathize with their weaker friends in the developing world who have not done well at all.

Among critics of American-style capitalism in the Third World, the way that America has responded to the current economic crisis has been the last straw. During the East Asia crisis, just a decade ago, America and the I.M.F. demanded that the affected countries cut their deficits by cutting back expenditures—even if, as in Thailand, this contributed to a resurgence of the aids epidemic, or even if, as in Indonesia, this meant curtailing food subsidies for the starving. America and the I.M.F. forced countries to raise interest rates, in some cases to more than 50 percent. They lectured Indonesia about being tough on its banks—and demanded that the government not bail them out. What a terrible precedent this would set, they said, and what a terrible intervention in the Swiss-clock mechanisms of the free market.

The contrast between the handling of the East Asia crisis and the American crisis is stark and has not gone unnoticed. To pull America out of the hole, we are now witnessing massive increases in spending and massive deficits, even as interest rates have been brought down to zero. Banks are being bailed out right and left. Some of the same officials in Washington who dealt with the East Asia crisis are now managing the response to the American crisis. Why, people in the Third World ask, is the United States administering different medicine to itself?

Many in the developing world still smart from the hectoring they received for so many years: they should adopt American institutions, follow our policies, engage in deregulation, open up their markets to American banks so they could learn “good” banking practices, and (not coincidentally) sell their firms and banks to Americans, especially at fire-sale prices during crises. Yes, Washington said, it will be painful, but in the end you will be better for it. America sent its Treasury secretaries (from both parties) around the planet to spread the word. In the eyes of many throughout the developing world, the revolving door, which allows American financial leaders to move seamlessly from Wall Street to Washington and back to Wall Street, gave them even more credibility; these men seemed to combine the power of money and the power of politics. American financial leaders were correct in believing that what was good for America or the world was good for financial markets, but they were incorrect in thinking the converse, that what was good for Wall Street was good for America and the world.

It is not so much Schadenfreude that motivates the intense scrutiny by developing countries of America’s economic failure as it is a real need to discover what kind of economic system can work for them in the future. Indeed, these countries have every interest in seeing a quick American recovery. What they know is that they themselves cannot afford to do what America has done to attempt to revive its economy. They know that even this amount of spending isn’t working very fast. They know that the fallout from America’s downturn has moved 200 million additional people into poverty in the span of just a few years. And they are increasingly convinced that any economic ideals America may espouse are ideals to run from rather than embrace.

Why should we care that the world has become disillusioned with the American model of capitalism? The ideology that we promoted has been tarnished, but perhaps it is a good thing that it may be tarnished beyond repair. Can’t we survive—even do just as well—if not everyone adheres to the American way?

To be sure, our influence will diminish, as we are less likely to be held up as a role model, but that was happening in any case. America used to play a pivotal role in global capital, because others believed that we had a special talent for managing risk and allocating financial resources. No one thinks that now, and Asia—where much of the world’s saving occurs today—is already developing its own financial centers. We are no longer the chief source of capital. The world’s top three banks are now Chinese. America’s largest bank is down at the No. 5 spot.

The dollar has long been the reserve currency—countries held the dollar in order to back up confidence in their own currencies and governments. But it has gradually dawned on central banks around the world that the dollar may not be a good store of value. Its value has been volatile, and declining. The massive increase in America’s indebtedness during the current crisis, combined with the Federal Reserve Board’s massive lending, has heightened anxieties about the future of the dollar. The Chinese have openly floated the idea of inventing some new reserve currency to replace it.

Meanwhile, the cost of dealing with the crisis is crowding out other needs. We have never been generous in our assistance to poor countries. But matters are getting worse. In recent years, China’s infrastructure investment in Africa has been greater than that of the World Bank and the African Development Bank combined, and it dwarfs America’s. African countries are running to Beijing for assistance in this crisis, not to Washington.

But my concern here is more with the realm of ideas. I worry that, as they see more clearly the flaws in America’s economic and social system, many in the developing world will draw the wrong conclusions. A few countries—and maybe America itself—will learn the right lessons. They will realize that what is required for success is a regime where the roles of market and government are in balance, and where a strong state administers effective regulations. They will realize that the power of special interests must be curbed.

But, for many other countries, the consequences will be messier, and profoundly tragic. The former Communist countries generally turned, after the dismal failure of their postwar system, to market capitalism, replacing Karl Marx with Milton Friedman as their god. The new religion has not served them well. Many countries may conclude not simply that unfettered capitalism, American-style, has failed but that the very concept of a market economy has failed, and is indeed unworkable under any circumstances. Old-style Communism won’t be back, but a variety of forms of excessive market intervention will return. And these will fail. The poor suffered under market fundamentalism—we had trickle-up economics, not trickle-down economics. But the poor will suffer again under these new regimes, which will not deliver growth. Without growth there cannot be sustainable poverty reduction. There has been no successful economy that has not relied heavily on markets. Poverty feeds disaffection. The inevitable downturns, hard to manage in any case, but especially so by governments brought to power on the basis of rage against American-style capitalism, will lead to more poverty. The con?sequences for global stability and American security are obvious.

There used to be a sense of shared values between America and the American-educated elites around the world. The economic crisis has now undermined the credibility of those elites. We have given critics who opposed America’s licentious form of capitalism ample ammunition to preach a broader anti-market philosophy. And we keep giving them more and more ammunition. While we committed ourselves at a recent G-20 meeting not to engage in protectionism, we put a “buy American” provision into our own stimulus package. And then, to soften the opposition from our European allies, we modified that provision, in effect discriminating against only poor countries. Globalization has made us more interdependent; what happens in one part of the world affects those in another—a fact made manifest by the contagion of our economic difficulties. To solve global problems, there must be a sense of cooperation and trust, including a sense of shared values. That trust was never strong, and it is weakening by the hour.

Faith in democracy is another victim. In the developing world, people look at Washington and see a system of government that allowed Wall Street to write self-serving rules which put at risk the entire global economy—and then, when the day of reckoning came, turned to Wall Street to manage the recovery. They see continued re-distributions of wealth to the top of the pyramid, transparently at the expense of ordinary citizens. They see, in short, a fundamental problem of political accountability in the American system of democracy. After they have seen all this, it is but a short step to conclude that something is fatally wrong, and inevitably so, with democracy itself.

The American economy will eventually recover, and so, too, up to a point, will our standing abroad. America was for a long time the most admired country in the world, and we are still the richest. Like it or not, our actions are subject to minute examination. Our successes are emulated. But our failures are looked upon with scorn. Which brings me back to Francis Fukuyama. He was wrong to think that the forces of liberal democracy and the market economy would inevitably triumph, and that there could be no turning back. But he was not wrong to believe that democracy and market forces are essential to a just and prosperous world. The economic crisis, created largely by America’s behavior, has done more damage to these fundamental values than any totalitarian regime ever could have. Perhaps it is true that the world is heading toward the end of history, but it is now sailing against the wind, on a course we set ourselves.

Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize–winning economist, is a professor at Columbia University.

http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/07/third-world-debt200907