2011年7月12日
摘要
2001 年至2009 年国有及国有控股工业企业累计获得利润总额为58462 亿元，2009 年的账面利润总额比2001 年增长了3.89 倍；累计获得净利润为40517 亿元，2009 年的账面净利润比2001 年增长了4.37 倍。
2010 年，中央企业共实现利润13415 亿元，占国有企业利润总额的67.5%。2009 年，在央企实现的利润中，中国石油、中国移动、中国电信、中国联通和中国石化等10 家企业占到70%以上；其中，中石油和中移动分别实现1285.6 亿元和1484.7 亿元，仅这两家企业就超过了全部央企利润的三分之一。可见，国有企业的利润主要是由垄断企业实现的。
2001 年至2009 年，国有及国有控股工业企业平均的净资产收益率为8.16%，非国有工业企业平均的净资产收益率为12.9%。2009 年，非国有工业企业净资产收益率为15.59%，国有企业净资产收益率为8.18%。因此，国有及国有控股企业的名义绩效也不够高。
即使如此，国有企业表现出来的绩效并非其真实绩效，是国有企业在享受着种种政策优惠，和民营企业在不平等的经营环境下所体现出的绩效。这种不平等主要体现在政府财政补贴、融资成本和土地及资源租金等方面。
按工业用地价格3%的比例计算工业土地租金，2001~2009 年国有及国有控股工业企业共应缴纳地租25787 亿元，占国有及国有控股企业名义净利润总额的63.6%。如果再考虑商业服务用地，仅2008 年一年，国有企业就应交纳12065 亿元地租。
国有及国有控股工业企业平均实际利息率为1.6%，其它企业加权平均的实际利率（视为市场利率）则约为4.68%。若按照市场利率水平重新计算国有企业应支付利息，2001 到2009年利息支付差额共计约27539 亿元，占国有及国有控股工业企业名义净利润总额的68%。
石油的资源税平均仅为每吨26 元，加上按销售收入的1%计征的资源补偿费。我国对石油征收的资源租金不足价格的2%；远低于我国向合资企业征收的12.5%的比例。即使加征了特别收益金，也不能完全实现资源所有者的权益。2001 年至2009 年，国有及国有控股工业企业少交纳的石油资源租金约为2437 亿元。加上天然气和煤炭等自然资源，国有及国有控股工业企业在2001 年至2009 年间共少交纳资源租金约4977 亿元。
从1994 年至2006 年，国家财政用于国企亏损的补贴达到了3653 亿元。据不完全统计，2007 年至2009 年，国有及国有控股工业企业获得财政补贴约为1943 亿元。
从账面财务数据中还原企业的真实成本，并对政府补贴予以扣除，从而测算国有企业的真实绩效。据测算，2001 年至2009 年，国有及国有控股工业企业平均真实净资产收益率则为-1.47%。
2008 年，国有企业人员的人均工资比其他单位高17.1%，比社会平均水平高13.7%；人均劳动者报酬分别比私营企业高62%，比非国有企业高35%。2009 年只有小幅回落。行业间存在巨大差异。2008 年，垄断行业职工人均年收入达12.85 万元，约为当年全国在岗职工年平均工资18364 元的7 倍。在收入最高的5 个工业行业中国有企业的比重最高，在收入最低的5 个工业行业中国有企业比重最小。
按照现行的公积金制度规定，职工和单位公积金缴存比例均不得低于职工上一年度月平均工资的5%，原则上不高于12%。不少垄断行业的国企和事业机关将这一比例提升到20%。网通运营公司全额计提41.42 亿元，一次性现金住房补贴。国有企业利用国家无偿划拨的用地进行单位集资建房。企业购买市场上的商品房，以较低的价格出售给本企业员工。
2007~2009 年，992 家国企所得税的平均税负为10%，民企的平均税负达到24%。
自1994 年至2007 年，国有企业没有上交一分钱利润。2009 年，国有企业利润上缴比例仅约6%，其余利润都在企业内部分配。2010 年，该比例降至2.2%。而央企上缴的红利目前主要在央企体系内部转移，尚没有体现出惠及民众的意义。
我国存在结构性的国进民退现象。从资金的角度来看，电力蒸汽热水生产供应业的国有比重从2005 年的85.8%上升到2008 年的88.2%。从工业总产值的角度来看，电力蒸汽热水生产供应业的国有比重从2005 年的89.3%上升到2008 年的91.7%。石油和天然气开采业的国有比重从2005 年的90.5%上升到2006 年的98.9%。
用市场力量的指标对各个行业的垄断程度进行了定量分析表明，在有色金属冶炼及压延加工业，烟草制品业，石油加工、炼焦及核燃料加工业和电气机械与器材制造等行业中，2007年的垄断程度比2002 年有显著增加。这些行业与国有企业比重增大的行业有很大重合。
通过对国家部委官员的履历统计发现，在19 个部委的183 名副部级以上官员当中，具有国有企业工作经历的就有56 人，比重达到30.6%。通过对123 家中央企业的高管履历统计发现，在有信息披露的47 家企业当中，一共有115 名高管具有政府工作背景，平均每家企业达到2.45 人。因而，存在国企管理层与官员之间的身份互换。
企业高管通过进入政府获取政策与资源；政府官员进入企业兑现在位时的经济收益。
行政部门拥有制订法律的实施条例、指导意见和部门规定等权利，即实际上存在“行政立法”；企业管理层无需游说立法机关，只需游说行政部门即可，即存在“院内活动”。
国有企业应当存在较为明确的边界，其适合于市场机制不能得到充分发挥的公共品和准公共品的提供。尤其当政府成为唯一买家或者生产过程需要严格控制的产品，应当由国有企业提供，其他产品则由民营经济提供。国有企业存在的条件，是在提供公共物品时，融资阶段和生产阶段不可分离。
国有企业是不同于一般政府和一般企业的公共机构。国有企业不应以营利为目标，应以实现社会公益为目标。
我国已有的国有企业改革的实质是国有资产的资本化，即通过对国有资产的经营而获取利润。因此，当国有资产不断显现资本的属性，政府也就逐渐成为人格化或机构化的资本。
国有资产资本化，尤其在我国经济转型的初期，不仅具有逻辑的必然性，而且具有推动市场化的积极意义。然而，随着我国市场经济的建立，以国有资产资本化为特征的国有企业改革，其历史使命将告终结。
国有企业的近期改革方案，应当围绕打破国有企业的行政垄断，取消国有企业无偿或低价占有和耗费国有资源的特权，规范国有企业的行为等重要方面而设计。其意义在于，促进不同经济主体充分、公平地展开经济竞争，从而更好地实现我国的社会正义，提高经济效率。
国有企业的终极改革目标有两个：其一，将国有企业转变为非营利性公法企业；其二，建立国有资产的宪政治理架构。
为实现国有企业的终极改革目标，国企必须从营利性领域（而不单是从竞争性领域）中逐步退出。
Abstract
The state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises made a total profit of 5846.2 billion yuan from 2001 to 2009, with the total book profit of 2009 increased by 3.89 times over that of 2001. The total net profit amounted to 4051.7 billion yuan, with the total book net profit of 2009 increased by 4.37 times over that of 2001.
The total profit of central enterprises reached 1341.5 billion yuan in 2010, accounting for 67.5% of the total profit of state-owned enterprises. The profits of ten enterprises occupied 70% of all net profits made by central enterprises in 2009, namely, China National Petroleum Corporation, China Mobile Limited, China Telecommunications Corporation, China United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd., China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation. Hereinto, China National Petroleum Corporation and China Mobile Limited made a profit of 128.56 billion yuan and 148.47 billion yuan respectively, the total of which exceeds one third of the total profit made by central enterprises. It can be seen that profits of central enterprises were mainly realized by monopoly enterprises.
From 2001 to 2009, the average return on equity of state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises was 8.16%, while that of industrial enterprises above designated size was 12.9%. 2009，that of the former is 8.18%, while that of the latter is 15.59%. Therefore, the nominal performance of state-owned and state-holding enterprises was not high enough.
Even the performance of state-owned enterprises is not their real performance, but one after enjoying various preferential policies and under such a management environment which is unfair to non-stated-owned enterprises. The unfairness is mainly embodied in fiscal subsidy by the government, financing cost, and land and resource rent, and so on.
If we compute the industrial land rent at 3% of the price of the industrial land, state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises should pay a total rent of 3931.2 billion yuan from 2001 to 2009, accounting for 67.2% of the total nominal profits made by state-owned and state-holding enterprises. Only in 2008, the state-owned enterprises should pay 1210.4 billion yuan rent for the land if we add the land for commercial and service use into the whole amount.
The real interest rate for state-owned and state-holding enterprises is 1.6%, while that market interest rate is 4.68%. If we recount the interests which should paid by state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises with the market interest rate, the total interest difference will be 2296.7 billion yuan from 2001 to 2008, accounting for 47% of the total nominal profits made by state-owned and state-holding enterprises.
The resource tax of oil is average only 26 yuan per ton. The resource compensation fee is merely 1% of sales revenue. Therefore, the real royalty of oil in China is less than 2% of its price, far below the ratio of 12.5% which is imposed on the capital venture in China. Even collection proportion for special oil gain levy below 40 dollars is too low to fully realize interests of resource owners. From 2001 to 2009, the state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises lack to pay 243.7 billion yuan of the oil royalty. Together with those of coal and natural gas, the state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises lack to pay 497.7 billion yuan of royalty of resources..
From 1994 to 2006, the state fiscal subsidy for the losses of state-owned enterprises accumulated to 365.3 billion yuan. According to incomplete data, from 2007 to 2009, the state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises received fiscal subsidy is about 194.3 billion yuan.
The real performance of state-owned enterprises can be estimated through deducting those costs without paid but should be paid and governmental subsidies, together achieving about 7491.4 billion yuans, from nominal profit of the state-owned enterprises. According to our estimation, the average real return on equity of state-owned and state-holding enterprises from 2001 to 2009 is -6.29%.
In 2008, the average staff wage of state-owned enterprises was 17. % higher than that of other organizations, their average labor income is 63% higher than that of private enterprises and 36% higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises. There is a big difference between the industries. 2008, the average income per year of employees in monopolistic industries reached 128.5 thousand yuan, which is about 7 times as that of the employees in the whole country. The ratio of the state-owned enterprises in 5 industries with highest income is highest, while that in 5 industries with lowest income is lowest.
According to regulations of existing housing provident fund system, the housing provident fund deposit ratio paid and deposited by staff themselves as well as that paid and deposited by units should be no less than 5% of the staff’s average monthly salary of the previous year, and no more than 12% in principle. A large number of state-owned enterprises and institutions of monopoly industries, however, raise this ratio to 20%. China Netcom Operations Limited once accrued 4.142 billion yuan at total amount as lump-sum cash housing allowance. State-owned enterprises also conduct residential building construction with raised funds on gratis land from free allocation by the state. In addition, some enterprises purchase commercial residential buildings and sell them to their own staff and workers at low price.
From 2007 to 2009, the average tax burden of 992 state-owned enterprises was 10%, while that of private enterprises was as high as 24%.
State-owned enterprises did not turn over any profits from 1994 to 2007. In 2009, only 6% of state-owned enterprises’ profits were turned over, and the rest was all distributed within enterprises. In 2010, it decreases to 2.2%. Moreover, dividend turnover by central enterprises mainly transfers within the central enterprise system. Their significance in benefiting the common people has not been embodied yet.
Structural “Guo Jin Min Tui” phenomenon currently exists in our country. In terms of capital, the proportion of state-owned enterprises in electric power, steam, and hot water production and supply industries rose from 85.8% in 2005 to 88.2% in 2008. In terms of gross industrial output value, the proportion of state-owned enterprises in electric power, steam, and hot water production and supply industries increased from 90.5% in 2005 to 98.9% in 2008.
The quantitive analysis with the term, market power, on the monopolistic levels of industries shows that colored metal smelting and pressing industry, tobacco industry, oil processing industry, coking industry, nuclear fuel industry, and electric machinery industry, and so on, the monopolistic level in 2007 is higher than that in 2002. These industries are overlapped very much with those with higher ratio of the state-owned enterprises.
A resume survey of officials of ministries and commissions under the State Council shows that among 183 officials above vice ministerial level of 19 ministries and commissions, 56 people have working experiences in state-owned enterprises, the proportion for which is as high as 30.6%. In addition, a resume survey of senior executives of 123 central enterprises shows that 115 senior administrators of 47 enterprises with information disclosure have government working background, that is, each enterprise has an average of 2.45 people with such background. Therefore, identity exchange exists between management staff of state-owned enterprises and government officials.
Enterprise senior executives enter the government for policies and resources, while governmental officials enter enterprises to materialize their economic profits earned while in the position.
Administrative departments have rights to formulate regulations on the implementation of laws, instruction opinions, and departmental regulations, i.e. In other words, administrative legislation exists. Enterprise management needs to lobby the administrative departments instead of the legislature. In other words, there are “lobbying within the house.”
State-owned enterprises should have a rather clear boundary that they are suitable for production of public goods and quasi public goods in which market mechanism could not be brought into full play. Products which are purchased solely by governments or which should be stringently controlled during production progress should be supplied by state-owned enterprises, while other products should be supplied by private economy. The condition for existence of state-owned enterprises is when they supply public goods and the financing stage and can not be separated from the production stage.
The state-owned enterprise is a public organization different from ordinary governments or enterprises, whose aim is to realize public good of society rather than to make profits.
The nature of China’s current state-owned enterprise reform is capitalization of state-owned assets, that is, making profits through management of state-owned assets. Therefore, the government gradually turns into personalized or institutionalized capital when state-owned assets constantly show the attributes of capital.
As the main content of China’s market-oriented reform, the reform orientation choice of state-owned assets capitalization had both logical inevitability and historical progressiveness especially at the primary stage of China’s economic transition. However, with the establishment of market economy in our country, the historical mission of state-owned enterprise reform characterized by state-owned assets capitalization is about to come to an end.
We should design the short-term reform plan for state-owned enterprises based on two major objectives, namely, breaking the administrative monopoly by state-owned enterprises, and regulating state-owned enterprises’ behaviors. The significance lies in that this will promote different economic main bodies to carry out adequate and fair economic competition, thus better realizing social justice and improving economic efficiency.
State-owned enterprise reform has two ultimate goals. The first goal is to change state-owned enterprises into non-profit public law enterprises, and the second one is to build up the constitutional governance framework for state-owned assets.
To realize the ultimate goal of reform, state-owned enterprises have to gradually retreat from the profit-making fields (rather than merely the competitive fields).
目录
前言
第一章 国有企业改革的理论与过程
一、 国有企业以“放权让利”为主要特征的改革
二、 国有企业以“两权分离”为主要特征的改革
三、 国有企业以“建立现代企业制度”为主要特征的改革
四、 国有企业改革过程中的政策推动
五、 总结
第二章 国有资产及企业的分类
一、 按资产性质划分
二、 按归口管理划分
第三章 国有企业的当下表现（一）：效率
一、关于国有企业效率研究的综述
二、本报告对效率的基本研究取向
三、国有及国有控股工业企业的名义绩效
四、还原：应付未付成本与补贴
五、关于“企业办社会”和“退休职工负担”的讨论
六、国有及国有控股工业企业的真实绩效
七、小结
第四章 国有企业的当下表现（二）：分配
一、从国民收入角度分析补贴与应交未交成本对分配的影响
二、国有企业员工的货币收入及非货币收入
三、国有企业高层管理者的收入与其它类型企业的比较
四、国有企业的税负与其它类型企业的比较
五、国有企业的利润上交和分红情况
六、小结
第五章 国进民退及对市场竞争的影响
——对中国当下“国进”本质的分析及案例研究
一、 近年来国有企业“进”“退”的特征
二、 “国进”的典型案例
三、 对“国进”现象的分析
第六章 国有企业对宏观经济的影响
一、 国有资本整合与经济脆性
二、 国有企业当下表现对房地产市场的影响
三、 国有企业当下表现对金融市场的影响：以证券市场为例
四、 国有企业行为对大宗商品的影响
五、 总结
第七章 对国有企业当下表现的政治经济学分析
一、 国有企业当下问题的历史起点
二、 九十年代初国有企业的制度状态
三、 国有企业扭曲制度环境下的管理层利益集团
四、 国有企业管理者与官员的身份互换
五、 国有企业管理层的“院内活动”
六、 我国的政府部门的宪政缺陷：“部门立法”
第八章 国有企业的性质：经济学视角
一、 企业的性质
二、 国家的性质
三、 国有企业的性质
四、 国有企业的边界
五、 国有企业与政府之间的宪政关系
第九章 国有企业的性质：法学视角
一、 国企作为特殊的公共机构
二、 国企作为特殊公共机构的规范意义
三、 重申国企公共性质对于中国国企改革的战略意义
四、 余论
第十章 重新界定下的国有企业的深化改革
一、 对国有企业改革的反思与评论
二、 国有企业的近期改革方案
三、 国有企业的终极改革目标
参考文献
附录
分报告之一：对国有企业使命的评论
分报告之二：国资委的职权与角色冲突
分报告之三：我国工业与商业用地的地租缺失
分报告之四：国有企业相关政策的演变
下载《国有企业的性质、表现与改革》（第三次修订版）全文 PDF 或者 WORD 文档。
Faced with the ceaseless stream of news about war, crime, and terrorism, one could easily think we live in the most violent age ever seen. Yet as New York Times bestselling author Steven Pinker shows in this startling and engaging new work, just the opposite is true: violence has been diminishing for millennia and we may be living in the most peaceful time in our species’s existence. For most of history, war, slavery, infanticide, child abuse, assassinations, pogroms, gruesome punishments, deadly quarrels, and genocide were ordinary features of life. But today, Pinker shows (with the help of more than a hundred graphs and maps) all these forms of violence have dwindled and are widely condemned. How has this happened?
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